本文選題：資本約束 + 銀行經(jīng)營��； 參考：《西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：2010年國際巴塞爾委員會出臺《巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ》,繼2004年《新巴塞爾協(xié)議》落地不過短短6年時間,隨后我國為響應(yīng)國際協(xié)議于2011年出臺銀行監(jiān)管新規(guī)并于2012年正式實(shí)施,這一系列銀行監(jiān)管新框架的推出再一次將銀行的資本約束與監(jiān)管問題推向了熱議的高峰。在我國資本市場并不完善的架構(gòu)下,資本市場融資結(jié)構(gòu)相當(dāng)失衡,其中間接融資占整個融資結(jié)構(gòu)的75%以上,而銀行便成為如此大規(guī)模間接融資的承載主體,這使得銀行大力開展貸款業(yè)務(wù)的同時不可避免的成為高風(fēng)險的集聚主體,而鑒于銀行強(qiáng)大的外部效應(yīng),對銀行資本的監(jiān)管問題就成為客觀必然。本文認(rèn)為,在我國特殊的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)和文化背景下,資本約束不論是作為一種監(jiān)管機(jī)制要求還是作為一種管理手段對銀行的經(jīng)營穩(wěn)健都帶來了巨大的積極效應(yīng),但是由于銀行主觀和客觀上的某些原因,使得資本約束下,銀行的經(jīng)營走入了一個循環(huán)往復(fù)的經(jīng)營盲區(qū),這在一定程度上對整個銀行業(yè)和資本市場的健康可持續(xù)發(fā)展形成了瓶頸,如何避免和擺脫資本約束下銀行的經(jīng)營誤區(qū),加大加強(qiáng)資本約束機(jī)制的正面積極效應(yīng),這也正是本文所要著重探討的問題。 資本約束的本質(zhì)就是將資本與風(fēng)險之間建立某種聯(lián)系,使得資本可以一定程度的覆蓋風(fēng)險資產(chǎn)。隨著資本市場和金融環(huán)境的日益復(fù)雜,金融工具的層出不窮,對銀行資本約束的要求也越來越細(xì)化和嚴(yán)格,《巴塞爾協(xié)議Ⅲ》和我國的銀行監(jiān)管新規(guī)中,對資本約束的內(nèi)涵和外延都做出了進(jìn)一步的更高層次的要求：從外延上,資本約束在加強(qiáng)資本充足率指標(biāo)要求的同時,也提出了流動性指標(biāo)和杠桿指標(biāo),這在一定程度上極大的將銀行的資產(chǎn)規(guī)模和信貸規(guī)�？刂圃谫Y本要求的范圍內(nèi),減少了銀行的風(fēng)險經(jīng)營,同時首次提出了計(jì)提逆周期資本的要求,這不僅保證了經(jīng)濟(jì)上行期銀行經(jīng)營的安全,同時也為經(jīng)濟(jì)下行期銀行的經(jīng)營穩(wěn)健和安全構(gòu)筑了一道防線;從內(nèi)涵上,對資本、核心資本、一級核心資本的構(gòu)成要素也做出了更細(xì)化和更為合理的定義,同時在數(shù)量指標(biāo)上加大了資本充足率的要求,可以看到不論是從內(nèi)涵上還是從外延上,對銀行資本約束的要求已經(jīng)越來越嚴(yán)格和完善,隨著我國銀行監(jiān)管新規(guī)的出臺并最后正式實(shí)施,我國的銀行監(jiān)管進(jìn)入到了一個全新的更為嚴(yán)格和更為完善的監(jiān)管新時代。在監(jiān)管新時代下,作為更為細(xì)化和更為嚴(yán)格的資本約束要求機(jī)制,其對銀行的穩(wěn)健經(jīng)營起到了巨大的不可替代的積極作用,在更為嚴(yán)格的資本約束機(jī)制下,我國的商業(yè)銀行正在走向一個“更加穩(wěn)健和安全的運(yùn)作帶動整個銀行體系的運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn),在充分的風(fēng)險覆蓋和風(fēng)險化解準(zhǔn)備機(jī)制下穩(wěn)步向前,在實(shí)現(xiàn)盈利的同時積極的為經(jīng)濟(jì)調(diào)控、市場穩(wěn)健做出貢獻(xiàn)”的局面。我們可以看到,在資本約束要求下,商業(yè)銀行正在逐步實(shí)現(xiàn)風(fēng)險可控下的盈利增長。 我們可以清晰的看到資本約束巨大的正面積極效應(yīng),然而隨著資本約束監(jiān)管要求的不斷完善和嚴(yán)格,這枚硬幣的反面效應(yīng)也越來越凸顯：在更為嚴(yán)格的資本約束要求下,銀行的經(jīng)營卻陷入了一個“融資——放貸——融資”不可自拔的循環(huán)往復(fù)的經(jīng)營怪圈。筆者通過對近幾年我國16家上市銀行在實(shí)施資本充足率要求前后的貸款規(guī)模、貸款增量、資產(chǎn)規(guī)模等財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)的描述和分析對16家銀行資本約束的實(shí)施情況和現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行了探索和研究,得出目前階段我國上市商業(yè)銀行在執(zhí)行資本約束要求下經(jīng)營的三個特點(diǎn)：1.貸款脫離資本規(guī)模而高速擴(kuò)張是導(dǎo)致商業(yè)銀行資本充足率下降的最主要原因；2.大量外部融資行為是資本充足率補(bǔ)足與達(dá)標(biāo)的最主要途徑；3.信貸投放是拉動銀行規(guī)模高速增長的核心力量,銀行超速擴(kuò)張局面難控。筆者認(rèn)為,通過透析這三個特點(diǎn),可以發(fā)現(xiàn)其背后折射出的一種銀行經(jīng)營的邏輯：強(qiáng)大的“規(guī)模偏好”和“速度情節(jié)”下,資本要求和資本管理并沒有納入銀行正常的經(jīng)營管理體系框架,對資本的一再忽視導(dǎo)致銀行不斷上演資本充足率倒逼的困境和尷尬,在此種經(jīng)營模式下,對資本充足率執(zhí)行的邏輯是一種倒逼式達(dá)標(biāo)。而這種經(jīng)營邏輯的外化表現(xiàn)就是銀行進(jìn)入了一輪又一輪的“融資——放貸——融資”循環(huán)往復(fù)的經(jīng)營怪圈,這不僅使銀行的成長陷入了一個不斷增資不斷倒逼的粗放型非可持續(xù)的不良增長模式,同時在銀行不斷的“膨脹”下,信貸風(fēng)險如同泡沫越積越多,對整個資本市場和金融環(huán)境的穩(wěn)健也埋下了隱患。 為使銀行盡快脫離經(jīng)營怪圈、摒棄粗放和不可持續(xù)的增長模式,走入健康的可持續(xù)發(fā)展的經(jīng)營正規(guī),筆者對其陷入融資怪圈、步入不良發(fā)展的原因進(jìn)行了深層次的剖析。具體的,筆者從銀行經(jīng)營怪圈的鏈條出發(fā),找出了突破和斷裂此怪圈鏈條的兩個關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)和節(jié)點(diǎn)所在：1.“資本充足率不足——融資補(bǔ)足資本充足率”環(huán)節(jié)：在資本充足率面臨不足時,我國商業(yè)銀行為什么一定要或熱衷于選擇資本市場融資的方式來提升資本充足率?2.“資本充足率回升——銀行開展信貸業(yè)務(wù)——資本充足率下降”環(huán)節(jié)：銀行為什么一定要將最能消耗資本的信貸業(yè)務(wù)作為主要經(jīng)營業(yè)務(wù)?或者說銀行為什么不將信貸業(yè)務(wù)擴(kuò)展速度和風(fēng)險程度限制在資本約束的范圍內(nèi)從而保持規(guī)模、風(fēng)險、資本三者的均衡增長?筆者認(rèn)為,以上兩個問題的答案便是銀行陷入融資怪圈的成因,換言之,如果突破或改善以上兩個環(huán)節(jié)便可以期待打斷整個怪圈的鏈條的銜接,銀行即可突破融資怪圈。 對此筆者通過系統(tǒng)性的深入探析發(fā)掘出銀行深陷怪圈的幾點(diǎn)原因：從宏觀方面說,我國銀行陷入融資怪圈有其相應(yīng)的制度背景：由于相對于西方發(fā)達(dá)國家,我國資本市場的發(fā)展并不成熟和完善,由計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)轉(zhuǎn)軌市場經(jīng)濟(jì)也不過三十幾年的時間,在整個資本市場的融資中,間接融資依然作為融資的主導(dǎo),據(jù)相關(guān)統(tǒng)計(jì),我國的融資結(jié)構(gòu)基本是失衡和不合理的,在整體資本市場融資中,間接融資占據(jù)了75%以上的比例,而發(fā)行股票、債券等直接融資卻不到15%。商業(yè)銀行作為間接融資的主要承擔(dān)者,其一方面將貸款作為核心業(yè)務(wù)也“順理成章”,另一方面銀行作為間接融資的主要承擔(dān)者的同時就決定了其成為風(fēng)險的承擔(dān)者,這些都會不同程度的降低資本充足率,使得銀行不斷的面臨資本充足率“踩線”的威迫,成為其陷入融資怪圈的間接殺手。另一方面,銀行作為一種具有特殊作用和經(jīng)濟(jì)功能的市場主體,為保持國家每年一定比例的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長、扶持經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展,大力開展貸款業(yè)務(wù)也就成為必然。從銀行個體的微觀方面說,筆者認(rèn)為主要存在以下幾點(diǎn)原因：1.我國上市商業(yè)銀行并沒有建立一個以資本管理為核心的有效資本規(guī)模約束業(yè)務(wù)擴(kuò)張的健康可持續(xù)經(jīng)營管理模式。2.我國上市商業(yè)銀行的業(yè)務(wù)構(gòu)成單一,中間業(yè)務(wù)、金融創(chuàng)新的新興業(yè)務(wù)的發(fā)展完全還處于起步和探索階段。3.我國商業(yè)銀行在經(jīng)營中并沒有建立一個科學(xué)和先進(jìn)的風(fēng)險管理體系,風(fēng)險管理水平普遍低下。4.我國商業(yè)銀行普遍缺乏一個有效的資本補(bǔ)充機(jī)制,資本內(nèi)生能力差,內(nèi)源性融資明顯不足。歸根結(jié)底,筆者認(rèn)為其最本質(zhì)的原因源于銀行的經(jīng)營理念的偏差,銀行應(yīng)摒棄傳統(tǒng)的“規(guī)模偏好”和“速度情節(jié)”,將銀行安全問題落實(shí)到實(shí)實(shí)在在的經(jīng)營流程中去。 最后,文章針對以上銀行存在的問題,對如何強(qiáng)化資本約束,構(gòu)建可持續(xù)發(fā)展的銀行體系提出了自己的幾點(diǎn)思考和建議：1.轉(zhuǎn)變銀行經(jīng)營理念,從價值觀和本質(zhì)上解讀資本約束的要求；2.強(qiáng)化資本硬約束,大力構(gòu)建以資本管理為核心的銀行經(jīng)營體系：3.樹立和加強(qiáng)銀行風(fēng)險觀,提高銀行風(fēng)險控制水平并加強(qiáng)對經(jīng)濟(jì)資本的管理；4.改變傳統(tǒng)利差時代,逐步實(shí)現(xiàn)多元化業(yè)務(wù)轉(zhuǎn)軌,提高資本使用效率；5.提升內(nèi)生資本的培養(yǎng)和補(bǔ)足機(jī)制,從粗放型增長轉(zhuǎn)軌到內(nèi)涵式增長；6.拓寬外部融資渠道,減少融資與資本壓力；7.逐步實(shí)現(xiàn)利率管制向利率市場化的轉(zhuǎn)軌。 在資本市場不斷發(fā)展和完善的浪潮下,銀行的經(jīng)營正面臨著一場質(zhì)變的改革,銀行很快會走出“短痛”局面,構(gòu)建一個全新的科學(xué)的穩(wěn)健的銀行體系,在資本約束的有效實(shí)施下,穩(wěn)步健康向前發(fā)展。
[Abstract]:In 2010, the international Basel committee introduced the Basel Agreement III, followed by the new Basel agreement in 2004, only 6 years, followed by the implementation of the new regulation of banking supervision in 2011 in response to the international agreement and the formal implementation in 2012. The new framework of this series of bank supervision and regulation once again put the capital constraints and supervision of the bank. Under the imperfect structure of China's capital market, the capital market financing structure is quite unbalanced, in which the indirect financing accounts for more than 75% of the whole financing structure, and the bank has become the main body of such large-scale indirect financing, which makes the bank develop the loan business and inevitably become a high wind. In view of the special political economy and cultural background of our country, the capital constraint has brought a huge product to the stable operation of the bank, whether it is a regulatory mechanism or as a management means. But because of the subjective and objective reasons of the bank, the bank's operation has entered a blind area under the constraints of capital, which has formed a bottleneck for the healthy and sustainable development of the whole banking and capital market to a certain extent, and how to avoid and get rid of the misunderstandings of the banks under capital constraints. The positive effect of strengthening the capital constraint mechanism is also what this article will focus on.
The essence of capital constraint is to establish a certain connection between capital and risk, so that the capital can cover the risk assets to a certain extent. With the increasing complexity of the capital market and the financial environment, the financial instruments emerge in an endless stream, and the requirements for the bank capital constraints are becoming more and more detailed and strict. < Basel III > and China's banking supervision. In the new regulation, the connotation and extension of capital constraints are further higher level: from the extension, capital constraints, while strengthening the requirements of the capital adequacy index, also put forward the liquidity index and leverage index, which, to a certain extent, controls the bank's asset scale and credit scale in capital requirements. Within the scope, the risk management of the bank is reduced. At the same time, the requirements of the counter cyclical capital are put forward for the first time. This not only ensures the safety of the bank operation in the economic uplink period, but also constructs a line of defense for the stable and safe operation of the bank in the economic downlink period, and the elements of capital, core capital and the first class core capital from the connotation. It has also made a more detailed and more reasonable definition. At the same time, the demand of capital adequacy ratio is increased on the quantity index. It can be seen that the demand for bank capital constraints is more and more strict and perfect in terms of connotation and extension. With the introduction of new regulation and the final implementation of China's banking regulation, China's banking supervision In the new era of supervision, as a more detailed and more strict demand mechanism for capital constraints, it has played a huge and irreplaceable role in the stable operation of the bank. Under the more stringent capital constraint mechanism, the commercial banks of our country are taking off under the new era of supervision. To a "more robust and safe operation to drive the operation of the whole banking system, steady progress under the full risk coverage and risk mitigation preparation mechanism, and make a positive contribution to economic control and market stability while realizing profit," we can see that commercial banks are progressively under the demand of capital constraints. Profit growth under risk control.
We can clearly see the positive positive effect of capital constraints. However, with the continuous improvement and strict requirements of capital restraint supervision, the reverse effect of this coin is becoming more and more obvious: under the stricter demand for capital constraints, the operation of the bank has fallen into a "financing - lending - financing". Through the description and analysis of the loan scale, loan increment, asset scale and other financial indexes of 16 listed banks before and after the requirement of capital adequacy ratio in recent years, the author explored and studied the implementation and present situation of the capital constraints of 16 banks, and reached the current stage of China's Listed Commercial banks. The three characteristics of the bank under the requirements of capital constraints: 1. the main reason for the decline of the capital adequacy ratio of commercial banks is the rapid expansion of the loan from the scale of capital; 2. a large number of external financing behavior is the most important way for the capital adequacy ratio to complement and reach the standard, and the 3. credit investment and release is the core of the rapid growth of the bank scale. The author believes that, through the three characteristics of dialysis, we can find that a kind of bank management logic behind it can be found: strong "scale preference" and "speed plot", capital requirements and capital management are not included in the normal management system framework of the bank, and the capital is repeated again and again. Ignoring the predicament and embarrassment that led to the banks' continuous performance of capital adequacy ratio, the logic of the implementation of capital adequacy is an upside down standard under such a mode of operation. Only the growth of the bank has fallen into an unsustainable and unsustainable growth model of continuous expansion of capital and constant "inflation". At the same time, under the constant "expansion" of the bank, the credit risk, like a bubble, has also buried a hidden danger to the stability of the whole capital market and the financial environment.
In order to make the bank break away from the business circle as soon as possible, abandon the extensive and unsustainable growth mode and enter the healthy and sustainable development management, the author deeply analyzes the reason why it falls into the strange circle of financing and enters the bad development. Two key links and nodes of the chain: 1. "insufficient capital adequacy ratio - financing sufficient capital adequacy ratio" link: when the capital adequacy ratio is insufficient, why should our commercial banks have to improve capital adequacy ratio in the way of choosing capital market financing? 2. "recovery of capital adequacy ratio - bank opening Credit spread business - a decline in capital adequacy ratio: why should banks have to use the most capital - consuming credit business as the main business? Or why banks do not limit the expansion and risk of credit business in the scope of capital constraints to maintain scale, risk and balanced growth of the three capital of capital? The answer is that the answer to the above two questions is the cause of banks falling into the financing circle. In other words, if the above two links are broken or improved, the link between the chain of the whole circle can be interrupted, and the bank can break through the financing circle.
The author finds out the reasons for the bank's deep trap through systematic analysis: from the macro point of view, the Bank of our country has its corresponding institutional background in the financial circle: compared with the developed countries in the west, the development of China's capital market is not mature and perfect, and the transition from planned economy to market economy is also thirty In the past few years, indirect financing is still the leading financing in the financing of the whole capital market. According to the relevant statistics, the financing structure of our country is basically unbalanced and unreasonable. In the overall capital market financing, indirect financing occupies more than 75% of the proportion, while the direct financing such as issuing shares and bonds is not the Commercial Bank of 15%.. The main undertaker of indirect financing, on the one hand, the loan as the core business is also "logical", on the other hand, as the main bearer of the indirect financing, the bank determines its risk bearer, which will reduce the capital adequacy ratio in varying degrees, so that the bank is constantly faced with the capital adequacy ratio "stepping on the line". On the other hand, as a market subject with special role and economic function, the bank is necessary to maintain a certain proportion of the country's economic growth every year, support the economic development and develop the loan business. The following reasons are as follows: 1. China's listed commercial banks have not established a healthy and sustainable management model with the capital management as the core of the effective capital scale constraint business expansion.2.. The business of the listed commercial banks in China is single, the intermediate business and the new business development of financial innovation are still in the start and exploration. Stage.3. China's commercial banks have not established a scientific and advanced risk management system in their operation, and the level of risk management is generally low..4. is generally lack of an effective capital replenishment mechanism, the inability of capital and the inadequacy of endogenous financing. The deviation of business philosophy is that banks should abandon traditional "scale preference" and "speed plot", and carry out the problem of bank security into real business process.
Finally, in view of the problems existing in the banks above, the paper puts forward some thoughts and suggestions on how to strengthen capital constraints and build a sustainable development bank system: 1. change the concept of bank management, interpret the requirements of capital constraints from values and essence; 2. strengthen the hard constraints of capital, and vigorously construct the core of capital management. Bank management system: 3. set up and strengthen the bank risk concept, improve the bank risk control level and strengthen the management of economic capital; 4. change the era of traditional spreads, gradually realize the transformation of diversified business, improve the efficiency of capital use; 5. enhance the cultivation of endogenous capital and complement the system, from extensive type of growth to connotation growth; 6 Broaden the external financing channels, reduce the pressure of financing and capital. 7., gradually transform the interest rate control to the marketization of interest rate.
In the tide of the continuous development and perfection of the capital market, the bank's operation is facing a qualitative change. The bank will soon get out of the "short pain" situation and build a new and scientific and stable banking system. Under the effective implementation of the capital constraint, the bank will develop steadily and healthily.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F832.33

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