本文選題：經(jīng)理人薪酬 + 經(jīng)理人聲譽��； 參考：《商業(yè)研究》2017年05期

【摘要】：以促進(jìn)技術(shù)創(chuàng)新為主旨的價值創(chuàng)造是衡量公司治理有效性的重要維度,本文運用2011-2014年的中國上市公司平衡面板數(shù)據(jù),從價值分配與價值創(chuàng)造的視角分析創(chuàng)新績效與經(jīng)理人薪酬及聲譽水平的關(guān)系。結(jié)果表明:財務(wù)績效與經(jīng)理人薪酬水平顯著正相關(guān),對經(jīng)理人聲譽卻沒有顯著影響;創(chuàng)新績效對經(jīng)理人薪酬及聲譽能夠產(chǎn)生影響,但不同類型的創(chuàng)新績效作用有所差異,突破性創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出越多,經(jīng)理人聲譽水平越高,漸進(jìn)性創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)出越多,經(jīng)理人薪酬水平越高;產(chǎn)權(quán)性質(zhì)對上述兩組關(guān)系具有顯著的調(diào)節(jié)效應(yīng)。因此,通過經(jīng)理人薪酬及聲譽契約的合理設(shè)計,以引導(dǎo)其進(jìn)行有效的技術(shù)創(chuàng)新決策是提高企業(yè)創(chuàng)新能力的重要途徑。
[Abstract]:Value creation with the aim of promoting technological innovation is an important dimension to measure the effectiveness of corporate governance. This paper uses the balance panel data of Chinese listed companies from 2011-2014.From the perspective of value distribution and value creation, this paper analyzes the relationship between innovation performance and managers' compensation and reputation level.The results show that the financial performance is positively correlated with the salary level of the manager, but it has no significant effect on the reputation of the manager, innovation performance can affect the compensation and reputation of the manager, but different types of innovative performance have different effects.The more the breakthrough innovation output, the higher the manager reputation level, the more incremental innovation output, the higher the manager compensation level, and the more the property right nature has a significant regulatory effect on the relationship between these two groups.Therefore, it is an important way to improve the innovation ability of enterprises through the reasonable design of managers' compensation and reputation contracts to guide them to make effective technological innovation decisions.
【作者單位】： 山東大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金青年項目“高管激勵契約整合與中小上市公司成長:基于技術(shù)創(chuàng)新動態(tài)能力的中介效應(yīng)”,項目編號:71302089;國家自然科學(xué)基金面上項目“上市公司高管激勵契約配置與協(xié)同——基于多層次情境因素的研究”,項目編號:71272120 山東大學(xué)人文社科青年團(tuán)隊項目,項目編號:IFYT17040
【分類號】：F272.92;F273.1

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