發(fā)布時間：2018-03-22 06:04

  本文選題：供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)　切入點：計算實驗方法　出處：《寧波大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著市場經(jīng)濟一體化進程的不斷加快，企業(yè)與企業(yè)之間的競爭已經(jīng)轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)楣⿷?yīng)鏈與供應(yīng)鏈之間的競爭，環(huán)境的復(fù)雜性以及競爭方式的轉(zhuǎn)變改變了供應(yīng)鏈管理的運作模式，同時更加為供應(yīng)鏈管理帶來了挑戰(zhàn)。 本文基于計算實驗的方法，從企業(yè)間既競爭又合作的特殊關(guān)系出發(fā)，在對影響供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間競合關(guān)系的重要因素的基礎(chǔ)上，對供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間競合關(guān)系進行研究。本文的主要內(nèi)容如下所述： 1、在構(gòu)建制造商和銷售商博弈模型的基礎(chǔ)上，將計算實驗方法引入到供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)的研究中去，通過自下而上的研究方法，利用多主體建模技術(shù)來建立供應(yīng)鏈模型，設(shè)計了關(guān)于供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)競合關(guān)系的計算實驗，以實驗的方法嘗試進行供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間競合關(guān)系的研究。并且實驗發(fā)現(xiàn)的規(guī)律與演化博弈方法所得出的結(jié)論基本一致，，證明了實驗的可行性。通過實驗我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)合作的支付矩陣以及初始合作比例對供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間的競合關(guān)系有著重要的影響； 2、針對監(jiān)督機制和信譽機制分別設(shè)計了實驗，并對實驗中發(fā)現(xiàn)的規(guī)律性現(xiàn)象進行總結(jié)，通過實驗我們發(fā)現(xiàn)： （1）監(jiān)督機制對供應(yīng)鏈網(wǎng)絡(luò)企業(yè)間的競合關(guān)系具有一定的保障作用，但是由于監(jiān)督機制的局限性（不是所有的背叛行為都會被發(fā)現(xiàn)），只要存在監(jiān)督不嚴(yán)的情況，背叛行為就會一直存在于系統(tǒng)中，部分行為主體采取背叛行為后取得高于常規(guī)的收益，這種行為就會被系統(tǒng)中的其他行為主體學(xué)習(xí)，進而導(dǎo)致了背叛行為的泛濫。但是高監(jiān)督水平可以使系統(tǒng)的合作率維持在比較高的水平上；低監(jiān)督水平下，系統(tǒng)中的背叛行為最終會在系統(tǒng)中泛濫。 （2）在信譽機制下，良好的信譽環(huán)境是企業(yè)采取合作策略的前提條件，在較差的信譽環(huán)境中，企業(yè)因為對于合作的收益預(yù)期不樂觀，害怕遭遇背叛而寧愿采取背叛策略獲得較少的收益；同時，在企業(yè)采取合作策略時，對企業(yè)采取一定的信譽激勵也是十分必要的，通過實驗發(fā)現(xiàn)，對于企業(yè)信譽采取懲罰措施反而加速了企業(yè)采取背叛策略。 3、結(jié)合上文的結(jié)論對聯(lián)想供應(yīng)鏈控制采購成本失敗的原因進行了研究并提出了相應(yīng)的建議。
[Abstract]:With the acceleration of the process of market economy integration, the competition between enterprises has been transformed into the competition between supply chain and supply chain. The complexity of environment and the change of competition mode have changed the operation mode of supply chain management. At the same time, it brings challenges to supply chain management. Based on the method of computational experiment, this paper starts from the special relationship of competition and cooperation among enterprises, and on the basis of the important factors that affect the relationship between enterprises in the supply chain network. The main contents of this paper are as follows:. 1. On the basis of constructing the game model of manufacturer and seller, the computational experiment method is introduced into the research of supply chain system. Through the bottom-up research method, the multi-agent modeling technology is used to establish the supply chain model. This paper designs a computational experiment on the competitive relationship between enterprises in the supply chain network, tries to study the relationship between the enterprises in the supply chain network by the experimental method, and the rule found by the experiment is basically consistent with the conclusion of the evolutionary game method. The feasibility of the experiment is proved. Through the experiment, we find that the payment matrix and the initial cooperation ratio of the enterprise cooperation have an important influence on the competition and cooperation relationship between the enterprises in the supply chain network. 2. According to the supervision mechanism and reputation mechanism, the experiment is designed, and the regular phenomena found in the experiment are summarized. Through the experiment, we find that:. (1) the supervision mechanism can guarantee the competition and cooperation relationship among the enterprises in the supply chain network, but because of the limitation of the supervision mechanism (not all betrayal will be found, as long as there is a situation of lax supervision, Betrayal will always exist in the system, some of the behavior subjects take betrayal behavior to obtain higher than the conventional benefits, and this behavior will be learned by other actors in the system. But the high level of supervision can keep the cooperation rate of the system at a relatively high level; under the low level of supervision, the betrayal behavior in the system will eventually spread in the system. 2) under the reputation mechanism, a good reputation environment is a prerequisite for enterprises to adopt cooperative strategies. In a poor reputation environment, enterprises are not optimistic about the benefits of cooperation. At the same time, it is necessary to take a certain credit incentive when enterprises adopt cooperative strategy. On the other hand, punitive measures for corporate reputation accelerate the adoption of betrayal strategy. 3. Based on the above conclusions, the causes of the failure of Lenovo supply chain to control purchasing cost are studied and the corresponding suggestions are put forward.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：寧波大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F273.7

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相關(guān)期刊論文 前1條

1 張慶一;李貴春;蹤程;;供應(yīng)鏈企業(yè)競爭與合作的博弈分析[J];統(tǒng)計與決策;2010年09期

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