本文選題：終極控制人 + 控制權(quán)��； 參考：《吉林大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：本文為了進一步揭示控制權(quán)和現(xiàn)金流權(quán)分離之謎,考慮最終控制人的控制權(quán)的基礎(chǔ)規(guī)模,深入研究控制權(quán)與企業(yè)業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系,以揭示不同情況下企業(yè)面臨的多重代理問題對業(yè)績產(chǎn)生的疊加作用。在此基礎(chǔ)上本文借鑒文獻中已有的超額控制權(quán)概念來代表控制權(quán)超過現(xiàn)金流權(quán)的程度,借鑒隧道效應和支持效應的研究結(jié)論,深入討論超額控制權(quán)對企業(yè)業(yè)績的影響。并通過超額控制權(quán)對資金侵占的研究,從行為層面為進一步驗證超額控制權(quán)與企業(yè)業(yè)績之間的關(guān)系。本文研究結(jié)果表明,控制權(quán)集中度較低時,經(jīng)理人與股東之間的矛盾占主導,提高終極控制人控制權(quán)有利于加強對管理者的監(jiān)管,從而提高企業(yè)業(yè)績;控制權(quán)集中度較高時,控股股東與中小股東之間的矛盾凸顯。最終控制人有動機且有能力侵占中小股東的利益,導致企業(yè)業(yè)績降低;由于國有企業(yè)最終控制人受到各級政府部門的績效考核、監(jiān)督管理,并且其政治晉升路徑與企業(yè)業(yè)績掛鉤,因此國有企業(yè)最終控制人侵占資產(chǎn)的程度較弱;超額控制權(quán)對企業(yè)業(yè)績有倒U型關(guān)系,其中控制權(quán)基礎(chǔ)規(guī)模越大,侵占程度越嚴重;此外,超額控制權(quán)與資金侵占間呈U型關(guān)系�？偟膩碚f,本文的研究基于三種不同類型的委托代理問題,明確了控制權(quán)基礎(chǔ)規(guī)模差異影響最終控制人對企業(yè)業(yè)績的作用機理,并檢驗超額控制權(quán)、資金侵占對業(yè)績的影響。為了控制控股股東的侵占行為,保護投資者利益,我國必須完善法律保護制度,提高大股東侵占中小股東利益的成本;針對控制權(quán)基礎(chǔ)規(guī)模的差異、最終控制人性質(zhì)的差異,有側(cè)重的運用不同監(jiān)管措施與治理方法。該結(jié)論為研究中小股東利益保護機制和公司治理提供了一個全新的視角。
[Abstract]:In order to further reveal the riddle of the separation of control and cash flow right, this paper considers the basic scale of the control right of the ultimate controller, and deeply studies the relationship between the control right and the performance of the firm. In order to reveal the effect of multiple agency problems on performance in different situations. On this basis, this paper draws lessons from the concept of excess control in the literature to represent the degree of control exceeding the cash flow right, draws on the research conclusions of tunnel effect and support effect, and discusses the influence of excess control on enterprise performance in depth. The relationship between excess control and corporate performance is further verified from the behavioral level through the study of excess control rights on capital encroachment. The results show that when the concentration of control is low, the contradiction between managers and shareholders is dominant, and the improvement of ultimate control rights is conducive to strengthening the supervision of managers, thus improving the performance of enterprises; when the concentration of control is high, The contradiction between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders is prominent. The ultimate controller is motivated and able to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders, leading to a decline in the performance of the enterprise; since the ultimate controller of the state-owned enterprise is subject to the performance appraisal of government departments at all levels, And its political promotion path is linked to the enterprise performance, so the extent of the state-owned enterprise's ultimate controller encroaching on the assets is weaker, the excess control right has the inverted U-shape relation to the enterprise's performance, and the bigger the control right base is, the more serious the encroachment degree is. In addition, there is a U-type relationship between excess control and capital encroachment. In a word, based on three different types of principal-agent problems, this paper clarifies the mechanism of the effect of controlling power base scale difference on the performance of enterprise, and tests the influence of excess control right and capital encroachment on performance. In order to control the expropriation behavior of controlling shareholders and protect the interests of investors, our country must perfect the legal protection system, increase the cost of the large shareholders encroaching on the interests of the minority shareholders, and aim at the difference of the basic scale of the control right and the difference of the nature of the controlling person. With emphasis on the use of different regulatory measures and governance methods. The conclusion provides a new perspective for the study of the protection mechanism of minority shareholders' interests and corporate governance.
【學位授予單位】：吉林大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F275

【參考文獻】

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本文編號：2067375