本文選題：股權(quán)激勵(lì) + 國(guó)有企業(yè)�。� 參考：《經(jīng)濟(jì)縱橫》2017年03期

【摘要】：國(guó)有企業(yè)的性質(zhì)與高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)存在一定沖突,且股權(quán)激勵(lì)本身所固有的缺陷使其在我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)改革實(shí)踐中沒(méi)能有效激勵(lì)國(guó)企高管,反而產(chǎn)生許多不利于國(guó)有企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)發(fā)展的問(wèn)題。西方國(guó)家的理論研究和實(shí)踐表明,股權(quán)激勵(lì)不僅在理論上存在諸多問(wèn)題,在實(shí)踐中更是導(dǎo)致高管腐敗頻發(fā),引起"超級(jí)經(jīng)理人崛起"并加劇了社會(huì)收入不平等。因此,股權(quán)激勵(lì)并非國(guó)企高管長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)制度的唯一選擇,混合所有制改革也并不意味著鼓勵(lì)實(shí)行國(guó)企高管股權(quán)激勵(lì)。我國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)高管薪酬制度設(shè)計(jì)應(yīng)堅(jiān)持以企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)指標(biāo)作為長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)的評(píng)價(jià)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)、兼顧國(guó)有企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)目標(biāo)與社會(huì)目標(biāo)、薪酬激勵(lì)與非薪酬激勵(lì)相結(jié)合等原則,結(jié)合國(guó)有企業(yè)自身特點(diǎn)、發(fā)揮自身優(yōu)勢(shì),更多地將長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)與企業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)績(jī)效聯(lián)系起來(lái),合理選擇高管長(zhǎng)期激勵(lì)方式。
[Abstract]:There are some conflicts between the nature of the state-owned enterprises and the executive equity incentive, and the inherent defects of the equity incentive itself make it unable to effectively motivate the state-owned enterprise executives in the practice of state-owned enterprise reform in our country. On the contrary, many problems are unfavorable to the management and development of state-owned enterprises. The theoretical research and practice in western countries show that equity incentive not only has many problems in theory, but also leads to frequent corruption of executives in practice, which causes the rise of "super managers" and exacerbates social income inequality. Therefore, equity incentive is not the only option for long-term incentive system, and mixed ownership reform does not mean to encourage the implementation of state-owned executives equity incentive. The design of executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises in China should adhere to the evaluation standard of long-term incentive based on the enterprise management index, taking into account the economic and social objectives of state-owned enterprises, the combination of salary incentive and non-salary incentive, and so on. Combining with the characteristics of state-owned enterprises, giving full play to their own advantages, more long-term incentive and enterprise performance will be linked together, reasonable choice of long-term incentives for senior executives.
【作者單位】： 中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F272.92;F276.1

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