廣場協議后日本中央銀行金融政策
發(fā)布時間：2019-04-01 16:10
【摘要】：1985年廣場協議以來，日本經濟在內外環(huán)境的影響下，經歷了由泡沫膨脹到崩潰、再通過改革尋求恢復的過程。在此過程中，金融制度改革以及中央銀行即日本銀行的政策操作對實體經濟產生了什么作用和影響？其經驗教訓如何？是本文要探討的基本問題。 本文采用實證考察的方法，運用貨幣銀行學、國際協調論、群體行為心理學、社會行動論等相關理論分析工具，系統闡述了1985年至2006年日本中央銀行的金融政策及其制度改革。 根據這一時期日本經濟及金融政策的變化，正文的四章重點考察了中央銀行促生泡沫經濟的低利率政策、導致泡沫經濟破潰的高利率政策、救市護企的“最后貸款人”作用、制度變革期的零利率及量化寬松政策。 通過對廣場協議后日本銀行金融政策的詳盡剖析，可以得出結論性看法是：其一，泡沫經濟的膨脹與崩潰，皆與金融政策直接相關，中央銀行在利率調控的時機和力度把握上明顯存在問題。其二，以國家權力為背景，中央銀行在整頓金融秩序、解決不良貸款問題上發(fā)揮了“最后貸款人”作用。其三，與同一時期財政政策相對照，面對經濟發(fā)展長期低迷的狀況，中央銀行選擇了通貨穩(wěn)定的政策目標，從而保證了金融秩序的穩(wěn)定，恢復了面臨危機的金融信用。其四，以“金融大爆炸”改革為分界線，改革終結了戰(zhàn)后以來“護送船隊”式金融管理體制，中央銀行的獨立性增強。此外，通過我們的考察，國內外學者、政府與執(zhí)政黨經常提出基于各種目的的政策建議，，有些是日本銀行難以接受的，為此常常產生各種爭論。一般而言，這種爭論是必不可缺的，也有益于經濟理論的發(fā)展。但通過媒體的推波助瀾，肆意渲染以及帶有偏見的報道，則往往形成對日本銀行的輿論壓力。那么中央銀行應該恪守的底線是什么？或者說是那些建議是可以接受的，那些建議是絕對不能接受的。通過本文的實證研究得出的答案是，人為地引起通貨膨脹及近鄰貧困化政策是絕對不能接受的。 由于個別史料的不完備，對民間經濟人及學界對經濟形勢判斷，可能會出現以偏概全現象。由于筆者的學識不足，對問題的深度及廣度上的把握上深感力不從心。有待于在今后的研究中加以解決。
[Abstract]:Since 1985, under the influence of internal and external environment, Japan's economy has experienced the process of expanding from bubble to collapse, and then seeking recovery through reform. In this process, the reform of the financial system and the policy operation of the Central Bank of Japan (the Bank of Japan) have what effect and impact on the real economy? What are the lessons learned? It is the basic problem to be discussed in this paper. This paper systematically expounds the financial policy and system reform of the Central Bank of Japan from 1985 to 2006 by using the methods of empirical investigation, such as monetary and banking studies, international coordination theory, group behavior psychology, social action theory and other relevant theoretical analysis tools. According to the changes of Japan's economic and financial policies during this period, the four chapters of the text focus on the low interest rate policy of the central bank to promote the bubble economy, the high interest rate policy that led to the collapse of the bubble economy, and the role of the "lender of last resort" in rescuing the market protection enterprises. Zero interest rate and quantitative easing policy in the period of institutional change. Through a detailed analysis of the financial policy of the Bank of Japan after the Plaza Agreement, we can draw a conclusion: first, the expansion and collapse of the bubble economy are all directly related to the financial policy. The central bank has obvious problems in the timing and strength of interest rate control. Secondly, under the background of state power, the central bank plays the role of lender of last resort in rectifying the financial order and solving the problem of non-performing loans. Third, compared with the fiscal policy of the same period, in the face of the long-term economic development downturn, the central bank has chosen the policy objective of currency stability, thus ensuring the stability of the financial order and restoring the financial credit facing the crisis. Fourth, the "Financial Big Bang" reform as the demarcation line, the reform ended the post-war "escort fleet"-style financial management system, the independence of the central bank strengthened. In addition, through our investigation, scholars at home and abroad, the government and the ruling party often put forward policy recommendations based on various purposes, some of which are difficult to accept by the Japanese banks, which often lead to various disputes. In general, such arguments are indispensable and beneficial to the development of economic theory. But media-fuelled, wanton rendering and biased reporting tend to create public opinion pressure on the Bank of Japan. So what is the bottom line that the central bank should adhere to? Or those suggestions are acceptable, and those proposals are absolutely unacceptable. The answer to this empirical study is that it is absolutely unacceptable to artificially cause inflation and poverty in neighboring countries. Due to the imperfection of individual historical materials, it is possible to judge the economic situation of the folk economic man and the academic circles in a partial way. Due to the author's lack of knowledge, the depth and breadth of the problem can not be grasped. It needs to be solved in the future research.
【學位授予單位】：南開大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F833.13
本文編號：2451688
[Abstract]:Since 1985, under the influence of internal and external environment, Japan's economy has experienced the process of expanding from bubble to collapse, and then seeking recovery through reform. In this process, the reform of the financial system and the policy operation of the Central Bank of Japan (the Bank of Japan) have what effect and impact on the real economy? What are the lessons learned? It is the basic problem to be discussed in this paper. This paper systematically expounds the financial policy and system reform of the Central Bank of Japan from 1985 to 2006 by using the methods of empirical investigation, such as monetary and banking studies, international coordination theory, group behavior psychology, social action theory and other relevant theoretical analysis tools. According to the changes of Japan's economic and financial policies during this period, the four chapters of the text focus on the low interest rate policy of the central bank to promote the bubble economy, the high interest rate policy that led to the collapse of the bubble economy, and the role of the "lender of last resort" in rescuing the market protection enterprises. Zero interest rate and quantitative easing policy in the period of institutional change. Through a detailed analysis of the financial policy of the Bank of Japan after the Plaza Agreement, we can draw a conclusion: first, the expansion and collapse of the bubble economy are all directly related to the financial policy. The central bank has obvious problems in the timing and strength of interest rate control. Secondly, under the background of state power, the central bank plays the role of lender of last resort in rectifying the financial order and solving the problem of non-performing loans. Third, compared with the fiscal policy of the same period, in the face of the long-term economic development downturn, the central bank has chosen the policy objective of currency stability, thus ensuring the stability of the financial order and restoring the financial credit facing the crisis. Fourth, the "Financial Big Bang" reform as the demarcation line, the reform ended the post-war "escort fleet"-style financial management system, the independence of the central bank strengthened. In addition, through our investigation, scholars at home and abroad, the government and the ruling party often put forward policy recommendations based on various purposes, some of which are difficult to accept by the Japanese banks, which often lead to various disputes. In general, such arguments are indispensable and beneficial to the development of economic theory. But media-fuelled, wanton rendering and biased reporting tend to create public opinion pressure on the Bank of Japan. So what is the bottom line that the central bank should adhere to? Or those suggestions are acceptable, and those proposals are absolutely unacceptable. The answer to this empirical study is that it is absolutely unacceptable to artificially cause inflation and poverty in neighboring countries. Due to the imperfection of individual historical materials, it is possible to judge the economic situation of the folk economic man and the academic circles in a partial way. Due to the author's lack of knowledge, the depth and breadth of the problem can not be grasped. It needs to be solved in the future research.
【學位授予單位】：南開大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F833.13
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