本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào) + 不對(duì)稱信息��； 參考：《北京郵電大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)已成為現(xiàn)代供應(yīng)鏈管理中的關(guān)鍵和學(xué)術(shù)研究的熱點(diǎn),在大多數(shù)供應(yīng)鏈管理研究模型中,供應(yīng)鏈的協(xié)調(diào)管理建立在對(duì)稱、準(zhǔn)確信息的基礎(chǔ)之上。但實(shí)際上,現(xiàn)代供應(yīng)鏈中普遍存在著庫(kù)存誤差問題和供應(yīng)鏈成員之間不共享成本信息的現(xiàn)象。 本文針對(duì)由單一供應(yīng)商和單一零售商組成的二級(jí)供應(yīng)鏈,同時(shí)把存在于供應(yīng)鏈庫(kù)存系統(tǒng)中的庫(kù)存誤差問題和供應(yīng)商成本信息不對(duì)稱這兩種情況考慮在內(nèi),以實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)為總體目標(biāo)來研究供應(yīng)鏈成員之間的博弈過程,其中供應(yīng)商的成本信息為私有信息,而同時(shí)供應(yīng)鏈庫(kù)存系統(tǒng)中存在庫(kù)存誤差問題。本文通過合理設(shè)置收益共享契約的參數(shù),提供一份收益共享契約清單,達(dá)到以下目標(biāo)：供應(yīng)商通過選擇與她自身成本相對(duì)應(yīng)的契約來自愿共享自身成本信息,零售商在不用犧牲自身利益的條件下獲得供應(yīng)商的成本信息,同時(shí)零售商在結(jié)合庫(kù)存誤差狀況所做出的最優(yōu)訂貨決策恰好與供應(yīng)鏈整體最優(yōu)決策相一致,從而供應(yīng)鏈成員各自利益與供應(yīng)鏈整體利益相一致,成員之間可以通過契約任意分配供應(yīng)鏈?zhǔn)找妗?進(jìn)一步地,本文研究了引入RFID(無線射頻識(shí)別)技術(shù)來消除供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)中的庫(kù)存誤差之后,供應(yīng)鏈協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制應(yīng)該相應(yīng)進(jìn)行怎樣的調(diào)整,供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)績(jī)效以及協(xié)調(diào)型契約參數(shù)的選擇范圍相應(yīng)有怎樣的變化。 最后,通過數(shù)例進(jìn)行比較分析,研究了供應(yīng)鏈最優(yōu)績(jī)效和協(xié)調(diào)型契約參數(shù)隨著庫(kù)存誤差狀況和RFID技術(shù)成本的變化情況,通過確定關(guān)鍵閥值為供應(yīng)鏈管理者提供是否應(yīng)該引入RFID技術(shù)的理論參考。
[Abstract]:Supply chain coordination has become a key issue in modern supply chain management and a hot topic in academic research. In most supply chain management research models, supply chain coordination management is based on symmetric and accurate information. However, in fact, inventory error and cost information do not share among members of supply chain are common in modern supply chain. In this paper, the problem of inventory error in the supply chain inventory system and the asymmetry of supplier cost information are taken into account in the secondary supply chain which is composed of a single supplier and a single retailer. In order to realize supply chain coordination as the overall goal, this paper studies the game process among supply chain members, in which the cost information of suppliers is private information, while the inventory error problem exists in the inventory system of supply chain. This paper provides a list of revenue-sharing contracts by reasonably setting the parameters of the revenue-sharing contracts, and achieves the following goals: suppliers voluntarily share their cost information by choosing contracts corresponding to their own costs. The retailer obtains the cost information of the supplier without sacrificing his own interests, and the optimal ordering decision made by the retailer in combination with the inventory error is exactly the same as the overall optimal decision of the supply chain. Therefore, the interests of the members of the supply chain are consistent with the interests of the supply chain as a whole, and the members can distribute the benefits of the supply chain arbitrarily through contracts. Furthermore, after introducing RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) technology to eliminate inventory errors in supply chain system, how should supply chain coordination mechanism be adjusted accordingly? How to change the optimal performance of supply chain and the choice range of coordination contract parameters. Finally, through the comparative analysis of several examples, the variation of the optimal performance of supply chain and the coordinated contract parameters with inventory error and RFID technology cost is studied. By determining the critical threshold, it provides a theoretical reference for supply chain managers whether or not to introduce RFID technology.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：北京郵電大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：TP391.44

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本文編號(hào)：1913285