發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-01-11 10:00

  本文關(guān)鍵詞：利益集團(tuán)與美國(guó)匯率政策調(diào)整　出處：《吉林大學(xué)》2013年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

  更多相關(guān)文章： 利益集團(tuán) 美國(guó) 匯率政策 結(jié)盟游說(shuō) “院外援華集團(tuán)”

【摘要】：作為開(kāi)放條件下的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)政策的重要組成部分，匯率政策原本是國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究的重要課題。但這些研究未能考慮到政治因素的重要性，因而存在著嚴(yán)重缺陷。事實(shí)上，匯率政策本質(zhì)上是一種收入再分配政策：一方面，它在國(guó)內(nèi)不同利益集團(tuán)之間產(chǎn)生“收入再分配”效應(yīng)。面對(duì)利益格局的變化，，“贏家”和“輸家”會(huì)動(dòng)員其經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治資源，以尋求對(duì)決策當(dāng)局的匯率政策施加影響，直至達(dá)到新的利益平衡。另一方面，一國(guó)特別是大國(guó)的匯率政策會(huì)產(chǎn)生重要的“外溢效果”，從而在國(guó)內(nèi)外不同利益集團(tuán)之間產(chǎn)生“收入再分配”效應(yīng)。與之相關(guān)的“贏家”和“輸家”也會(huì)為謀求自身利益的最大化做出努力�？梢�(jiàn)，匯率政策既是一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，又是一個(gè)政治問(wèn)題；不僅是一個(gè)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)問(wèn)題，更是一個(gè)國(guó)際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)問(wèn)題。 依循這一思路，本文從利益集團(tuán)的角度，運(yùn)用理論分析與實(shí)證分析相結(jié)合、邏輯分析與歷史分析相結(jié)合、整體分析與案例分析相結(jié)合的研究方法，研究布雷頓森林體系以來(lái)的美國(guó)匯率政策調(diào)整，考察的對(duì)象包括美國(guó)匯率政策的決策機(jī)制及特征、美國(guó)匯率政策制定與調(diào)整中所涉及的利益集團(tuán)、布雷頓森林體系下的利益集團(tuán)與美國(guó)匯率政策的調(diào)整、后布雷頓森林體系下的利益集團(tuán)行為與美國(guó)匯率政策的調(diào)整、利益集團(tuán)的活動(dòng)與美國(guó)對(duì)華匯率外交。本文的根本目的旨在解決三個(gè)方面的問(wèn)題：第一，思考美國(guó)匯率政策的決策機(jī)制、決策過(guò)程的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)特征及政策調(diào)整的邏輯；第二，思考美國(guó)的貨幣政治和匯率外交；第三，思考美國(guó)匯率政策的外溢效果及外圍國(guó)家的應(yīng)對(duì)策略。 除“導(dǎo)論”外，論文共分為6章。第1章“美國(guó)匯率政策的決策機(jī)制及特征”，首先利用政治學(xué)理論中的結(jié)構(gòu)—功能論和系統(tǒng)論的方法，用“初始條件”、“政策輸入”、“政策決策”、“政策輸出”、“政治體制”、“國(guó)際政治經(jīng)濟(jì)格局”六要素，刻畫(huà)出政府政策制定與決策過(guò)程的一般框架。在此基礎(chǔ)上，從制度化程度和分權(quán)化程度兩個(gè)方面將美國(guó)政治體制的性質(zhì)簡(jiǎn)潔地概括為“依托制度代理關(guān)系的權(quán)力共享”。論文隨后給出了美國(guó)匯率政策決策過(guò)程的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)特征：作為立法機(jī)構(gòu)的國(guó)會(huì)對(duì)政府的匯率政策擁有監(jiān)督權(quán)；作為行政機(jī)構(gòu)的財(cái)政部與作為獨(dú)立部門(mén)的美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)之間的非對(duì)稱(chēng)合作是美國(guó)匯率政策決策的最重要的組織動(dòng)力；作為美國(guó)政治經(jīng)濟(jì)生活的重要構(gòu)成，國(guó)內(nèi)多元化經(jīng)濟(jì)利益集團(tuán)對(duì)政府匯率政策的影響力正日益凸顯；美國(guó)政府也面臨著來(lái)自外國(guó)政府和私人經(jīng)濟(jì)利益集團(tuán)的逐漸增長(zhǎng)的外部約束。最后，本章總結(jié)了美國(guó)匯率政策調(diào)整的邏輯：首先，作為立法機(jī)構(gòu)的國(guó)會(huì)選擇逼迫（或壓迫）財(cái)政部和美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)調(diào)整匯率政策的時(shí)機(jī)，主要取決于國(guó)會(huì)議員所面臨的來(lái)自國(guó)內(nèi)外不同類(lèi)型利益集團(tuán)的壓力大小。其次，匯率政策的決策者采取的是一種“雙層博弈”策略，即要兼顧到國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)外兩個(gè)層次的利益訴求，既不能忽視國(guó)內(nèi)利益集團(tuán)的訴求，又要考慮國(guó)外利益集團(tuán)的態(tài)度。再次，利益集團(tuán)是否有意愿、有能力推進(jìn)決策者的匯率政策調(diào)整，以及在多大程度上促成該調(diào)整朝向其所期望的方向和目標(biāo)，是多種因素的函數(shù)。 第2章“美國(guó)匯率政策制定與調(diào)整中的利益集團(tuán)”，首先回顧了前人對(duì)利益集團(tuán)的理解，并據(jù)此給出自己的定義：由對(duì)共同利益有著明確認(rèn)知和訴求的成員所組成的，并以增進(jìn)其成員的共同利益為動(dòng)機(jī)或目的的組織或?qū)嶓w。隨后，論文梳理了利益集團(tuán)理論的演進(jìn)脈絡(luò)。在此基礎(chǔ)上，論文分析了與美國(guó)匯率政策密切相關(guān)的利益集團(tuán)及其匯率政策偏好，并就利益集團(tuán)圍繞匯率政策存在的集體行動(dòng)困境展開(kāi)分析。最后，運(yùn)用翔實(shí)的數(shù)據(jù)分析了利益集團(tuán)賴(lài)以影響美國(guó)政府匯率政策的資源和策略。 第3章“布雷頓森林體系下的利益集團(tuán)與美國(guó)匯率政策調(diào)整”，首先考察了布雷頓森林體系初創(chuàng)期內(nèi)“沉默的”美國(guó)利益集團(tuán)，指出這一“沉默”現(xiàn)象源于五個(gè)方面的原因：國(guó)際貨幣政策領(lǐng)域的專(zhuān)業(yè)性；國(guó)際貨幣政策決策場(chǎng)所的隔絕性；政府輿論宣傳的導(dǎo)向性；集體行動(dòng)的困境；美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的相對(duì)封閉性。其次，論文考察了1963-1968年間國(guó)內(nèi)外不同利益集團(tuán)圍繞美國(guó)的利息平衡稅（IET）、自愿對(duì)外信貸限制計(jì)劃（VFCR）、對(duì)外直接投資計(jì)劃（FDIP）所開(kāi)展的利益集團(tuán)政治。最后，分析了1968-1973年間國(guó)內(nèi)外利益集團(tuán)的行為與尼克松治下的美國(guó)匯率政策調(diào)整。 第4章“后布雷頓森林體系下的利益集團(tuán)與美國(guó)匯率政策”，首先考察了第一輪強(qiáng)勢(shì)美元政策給美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)相關(guān)利益集團(tuán)帶來(lái)的強(qiáng)烈沖擊，以及這些利益集團(tuán)為此展開(kāi)的密集游說(shuō)。隨后，研究了第二輪強(qiáng)勢(shì)美元政策推行期間美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)利益集團(tuán)的集體“失聲”現(xiàn)象。此外，論文分析了美國(guó)金融部門(mén)利益集團(tuán)在后布雷頓森林體系下對(duì)美國(guó)匯率政策的“悄然影響”。最后，對(duì)外國(guó)利益集團(tuán)在美國(guó)匯率政策調(diào)整中的作為和作用進(jìn)行了探討。 第5章“利益集團(tuán)與美國(guó)對(duì)華匯率外交”，首先，回顧了美國(guó)對(duì)華匯率外交的緣起：人民幣低估論和匯率操縱指控；其次，考察了美國(guó)對(duì)華匯率外交中所涉及的私人經(jīng)濟(jì)利益集團(tuán)，分別分析了保護(hù)性經(jīng)濟(jì)利益集團(tuán)的結(jié)盟游說(shuō)和美國(guó)反保護(hù)經(jīng)濟(jì)利益集團(tuán)——“院外援華集團(tuán)”的聯(lián)合抵制行動(dòng)；再次，研究了中國(guó)政府回應(yīng)美國(guó)匯率外交的態(tài)度、策略以及對(duì)美國(guó)政府施壓的影響；最后，通過(guò)對(duì)比美元本位制下中日兩國(guó)在應(yīng)對(duì)美國(guó)匯率外交壓力方面的能力強(qiáng)弱，揭示了美國(guó)對(duì)華匯率外交的短板。 第6章“結(jié)論與前瞻”，簡(jiǎn)要總結(jié)了論文前面各章的主要結(jié)論，并就今后需要進(jìn)一步研究的問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了初步的探討。
[Abstract]:As an important part of the open conditions of macroeconomic policy, exchange rate policy was an important research topic in international economics. But these studies failed to consider the importance of political factors, thus seriously flawed. In fact, the exchange rate policy is essentially a kind of income redistribution policy: on the one hand, it produces a "redistribution of income" effect in China between different interest groups. In the face of the change of interest pattern, "winners" and "losers" will mobilize its economic and political resources, to seek to influence the decision-making authorities exchange rate policy, to achieve the balance of interests of the new direct. On the other hand, a country especially big exchange rate policy will have an important the "spillover effect", resulting in "income redistribution effect between different interest groups at home and abroad. The" winners "and" losers "will seek for self benefit We should make efforts to maximize profits. We can see that exchange rate policy is both an economic issue and a political one. It's not only a political economy issue, but also an international political and economic issue.
According to this idea, this paper from the point of view of interest groups, the use of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, logical analysis and historical analysis of combining research methods, analysis of the overall analysis and case combination, the exchange rate policy adjustment of the Bretton Woods system has been the object of study include the decision-making mechanism and characteristics of American exchange rate policy. The formulation and adjustment of the interest groups involved in the exchange rate policy, the Bretton Woods system of interest groups and the adjustment of the exchange rate policy, interest group behavior after the Bretton Woods system and the adjustment of the exchange rate policy, interest group activities and the United States to China foreign exchange rate. The fundamental purpose of this paper aims at three aspects question: first, decision-making mechanism of American exchange rate policy, political and economic characteristics and the adjustment of the policy decision process logic; second, think about America Monetary politics and exchange rate diplomacy; third, thinking about the spillover effect of the US exchange rate policy and the coping strategies of the peripheral countries.
In addition to the "Introduction", the paper is divided into 6 chapters. The first chapter "the decision mechanism and the characteristics of the exchange rate policy, the first use of political science methodology in the theory of structure function theory and system, with the" initial conditions "," policy input "," policy "," policy output. "" the political system "," the international political and economic pattern "six elements, depicts the general framework of government policy formulation and decision-making process. On this basis, from the two aspects of the system and the degree of decentralization will be the nature of American political system briefly summarized as" relying on the system of agency relationship. Then the power sharing "given the political and economic characteristics of making process of American exchange rate policy: as the legislature of the Congress has oversight of the government's exchange rate policy; non symmetry between administrative agencies as the Treasury and the Federal Reserve as an independent department Cooperation is the American exchange rate policy decision is the most important organization power; as an important part of American political and economic life, domestic interest group diversified economic influence on the government's exchange rate policy is becoming increasingly prominent; the United States government is also facing increasing external constraints from foreign governments and private economic interests. Finally, this chapter summarizes the adjustment of exchange rate policy logic: first, as the legislature Congress forced (or compression) the Treasury and the fed to adjust the exchange rate policy of the time at home and abroad from different types of interest group pressure depends mainly on the size of Congress faced. Secondly, the exchange rate policy makers to take a double game "the strategy, take into account the interests of the two levels of domestic and abroad, we can not ignore the demands of domestic interest groups, but also consider the foreign interest Interest group's attitude. Once again, whether interest groups have the will and ability to promote the adjustment of policy makers' exchange rate policy and to what extent to make the adjustment towards their desired direction and goal is a function of many factors.
The second chapter "the American exchange rate policy formulation and adjustment of the interest group", first reviews the previous understanding of the interest group, and gives the definition of their own: composed of members have a clear cognition and pursuit of common interests, and to promote the common interests of the members of the organization or entity motive or purpose then, this paper reviews the evolution of interest group theory. On this basis, the paper analyses the American exchange rate policy is closely related to the interests of the group and its exchange rate policy preferences, and interest groups around the collective action dilemma existing exchange rate policy are analyzed. Finally, using detailed data analysis for the influence of interest group of the United States government exchange rate the policy of resources and strategies.
The third chapter "the Bretton Woods system of interest groups and American exchange rate policy adjustment, first examines the Bretton Woods system start-up period" silent "American interest group, the reason that this" Silence "phenomenon from five aspects: the professional field of international monetary policy; policy places the international monetary isolation oriented government; public opinion propaganda; the dilemma of collective action; the United States economy is relatively closed. Secondly, this paper investigates the interest equalization tax between 1963-1968 domestic and different interest groups around the United States (IET), voluntary foreign credit restraint program (VFCR), foreign direct investment plan (FDIP) to carry out political interest group the analysis of the United States. Finally, adjust the exchange rate between 1968-1973 domestic and foreign interest group behavior and under Nixon.
The fourth chapter "after the Bretton Woods system of interest groups and the exchange rate policy, strong shock first inspected the first round of strong dollar policy to us domestic interest groups brings, and these intense lobbying by interest groups. Then, on the second round of strong dollar policy during the implementation of the interest groups of the collective" voice "phenomenon. In addition, this paper analyzes the financial sector in the US interest groups in the post Bretton Woods system on American exchange rate policy" quietly ". Finally, on foreign interests and exchange rate policy as a role in the adjustment in the United States are discussed.
The fifth chapter "interest group and the United States to China foreign exchange rate", firstly, reviews the origin of American Diplomacy: an undervalued renminbi exchange rate to China on currency manipulation and charges; secondly, investigated the group involved in America's foreign exchange rate in the private economic interests, respectively analyzes the protective economic interest group lobbying and anti American alliance protection economic interest group -- "China lobby" boycott; again, on the China government response to the exchange rate of U.S. diplomatic attitude, strategy and the impact on the United States put pressure on the government; finally, through the comparison of the dollar standard in Japan in response to U.S. foreign exchange rate pressure ability, reveals the short board of America China foreign exchange rate.
The sixth chapter, "conclusion and foresight", briefly summarizes the main conclusions of the chapters in front of the paper, and makes a preliminary discussion on the problems that need further study in the future.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F837.12

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