基于EPR制度的政府規(guī)制與逆向供應鏈激勵機制
發(fā)布時間：2018-07-28 18:02
【摘要】：科技的進步和工業(yè)的發(fā)展使得再生資源回收再利用逐漸成為世界各國經(jīng)濟持續(xù)發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略的重要舉措。企業(yè)對廢舊產(chǎn)品進行回收再制造,履行生產(chǎn)者延伸責任(EPR)制度,可以有效促進環(huán)境保護,提高資源利用率,節(jié)約成本,提升競爭優(yōu)勢,從而實現(xiàn)企業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。目前,我國消費者環(huán)保意識欠缺、廢品回收市場無序、企業(yè)回收再制造積極性不高,使得政府和企業(yè)有效實施逆向供應鏈系統(tǒng)具有相當?shù)碾y度。因此,設計合理有效的激勵機制來監(jiān)督管理有關企業(yè)至關重要。鑒于此,本文基于EPR制度,運用博弈論、激勵理論等知識,研究政府與逆向供應鏈系統(tǒng)的協(xié)調(diào)機制,以期得到有益結論為政府和逆向供應鏈成員提供政策參考和決策支持。本文主要研究內(nèi)容概述如下。(1)逆向供應鏈參與企業(yè)對廢品回收再制造的積極性能有效推動其協(xié)調(diào)發(fā)展。針對一個道德風險和逆向選擇并存的逆向供應鏈系統(tǒng),利用博弈論和激勵理論,分別研究了對稱信息和不對稱信息下政府和制造商線性契約設計過程,分析了各激勵因素對契約的影響,并通過數(shù)值仿真探討了各參數(shù)變化對政府、制造商和回收商期望收益的影響。研究表明：委托方設計合理的激勵契約能有效甄別代理方的信息,促進企業(yè)努力水平,提高政府和企業(yè)的期望收益。所得結論對EPR制度下逆向供應鏈的運營實踐有較好的指導意義。(2)基于EPR制度,針對由制造商和回收處理商構成的二級逆向供應鏈系統(tǒng),建立了政府與供應鏈系統(tǒng)博弈的雙層規(guī)劃模型。通過設計制造商對回收處理商的激勵契約,探究了供應鏈成員的最優(yōu)決策、政府的最優(yōu)財政策略以及各相關參數(shù)對政府和企業(yè)決策的影響。研究表明：政府實施合理的環(huán)境規(guī)制能有效激勵制造商提高產(chǎn)品再造率,促進回收處理商提高回收努力水平,增進社會整體福利,保障EPR制度的有效實施。EPR制度下逆向供應鏈的發(fā)展有助于提高資源循環(huán)利用,推動靜脈產(chǎn)業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展,實現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟效益和環(huán)境效益的雙豐收,因此,設計有效的激勵機制激勵企業(yè)提高回收再制造能力具有極其重要的意義。
[Abstract]:With the progress of science and technology and the development of industry, recycling and reuse of renewable resources has gradually become an important measure in the strategy of sustainable economic development of countries all over the world. The recycling and remanufacturing of waste products and the implementation of (EPR) system of extended producer responsibility can effectively promote environmental protection, improve the utilization rate of resources, save costs and enhance competitive advantages, thus realizing the sustainable development of enterprises. At present, the lack of awareness of environmental protection among consumers in China, the disorder of recycling market and the low enthusiasm of enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing make it difficult for the government and enterprises to effectively implement the reverse supply chain system. Therefore, it is very important to design a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism to supervise and manage the relevant enterprises. In view of this, based on the EPR system, using the knowledge of game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the coordination mechanism between the government and the reverse supply chain system, in order to obtain a useful conclusion for the government and the members of the reverse supply chain to provide policy reference and decision support. The main contents of this paper are summarized as follows: (1) the enthusiasm of reverse supply chain enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing of waste products can effectively promote their coordinated development. Aiming at a reverse supply chain system in which moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, using game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the process of government and manufacturer linear contract design under symmetric information and asymmetric information, respectively. The influence of various incentive factors on the contract is analyzed, and the influence of various parameters on the expected income of the government, manufacturers and recyclers is discussed by numerical simulation. The research shows that reasonable incentive contract design can effectively identify the information of the agent, promote the level of enterprise efforts, and improve the expected income of the government and enterprises. The conclusions are helpful to the operation of reverse supply chain under EPR system. (2) based on EPR system, this paper aims at the two-level reverse supply chain system, which is composed of manufacturer and recycler. A bilevel programming model of the game between government and supply chain system is established. By designing the incentive contract of the manufacturer to the recycler, this paper probes into the optimal decision of the supply chain member, the optimal financial strategy of the government and the influence of the relevant parameters on the decision of the government and the enterprise. The research shows that reasonable environmental regulation by the government can effectively encourage manufacturers to improve the recycling rate, promote the recyclers to improve the level of recycling efforts, and promote the overall welfare of the society. The development of reverse supply chain under EPR system can help to improve the recycling of resources, promote the sustainable development of venous industry, and realize the double harvest of economic and environmental benefits. It is of great significance to design an effective incentive mechanism to encourage enterprises to improve their ability of recycling and remanufacturing.
【學位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F270.7;F713.2
本文編號：2151162
[Abstract]:With the progress of science and technology and the development of industry, recycling and reuse of renewable resources has gradually become an important measure in the strategy of sustainable economic development of countries all over the world. The recycling and remanufacturing of waste products and the implementation of (EPR) system of extended producer responsibility can effectively promote environmental protection, improve the utilization rate of resources, save costs and enhance competitive advantages, thus realizing the sustainable development of enterprises. At present, the lack of awareness of environmental protection among consumers in China, the disorder of recycling market and the low enthusiasm of enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing make it difficult for the government and enterprises to effectively implement the reverse supply chain system. Therefore, it is very important to design a reasonable and effective incentive mechanism to supervise and manage the relevant enterprises. In view of this, based on the EPR system, using the knowledge of game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the coordination mechanism between the government and the reverse supply chain system, in order to obtain a useful conclusion for the government and the members of the reverse supply chain to provide policy reference and decision support. The main contents of this paper are summarized as follows: (1) the enthusiasm of reverse supply chain enterprises in recycling and remanufacturing of waste products can effectively promote their coordinated development. Aiming at a reverse supply chain system in which moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, using game theory and incentive theory, this paper studies the process of government and manufacturer linear contract design under symmetric information and asymmetric information, respectively. The influence of various incentive factors on the contract is analyzed, and the influence of various parameters on the expected income of the government, manufacturers and recyclers is discussed by numerical simulation. The research shows that reasonable incentive contract design can effectively identify the information of the agent, promote the level of enterprise efforts, and improve the expected income of the government and enterprises. The conclusions are helpful to the operation of reverse supply chain under EPR system. (2) based on EPR system, this paper aims at the two-level reverse supply chain system, which is composed of manufacturer and recycler. A bilevel programming model of the game between government and supply chain system is established. By designing the incentive contract of the manufacturer to the recycler, this paper probes into the optimal decision of the supply chain member, the optimal financial strategy of the government and the influence of the relevant parameters on the decision of the government and the enterprise. The research shows that reasonable environmental regulation by the government can effectively encourage manufacturers to improve the recycling rate, promote the recyclers to improve the level of recycling efforts, and promote the overall welfare of the society. The development of reverse supply chain under EPR system can help to improve the recycling of resources, promote the sustainable development of venous industry, and realize the double harvest of economic and environmental benefits. It is of great significance to design an effective incentive mechanism to encourage enterprises to improve their ability of recycling and remanufacturing.
【學位授予單位】：浙江工業(yè)大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F270.7;F713.2
【參考文獻】
相關期刊論文 前2條
1 貢文偉;李虎;葛翠翠;;不對稱信息下逆向供應鏈契約設計[J];工業(yè)工程與管理;2011年05期
2 辛玉紅;李小莉;;基于SCF的多任務委托代理激勵機制[J];工業(yè)工程;2013年05期
，本文編號：2151162
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