發(fā)布時間：2018-04-13 23:28

  本文選題：銀行 + 高管薪酬��； 參考：《中央民族大學(xué)》2012年碩士論文

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度下,所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離導(dǎo)致了委托代理問題。高管薪酬作為公司治理的重要環(huán)節(jié),是解決委托代理問題的一種有效手段,一直是學(xué)術(shù)研究的熱點問題。然而在金融危機期間,國外銀行高管仍領(lǐng)取天價薪酬,與業(yè)績嚴重脫鉤,更是引發(fā)人們的強烈質(zhì)疑和討論。我國銀行高管薪酬也屢創(chuàng)新高,引起了相當?shù)年P(guān)注。中國銀行正處于改革時期,如何進行銀行高管薪酬制度改革是一項重要課題。因此本文對銀行高管薪酬與績效的相關(guān)性進行研究,具有一定的理論與現(xiàn)實意義。 本文回顧了相關(guān)研究文獻,從公司治理的角度,以委托代理理論為基礎(chǔ)進行理論分析。對于我國銀行高管薪酬的現(xiàn)狀進行了研究,并與國外銀行高管薪酬做了比較。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)我國商業(yè)銀行高管薪酬水平差異較大,結(jié)構(gòu)上初步建立了基本薪酬加績效薪酬的薪酬激勵制度,薪酬基本與其短期經(jīng)營業(yè)績聯(lián)系,缺乏中長期激勵機制。實證部分以2006—2010年滬深兩市16家上市銀行數(shù)據(jù)為研究樣本,考慮了盈利和風(fēng)險因素,選取總資產(chǎn)利潤率、每股收益、凈利潤、資本充足率等綜合績效指標,建立多元模型,對銀行高管薪酬與公司績效的相關(guān)性進行了檢驗分析。通過實證分析我們發(fā)現(xiàn),目前我國銀行高管薪酬與總資產(chǎn)利潤率的相關(guān)性較強,但方程的線性相關(guān)性不顯著,反而成倒U形；按照股權(quán)性質(zhì)分類考察發(fā)現(xiàn)國有銀行高管薪酬與績效的正相關(guān)顯著,且體現(xiàn)了風(fēng)險控制；非國有銀行高管薪酬對績效的變化更加敏感,體現(xiàn)了盈利能力和風(fēng)險控制的關(guān)系,但線性關(guān)系不顯著,二次方程回歸結(jié)果較好,農(nóng)明當超過某一值后,績效與高管薪酬反方向變化。 本文針對中國上市銀行高管薪酬存在的問題提出以下建議：我國銀行高管薪酬激勵制度仍需完善,建立多元化綜合績效考核體系,增強高管薪酬與績效的相關(guān)性；進步探索高管薪酬的長期激勵；要有合理適度的薪酬監(jiān)管制度；增強投資者和社會公眾的監(jiān)督；培育經(jīng)理人市場。 本文創(chuàng)新點在于：認為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對銀行績效與高管薪酬關(guān)系有很大影響,因此將國有控股銀行和非國有控股銀行分別討論；為避免績效指標選取相對單一的缺陷,建立了盈利能力、運營風(fēng)險和資金安全的綜合評價體系；鑒于早期的研究沒有統(tǒng)一結(jié)論,本文首先利用多元線性模型進行檢驗,發(fā)現(xiàn)回歸結(jié)果不顯著,又建立了多元非線性回歸進行檢驗。
[Abstract]:Under the modern enterprise system, the separation of ownership and control leads to the principal-agent problem.As an important part of corporate governance, executive compensation is an effective means to solve the principal-agent problem, and has always been a hot issue in academic research.However, during the financial crisis, foreign bank executives still receive sky-high compensation, which is seriously decoupled from the performance, which has aroused strong doubt and discussion.Our country bank executive compensation also repeatedly sets new records, has caused considerable concern.Bank of China is in the period of reform, how to reform the bank executive compensation system is an important subject.Therefore, this paper studies the correlation between executive compensation and performance, which has certain theoretical and practical significance.This paper reviews the relevant research literature, from the perspective of corporate governance, on the basis of principal-agent theory for theoretical analysis.This paper studies the current situation of bank executive compensation in China and compares it with that of foreign banks.The study found that the level of executive compensation of commercial banks in China is quite different, and the structure of the system has established the basic salary plus performance compensation incentive system, the compensation is basically related to its short-term operating performance, and lack of medium and long term incentive mechanism.The empirical part takes the data of 16 listed banks in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2006 to 2010 as the research sample, considers the profit and risk factors, selects the comprehensive performance indicators, such as total asset profit rate, earnings per share, net profit, capital adequacy ratio and so on, and establishes multiple models.The correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance is tested and analyzed.Through the empirical analysis, we find that the correlation between executive compensation and total asset profit margin is strong, but the linear correlation of the equation is not significant, but become inverted U shape;According to the classification of equity nature, it is found that executive compensation of state-owned banks is positively correlated with performance and reflects risk control. Non-state-owned bank executive compensation is more sensitive to the change of performance and reflects the relationship between profitability and risk control.However, the linear relationship is not significant, quadratic equation regression results are better, when Nong Ming exceeds a certain value, performance and executive compensation change in the opposite direction.This paper puts forward the following suggestions in view of the problems existing in the executive compensation of listed banks in China: the incentive system of executive compensation of Chinese banks still needs to be perfected, and a diversified comprehensive performance appraisal system should be established to enhance the correlation between executive compensation and performance;It is necessary to have a reasonable and appropriate salary supervision system, strengthen the supervision of investors and the public, and cultivate the manager market.The innovation of this paper lies in the fact that the equity structure has a great influence on the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation, so the state-owned holding banks and non-state-owned holding banks are discussed separately.A comprehensive evaluation system of profitability, operational risk and capital safety is established. In view of the lack of a unified conclusion in the early studies, this paper first uses multiple linear models to test, and finds that the regression results are not significant.The multivariate nonlinear regression is also established to test it.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：中央民族大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51;F224

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本文編號：1746710