【摘要】：銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為在金融領(lǐng)域的研究受到廣泛關(guān)注，但傳統(tǒng)研究主要側(cè)重于資本監(jiān)管、市場(chǎng)約束等外部視角，較少考慮銀行內(nèi)部的委托代理問(wèn)題。2007年美國(guó)金融危機(jī)的爆發(fā)，使得人們從公司治理視角反思銀行冒險(xiǎn)行為的內(nèi)在動(dòng)力，也使得銀行治理與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的關(guān)系成為亟待研究的重要命題之一。自2004年以來(lái)，我國(guó)正在著力深化商業(yè)銀行的股份制改造與公司治理改革，在這樣的背景下研究中國(guó)商業(yè)銀行所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、治理機(jī)制與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的關(guān)系顯得尤為重要。 本文基于股東與債權(quán)人共同治理的視角，研究轉(zhuǎn)型制度背景下所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制對(duì)我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的影響。首先，從銀行治理的特殊性出發(fā)分析了多重代理沖突下銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的決定，結(jié)合轉(zhuǎn)型制度背景提出所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制影響銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的OGR分析框架，揭示銀行所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的傳導(dǎo)路徑及作用機(jī)理；然后，以我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行為樣本對(duì)所有權(quán)集中、境外戰(zhàn)略引資影響銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制及所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響市場(chǎng)約束、資本監(jiān)管進(jìn)而影響銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的外部治理機(jī)制進(jìn)行實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)。 本文的主要貢獻(xiàn)及創(chuàng)新如下： ①提出了所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的OGR分析框架，揭示了多重代理沖突下銀行所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的傳導(dǎo)路徑和作用機(jī)理�，F(xiàn)有銀行治理文獻(xiàn)主要集中于討論內(nèi)部治理對(duì)績(jī)效的影響，不能揭示出銀行價(jià)值創(chuàng)造背后所承擔(dān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)水平；而金融學(xué)關(guān)于銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的研究主要基于資本監(jiān)管、市場(chǎng)約束等外部視角，忽視了內(nèi)部代理問(wèn)題的存在，削弱了對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的解釋力度。本文將公司治理理論與金融學(xué)理論結(jié)合起來(lái)探討了多重代理沖突下銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的決定，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為是股東資產(chǎn)替代問(wèn)題與內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制共同作用的結(jié)果，并在此基礎(chǔ)上將以所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)為核心的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制與資本監(jiān)管、市場(chǎng)約束等外部機(jī)制整合起來(lái)，結(jié)合我國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)型制度背景，構(gòu)建了所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響內(nèi)外部治理機(jī)制進(jìn)而影響銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的OGR分析框架，從而揭示出多重代理沖突下轉(zhuǎn)型銀行所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的傳導(dǎo)路徑和作用機(jī)理。這一研究突出了股東資產(chǎn)替代問(wèn)題與內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制的共同作用，考慮了轉(zhuǎn)型制度背景與銀行治理的特殊性，有助于豐富轉(zhuǎn)型國(guó)家銀行治理與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的理論研究。 ②證實(shí)了境外戰(zhàn)略投資者對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的約束作用以及戰(zhàn)略引資效應(yīng)在不同類別銀行中存在的差異�，F(xiàn)有研究對(duì)于銀行境外戰(zhàn)略引資效應(yīng)的分析側(cè)重于討論境外戰(zhàn)略投資者對(duì)銀行績(jī)效的影響，無(wú)法反映出境外戰(zhàn)略引資對(duì)銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的直接影響，且忽視了戰(zhàn)略引資效果在不同類型銀行之間存在的差異。本文結(jié)合我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行境外戰(zhàn)略引資背景，分析了境外戰(zhàn)略投資者對(duì)銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的影響及其在國(guó)有控股銀行、股份制商業(yè)銀行、城市商業(yè)銀行之間存在的差異。這一研究從從銀行經(jīng)營(yíng)行為的角度驗(yàn)證了境外戰(zhàn)略引資政策的有效性，與現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)相比突出了戰(zhàn)略引資效應(yīng)的差異性，為制定差別化的戰(zhàn)略引資監(jiān)管政策提供了經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)，且采用行為指標(biāo)比績(jī)效能更直接地反映外資股東對(duì)管理層經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)的影響，從而更直接地反映了銀行改制的效果。 ③揭示了所有權(quán)集中度與市場(chǎng)約束共同影響銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的作用機(jī)理�，F(xiàn)有關(guān)于市場(chǎng)約束效應(yīng)的研究?jī)A向于把銀行視為“黑箱”，不考慮內(nèi)部委托代理問(wèn)題的影響，且不考慮股權(quán)集中條件下大股東的治理作用。本文基于股東與債權(quán)人共同治理的視角，結(jié)合中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)型經(jīng)濟(jì)條件下銀行所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的特征，構(gòu)建委托代理模型分析了存款保險(xiǎn)制度下銀行額外風(fēng)險(xiǎn)補(bǔ)貼與債權(quán)人監(jiān)督強(qiáng)度的關(guān)系，并以我國(guó)上市商業(yè)銀行為樣本對(duì)所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、市場(chǎng)約束與銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的關(guān)系進(jìn)行了實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)，證實(shí)了所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)影響外部治理機(jī)制進(jìn)而影響銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的作用機(jī)制。與現(xiàn)有文獻(xiàn)相比，這一研究突出了大股東道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)與債權(quán)人市場(chǎng)約束之間的相互作用，，揭示了轉(zhuǎn)型背景下政府股東既通過(guò)直接持股控制風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為又通過(guò)強(qiáng)化隱性擔(dān)保激勵(lì)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)行為的兩面性，有利于豐富銀行治理與市場(chǎng)約束效應(yīng)的研究。
[Abstract]:The study of bank risk behavior in the financial field has attracted wide attention, but the traditional research mainly focuses on capital supervision, market constraints and other external perspectives, and less considers the principal-agent problem within banks. The relationship between bank governance and risk behavior has become one of the important propositions that need to be studied urgently. Since 2004, China has been making great efforts to deepen the joint-stock system reform and corporate governance reform of commercial banks. Under this background, it is particularly important to study the ownership structure of Chinese commercial banks and the relationship between governance mechanism and risk behavior.
Based on the perspective of co-governance between shareholders and creditors, this paper studies the ownership structure and the impact of internal and external governance mechanisms on the risk behavior of commercial banks in China under the background of transition system. Firstly, this paper analyzes the decision of bank risk behavior under multi-agency conflict from the perspective of the particularity of bank governance, and proposes the ownership knot under the background of transition system. The OGR analysis framework of internal and external governance mechanisms affecting bank risk behavior reveals the conduction path and mechanism of bank ownership structure affecting bank risk behavior; then, taking China's commercial banks as a sample, the internal governance mechanism and ownership structure affecting bank risk behavior are analyzed. The external governance mechanism of capital regulation, which affects bank risk behavior, is empirically tested.
The main contributions and innovations of this paper are as follows:
(1) The OGR analysis framework of ownership structure influencing bank risk behavior is proposed, which reveals the transmission path and mechanism of ownership structure influencing bank risk behavior under multiple agency conflicts. The research on bank risk behavior in finance is mainly based on the external perspectives of capital supervision and market restraint, ignoring the existence of internal agency problems and weakening the interpretation of bank risk behavior. In order to make a decision, the study finds that bank risk behavior is the result of the joint action of shareholder asset substitution and internal governance mechanism. On this basis, the paper integrates the internal governance mechanism with the core of ownership structure with the external mechanisms such as capital supervision and market restraint, and constructs the ownership structure influence combined with the background of China's transition system. The OGR analysis framework of the internal and external governance mechanisms which then influence bank risk behavior reveals the transmission path and mechanism of the transition bank ownership structure affecting risk behavior under multiple agency conflicts. The particularity of bank governance helps to enrich the theoretical research on bank governance and risk behavior in transitional countries.
(2) It confirms the restraint effect of foreign strategic investors on bank risk behavior and the difference of strategic attraction effect among different types of banks. This paper analyzes the influence of foreign strategic investors on the risk behavior of banks and the differences among state-owned holding banks, joint-stock commercial banks and urban commercial banks. This study validates the effectiveness of the foreign strategic attraction policy from the perspective of bank operation behavior, highlights the differences in the effect of strategic attraction compared with the existing literature, provides empirical evidence for the formulation of differentiated regulatory policies on strategic attraction, and the adoption of behavioral indicators can more directly reflect foreign shareholders'economic performance than performance. The influence of camp activities directly reflects the effect of bank restructuring.
The existing research on the effect of market constraint tends to regard banks as "black boxes" without considering the impact of internal principal-agent problems and the governance role of large shareholders under the condition of equity concentration. From the perspective of co-governance and combining with the characteristics of bank ownership structure in China's transitional economy, this paper constructs a principal-agent model to analyze the relationship between bank additional risk subsidy and creditor supervision intensity under the deposit insurance system, and takes listed commercial banks in China as samples to analyze the relationship between ownership structure, market constraints and bank risk behavior. Empirical tests are carried out to confirm the mechanism of ownership structure influencing external governance mechanism and then bank risk behavior. Compared with existing literature, this study highlights the interaction between moral hazard of major shareholders and market constraints of creditors, and reveals that government shareholders control risk through direct shareholding in the context of transition. In order to enrich the research on bank governance and market restraint effect, we should strengthen the duality of implicit guarantee incentive risk behavior.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：重慶大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：F832.33;F224

【引證文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 南星星;城市商業(yè)銀行股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)信貸資產(chǎn)配置行為的影響研究[D];蘭州大學(xué);2014年

本文編號(hào)：2187542