【摘要】：隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展和電子商務(wù)的普及,產(chǎn)品流通的渠道呈現(xiàn)出多樣化的趨勢(shì)。與以往不同的是,制造商既可以通過(guò)網(wǎng)絡(luò)和線下門店,直接面向客戶銷售產(chǎn)品,又可以與服務(wù)商進(jìn)行捆綁銷售。不同的渠道策略直接關(guān)系到制造商的市場(chǎng)覆蓋范圍和消費(fèi)者需求,并最終影響制造商的盈利能力。所以,渠道選擇已經(jīng)成為制造商和服務(wù)商市場(chǎng)策略中至關(guān)重要的一環(huán)。同時(shí),現(xiàn)有研究仍然較少涉及產(chǎn)品-服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈,企業(yè)能夠參考的依據(jù)極少。為了給企業(yè)提供可靠的管理建議,本文將建立完整的數(shù)學(xué)模型,研究不同的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下產(chǎn)品-服務(wù)供應(yīng)鏈(PSSC)中各個(gè)主體(制造商和服務(wù)商)如何選擇渠道策略,其中不同的市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)主要體現(xiàn)在供應(yīng)鏈參與主體的市場(chǎng)力量和成本結(jié)構(gòu)兩個(gè)維度。結(jié)合市場(chǎng)力量和成本結(jié)構(gòu),本文考慮四種模型,包括制造商與服務(wù)商均衡模型、制造商主導(dǎo)-服務(wù)商均衡模型、制造商主導(dǎo)-高效服務(wù)商Stackelberg模型、制造商主導(dǎo)-低效服務(wù)商Stackelberg模型。同時(shí),在四種不同的模型條件下,利用博弈論的工具和方法,求解四種不同渠道策略的最優(yōu)價(jià)格并且進(jìn)行利潤(rùn)比較,最后分析結(jié)論得到最優(yōu)的策略選擇。本文研究不僅為制造商和服務(wù)商論證了不同情況下的最優(yōu)渠道策略,還為政府反壟斷提出了新的調(diào)控手段。從供應(yīng)鏈總體來(lái)看,四種模型中供應(yīng)鏈可能選擇雙渠道捆綁也可能選擇捆綁高效服務(wù)商,判斷條件為供應(yīng)鏈成本結(jié)構(gòu),同時(shí)制造商和服務(wù)商的市場(chǎng)力量決定了兩種渠道策略的臨界點(diǎn);從服務(wù)商角度來(lái)看,與制造商進(jìn)行捆綁是服務(wù)商的占優(yōu)策略,同時(shí)可以通過(guò)調(diào)節(jié)服務(wù)商之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)利潤(rùn)最優(yōu);從制造商角度來(lái)看,制造商可以通過(guò)扶持低效服務(wù)商來(lái)制衡高效服務(wù)商,從而維持自身的市場(chǎng)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位。從政府角度來(lái)看,政府可以通過(guò)控制制造商的渠道策略,來(lái)實(shí)現(xiàn)服務(wù)商之間市場(chǎng)力量的平衡,從而達(dá)到反壟斷的目的。
[Abstract]:With the development of economy and the popularization of e-commerce, the channel of product circulation presents a variety of trends. Different from the past, the manufacturer can sell the product directly to the customer through the network and the offline store, and can be bundled and sold with the service provider. Different channel strategies are directly related to the manufacturer's market coverage and consumer demand, and ultimately affect the manufacturer's profitability. Therefore, channel selection has become an important part in the market strategy of manufacturers and service providers. At the same time, the existing research is still less involved in the product-service supply chain, and the basis for which the enterprise can reference is minimal. In order to provide a reliable management suggestion for the enterprise, this paper will establish a complete mathematical model to study how to select the channel strategy for each main body (manufacturer and service provider) in the product-service supply chain (PSSC) under different market structure. The different market structure is mainly embodied in the market force and cost structure of the main body of the supply chain. In combination with the market force and cost structure, this paper takes into account four models, including the equilibrium model of the manufacturer and the service provider, the manufacturer-led-service provider equilibrium model, the maker-led-high-efficiency service provider Stackelberg model, the manufacturer-led-low-efficiency service provider Stackelberg model. At the same time, under the four different model conditions, the optimal price of four different channel strategies is solved and the profit comparison is carried out by using the tool and the method of the game theory, and the final analysis conclusion is the optimal policy choice. The research not only proves the optimal channel strategy under different circumstances for the manufacturer and the service provider, but also put forward the new regulation means for the government's anti-monopoly. In the overall view of the supply chain, the supply chain in the four models may choose a two-channel bundle or a bundle of high-efficiency service providers, the judgment condition is the supply chain cost structure, and the market forces of the manufacturers and the service providers determine the critical point of the two channel strategies; and from the service provider perspective, Bundling with the manufacturer is the dominant strategy of the service provider, and the profit is optimal by adjusting the competition strength between the service providers; and from the manufacturer's point of view, the manufacturer can check and balance the high-efficiency service provider by supporting the low-efficiency service provider, thereby maintaining the market leadership position of the service provider. From the government point of view, the government can realize the balance of the market forces among the service providers by controlling the manufacturer's channel strategy, so as to achieve the purpose of anti-monopoly.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F274

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