本文選題：碳金融　切入點(diǎn)：清潔發(fā)展機(jī)制　出處：《武漢理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：隨著全球氣候變暖問(wèn)題的日益嚴(yán)重,人們?cè)谏a(chǎn)與生活過(guò)程中擁有的碳排方空間從免費(fèi)的公共資源變?yōu)槭苤攸c(diǎn)約束的考量因素,同時(shí)低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展成為紛紛關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。而金融體系的支持與推動(dòng)對(duì)于低碳經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展具有重要的影響,以碳排放權(quán)為核心的碳金融,作為解決氣候變化問(wèn)題進(jìn)行金融創(chuàng)新的主要方向,是促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)與社會(huì)可持續(xù)發(fā)展的重要經(jīng)濟(jì)手段。清潔發(fā)展機(jī)制(CDM)是我國(guó)作為發(fā)展中國(guó)家參與碳排放權(quán)交易的重要方式,對(duì)我國(guó)碳金融順利發(fā)展發(fā)揮著重要作用。 本文從博弈論的角度研究我國(guó)商業(yè)銀行與生產(chǎn)企業(yè)在進(jìn)行CDM項(xiàng)目建設(shè)上的決策行為會(huì)如何相互作用。第一部分詳細(xì)論述了碳金融及清潔發(fā)展機(jī)制的基本理論并從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)角度分析了CDM項(xiàng)目實(shí)施的可行性。在對(duì)我國(guó)CDM項(xiàng)目省市分布和減排類(lèi)型建設(shè)現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行深入分析基礎(chǔ)上,提出了我國(guó)企業(yè)CDM項(xiàng)目建設(shè)及商業(yè)銀行參與方面存在的問(wèn)題。第二部分運(yùn)用動(dòng)態(tài)博弈的方法,通過(guò)建立兩方三階段動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,分析商業(yè)銀行支持CDM項(xiàng)目建設(shè)的業(yè)務(wù)開(kāi)展和參與CDM項(xiàng)目企業(yè)是否按照規(guī)定進(jìn)行減排生產(chǎn)的雙方博弈行為。根據(jù)博弈結(jié)果總結(jié)出CDM項(xiàng)目的正常實(shí)施依賴(lài)于監(jiān)管部門(mén)獎(jiǎng)懲制度和銀行對(duì)其業(yè)務(wù)開(kāi)展監(jiān)督的持續(xù)性。第三部分運(yùn)用進(jìn)化博弈的方法分析商業(yè)銀行和企業(yè)在長(zhǎng)期動(dòng)態(tài)的博弈過(guò)程中行為的選擇方向。通過(guò)構(gòu)建進(jìn)化博弈模型,求解復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程的進(jìn)化穩(wěn)定策略和漸進(jìn)穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)等方法討論了監(jiān)管部門(mén)的監(jiān)管程度、銀行開(kāi)展力度和消費(fèi)者關(guān)注程度的漸進(jìn)穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)。根據(jù)博弈結(jié)果總結(jié)出,企業(yè)CDM項(xiàng)目參與的決策行為受到監(jiān)管部門(mén)獎(jiǎng)懲、商業(yè)銀行等金融機(jī)構(gòu)的承載和社會(huì)公眾低碳意識(shí)的影響,以此為基礎(chǔ),認(rèn)為應(yīng)從政府等主管部門(mén)的激勵(lì)和懲罰機(jī)制、商業(yè)銀行推動(dòng)機(jī)制、企業(yè)的參與機(jī)制方面促進(jìn)我國(guó)CDM項(xiàng)目的建設(shè)和完善。第四部分為了進(jìn)一步討論在長(zhǎng)期動(dòng)態(tài)博弈過(guò)程中各參數(shù)對(duì)博弈各方的影響,通過(guò)計(jì)算機(jī)程序?qū)M(jìn)化博弈中的復(fù)制動(dòng)態(tài)方程進(jìn)行了數(shù)值仿真,并且仿真的結(jié)論進(jìn)一步驗(yàn)證了博弈結(jié)果的正確性。 最后,結(jié)合博弈模型的均衡分析結(jié)果,從政府、商業(yè)銀行以及企業(yè)三個(gè)角度提出了相應(yīng)的策略。政府作為監(jiān)管部門(mén)應(yīng)加強(qiáng)監(jiān)管力度和完善獎(jiǎng)懲制度,營(yíng)造建設(shè)的大環(huán)境。商業(yè)銀行應(yīng)廣泛開(kāi)展相關(guān)創(chuàng)新業(yè)務(wù)來(lái)支持CDM項(xiàng)目發(fā)展,利用金融杠桿有力地促進(jìn)自然和社會(huì)環(huán)境的良性發(fā)展。企業(yè)應(yīng)積極參與適合自身的CDM項(xiàng)目,從而取得品牌宣傳與推廣的先機(jī)。
[Abstract]:As global warming becomes more acute, the amount of carbon space that people have in their production and lives has changed from a free public resource to a critical constraint. At the same time, the development of low-carbon economy has become the focus of attention, and the support and promotion of the financial system has an important impact on the development of low-carbon economy. As the main direction of financial innovation to solve the problem of climate change, it is an important economic means to promote sustainable economic and social development. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is an important way for China to participate in carbon emissions trading as a developing country. It plays an important role in the smooth development of carbon finance in China. From the perspective of game theory, this paper studies how the decision-making behavior of commercial banks and manufacturing enterprises in China will interact in the construction of CDM projects. The first part discusses the basic theories of carbon finance and clean development mechanism in detail. This paper analyzes the feasibility of implementing CDM project from the angle of economics. On the basis of in-depth analysis of the distribution of provinces and cities and the construction of emission reduction types of CDM projects in China, The problems in the construction of CDM projects and the participation of commercial banks in China are put forward. The second part uses the method of dynamic game to establish a two-party and three-stage dynamic game model. This paper analyzes the game behavior of commercial banks supporting the construction of CDM projects and whether the enterprises involved in CDM projects are engaged in emission reduction production in accordance with the regulations. Based on the results of the game, it is concluded that the normal implementation of CDM projects depends on the regulatory authorities. The third part uses the evolutionary game method to analyze the choice direction of commercial banks and enterprises in the long-term dynamic game process. The evolutionary stability strategy and the gradual stable state of solving the replicating dynamic equation are discussed in this paper. The degree of supervision, the degree of bank development and the degree of consumer concern are discussed. The decision-making behavior of enterprise CDM project participation is influenced by the reward and punishment of the regulatory department, the bearing capacity of the financial institution such as the commercial bank and the low carbon consciousness of the public. On the basis of this, the incentive and punishment mechanism of the government and other competent departments should be taken as the basis. In 4th, in order to further discuss the influence of the parameters on the game parties in the long-term dynamic game process, the commercial banks promote the construction and perfection of the CDM project in the aspect of the participation mechanism of the enterprises. The replicating dynamic equation in evolutionary game is numerically simulated by computer program, and the conclusion of simulation further verifies the correctness of the game result. Finally, combining the equilibrium analysis result of the game model, this paper puts forward the corresponding strategies from three angles of government, commercial bank and enterprise. The government should strengthen the supervision and perfect the reward and punishment system as the supervision department. Commercial banks should carry out relevant innovative business to support the development of CDM projects, and make use of financial leverage to promote the benign development of natural and social environment. Enterprises should actively participate in CDM projects suitable for themselves. In order to achieve brand publicity and promotion of the first opportunity.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：武漢理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F832.33;F279.2;F224.32

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