本文關(guān)鍵詞：基于博弈論的工程項(xiàng)目建設(shè)過程的溝通管理研究　出處：《華北電力大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 博弈論 溝通管理 工程項(xiàng)目

【摘要】：隨著中國改革開放戰(zhàn)略的順利進(jìn)行,建筑市場正在逐步完善,建筑業(yè)已發(fā)展成國民經(jīng)濟(jì)中的一個(gè)支柱產(chǎn)業(yè)。然而,建筑項(xiàng)目的建設(shè)和實(shí)施過程中,仍然存在如信息不對稱、信息溝通不暢和各方利益分配不均等問題。要降低這些問題對項(xiàng)目各方利益的損害,就要科學(xué)管理各個(gè)溝通環(huán)節(jié),優(yōu)化溝通及決策過程。本文擬將博弈論運(yùn)用于項(xiàng)目溝通管理,將項(xiàng)目不同階段溝通過程中的影響因素及利益分配用數(shù)學(xué)模型的形式表達(dá)出來,分析各階段影響因素和利益收益之間的關(guān)系,找出影響項(xiàng)目利益主體收益的因素,為決策者提供決策依據(jù)。 本文將運(yùn)用博弈論,分析建筑工程項(xiàng)目中的各利益主體之間的溝通,建立各利益主體之間的溝通博弈模型,并提出在項(xiàng)目生命周期各階段的溝通中應(yīng)選擇的最優(yōu)策略,實(shí)現(xiàn)多方利益的最優(yōu)。本文在梳理國內(nèi)外研究現(xiàn)狀和相關(guān)理論的基礎(chǔ)上,對項(xiàng)目各階段的流程和內(nèi)容加以分析,并從博弈的角度分析不同階段的相關(guān)利益主體之間在溝通過程中的溝通策略及溝通博弈過程。最后在第四章通過建立博弈模型,確定博弈各方的收益函數(shù)、分析影響收益的主要因素、研究各階段溝通博弈的最優(yōu)策略組合等問題。在此基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)一步構(gòu)建科學(xué)合理的溝通管理模型。 論文研究發(fā)現(xiàn)：不同階段各利益主體利益最大化及最優(yōu)的影響因素不同,各利益主體考慮的溝通策略不同,不同階段適用的博弈模型類型也不同。在項(xiàng)目決策階段,各博弈方(利益主體)以達(dá)成協(xié)議為目標(biāo),在政府對大型建設(shè)工程項(xiàng)目選擇審查策略概率較大時(shí),項(xiàng)目的整體效益與業(yè)主愿意支付社會效益成本的概率成正相關(guān)。針對大型建設(shè)工程項(xiàng)目或?qū)χ車h(huán)境影響較大的項(xiàng)目來說,政府的優(yōu)惠政策是引導(dǎo)項(xiàng)目業(yè)主能夠更多考慮社會效益的主要因素；在招投標(biāo)階段,通過業(yè)主風(fēng)險(xiǎn)類型和投標(biāo)方報(bào)價(jià)分析看出,對于大型建設(shè)工程項(xiàng)目或公共項(xiàng)目,提高技術(shù)質(zhì)量降低管理成本是能否中標(biāo)的主要影響因素；在施工及驗(yàn)收階段,各博弈方(利益主體)溝通過程是在已經(jīng)達(dá)的協(xié)議下進(jìn)行溝通,業(yè)主的收益與監(jiān)理方和承包商的尋租概率成負(fù)相關(guān),與業(yè)主的監(jiān)控概率和監(jiān)控有效性成正相關(guān)關(guān)系。監(jiān)理方與施工方在與業(yè)主溝通過程中,是否合謀與業(yè)主對監(jiān)理方的授權(quán)及業(yè)主自身的監(jiān)督能力有很大關(guān)系。此外,還與準(zhǔn)備階段的招投標(biāo)過程中達(dá)成的協(xié)議有關(guān)。最后在上述模型分析的基礎(chǔ)上,建立各個(gè)階段的溝通模型,總結(jié)如何使溝通博弈參與方達(dá)到利益最優(yōu)化。
[Abstract]:With the smooth development of China's reform and opening up strategy, the construction market is gradually improving, and the construction industry has developed into a pillar industry in the national economy. However, the construction and implementation of construction projects in the process. There are still problems such as asymmetric information, poor information communication and unequal distribution of interests of all parties. To reduce the damage to the interests of all parties to the project, it is necessary to manage each communication link scientifically. This paper intends to apply game theory to project communication management and express the influencing factors and benefit distribution in different stages of the project in the form of mathematical model. This paper analyzes the relationship between the influencing factors and the benefits in each stage, finds out the factors that affect the profit of the main interests of the project, and provides the decision making basis for the decision makers. In this paper, the game theory is used to analyze the communication among the stakeholders in the construction project, and the communication game model between the stakeholders is established. And put forward in the project life cycle in the various stages of communication should choose the optimal strategy to achieve the best multi-interest. This paper reviews the domestic and foreign research status and related theories on the basis. Analyze the process and content of each phase of the project. And from the perspective of the game analysis of the different stages of the relevant stakeholders in the communication process of the communication strategy and communication game process. Finally in the 4th chapter through the establishment of a game model to determine the benefit of the parties to the game function. Based on the analysis of the main factors affecting the revenue and the study of the optimal strategy combination of the communication game in each stage, a scientific and reasonable communication management model is constructed. The paper finds that: different stages of the interests of the main interests maximization and optimal factors are different, different stakeholders consider different communication strategies. In the project decision-making stage, the game parties (stakeholders) aim to reach an agreement, when the probability of the government to choose a review strategy for large-scale construction projects is high. The overall benefit of the project is positively related to the probability that the owner is willing to pay the cost of social benefits. The preferential policy of the government is the main factor to guide the project owner to consider the social benefit more; In the bidding stage, through the analysis of the owner's risk type and the bidder's quotation, it can be seen that for the large-scale construction project or public project, improving the technical quality and reducing the management cost are the main influencing factors to win the bid. In the stage of construction and acceptance, the communication process of game parties (stakeholders) is carried out under the agreement reached, and the owner's income is negatively correlated with the rent-seeking probability of the supervisor and the contractor. There is a positive correlation with the monitoring probability and effectiveness of the employer. The supervisor and the constructor are communicating with the owner. Whether collusion is related to the owner's authorization to the supervisor and the owner's own supervisory ability. In addition, it is also related to the agreement reached in the bidding process of the preparatory stage. Finally, on the basis of the above model analysis. The communication model of each stage is established, and how to optimize the benefit of the participants in the communication game is summarized.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：F282;F426.92;F224.32

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