【摘要】：知識產權法和競爭法從產生之日便交織在一起，它們之間既存在共同目標，又具有沖突和矛盾的一面。共同目標體現(xiàn)在鼓勵創(chuàng)新和促進消費者福利。沖突則主要在于它們鼓勵創(chuàng)新和促進消費者福利的方式不同：反壟斷法是通過反對限制競爭、維護市場有效競爭來實現(xiàn)目標，因為限制競爭會損害現(xiàn)實和潛在的競爭；而知識產權法則是通過授予某種限制競爭的方式，如通過保護專有權，給予權利人一段時間內的排他性權利來激勵人們在知識經濟領域的創(chuàng)新活動。雖然知識產權法保護權利人的排他性權利，但知識產權與一般財產權一樣在反壟斷法上并無根本的區(qū)別，因為知識產權也具有限制競爭的可能性，難免會受到反壟斷法的制約。也就是說，一方面，權利人有權通過其發(fā)明創(chuàng)造等受知識產權保護的智力成果獲取競爭優(yōu)勢地位甚至壟斷地位；另一方面，因為市場經濟的本質是競爭，競爭也是促進創(chuàng)新的途徑之一，反壟斷法不允許知識產權人憑借其壟斷地位而嚴重妨礙、限制或者扭曲市場競爭。 對于競爭法是否應該干預知識產權的問題，理論界有兩種截然相反的觀點。一種是不干預論，這種觀點認為即使某一特定知識產權確實給權利人帶來了壟斷力，這種排他性權利也應該受到保護，免于競爭法審查；競爭法的適用只會給知識產權制度的激勵機制造成負面影響。政策制定者在打擊限制競爭行為時犯錯的可能性和各種錯誤的代價決定了譴責競爭性行為的成本比豁免限制競爭行為的成本要高。因此，建議競爭法執(zhí)法者不要干預與知識產權有關的創(chuàng)新市場。美國在微軟拆分案對待知識產權壟斷的態(tài)度是不干預論。當微軟面臨壟斷而被起訴面臨拆分的危險時，美國經濟學界達成了一種前所未有的默契，痛斥美國反壟斷法。與不干預論相反的是歐盟委員會一貫持有的干預論，這種干預的基礎是互補理論。互補理論認為：知識產權法授予排他性權利的事實并不意味著知識產權和競爭規(guī)則之間存在固有的沖突。實際上，這兩個法律制度都以促進消費者福利和資源的有效分配為基本目標。創(chuàng)新是一個開放的競爭市場所必要的、動態(tài)的組成部分。知識產權通過鼓勵企業(yè)投資開發(fā)新產品、新技術來促進動態(tài)競爭，而競爭法通過給企業(yè)實施競爭壓力促進創(chuàng)新。所以，二者均為促進創(chuàng)新和競爭所必須。除了知識產權制度的保護外，企業(yè)投資創(chuàng)新也需要來自其他企業(yè)的競爭壓力。沒有知識產權保護，競爭者可以通過模仿來競爭，而不需要自己投資更好的新產品；沒有競爭壓力，就不能保證知識產權人獲得壟斷利潤后會繼續(xù)投資創(chuàng)新。尤其在迅猛發(fā)展的高科技領域，某個擁有事實上或法律上的標準的知識產權企業(yè)很容易將整個市場收歸己有，此后該知識產權企業(yè)就可能排除這一市場原本存在的競爭，為擴張知識產權而開始尋租活動。由此可見，在競爭狀態(tài)下，一個競爭者可以通過投資創(chuàng)新贏得未來的壟斷利潤，但反過來，在壟斷狀態(tài)下，一個支配地位企業(yè)不需要繼續(xù)投資未來的創(chuàng)新就能獲得壟斷利潤。所以，以互補理論為基礎的干預論主張，動態(tài)競爭受到限制時競爭法應該干預知識產權領域。 近年來，跨國公司屢屢在我國通過知識產權策略如拒絕許可、超高定價、強制性一攬子許可、設置“專利叢林”等手段，濫用其因為擁有知識產權而獲得的市場支配地位，排擠競爭對手，危及我國民族企業(yè)的發(fā)展，損害消費者福利。在我國，從理論上講，知識產權濫用的情況也不僅僅發(fā)生在跨國公司身上，國內企業(yè)同樣也可能發(fā)生知識產權濫用的情況。但目前由于我國本土企業(yè)在知識產權方面還處于相對劣勢，而跨國公司實力雄厚，技術先進，持有的知識產權也很多，較之我國一般企業(yè)來說更容易發(fā)生知識產權濫用的問題，其影響也更大。所以經常見諸報端的知識產權濫用市場支配地位行為主要是跨國公司所為。 在中國并不是真的不存在知識產權濫用市場支配地位的問題，只是因為很多情況下沒有相應的法律規(guī)范才使一些行為沒有受到應有的制裁。如何防止知識產權制度背離其立法初衷和淪為創(chuàng)新壟斷的工具，是我國反壟斷法需要解決的一個重要問題。過度保護的權利必然導致權利的濫用。尤其在我國自主創(chuàng)新水平較低，技術相對落后，而外來知識產權力量強大的狀況下，知識產權立法已與國際接軌，降低知識產權保護水平不可行，因此不能不強化知識產權反壟斷規(guī)制。強知識產權保護與強反壟斷法規(guī)制是一個硬幣的兩面，是為我國技術發(fā)展經濟騰飛保駕護航的兩大支柱。因此，兩手都要抓，而且兩手都要硬。相對于知識產權保護來說，我國知識產權反壟斷問題顯得更為突出，已經迫在眉睫，但我國在知識產權反壟斷方面的立法卻不完善。如何在保護競爭和保護知識產權之間找到平衡點，即一方面保護知識產權的激勵機制，使其充分發(fā)揮“給天才之火添加了利益之油”的功能，以最終豐富公共產品和提高消費者福利，另一方面又要維護市場的有效競爭，將知識產權領域的排除、限制競爭限于為激勵創(chuàng)新所必需的范圍之內，這是我國急需解決的問題。 從國際經驗看，歐盟競爭法的首要目標是建立統(tǒng)一的內部市場，對利用知識產權來限制商品貨物自由流動和限制自由競爭等行為進行嚴格規(guī)制，歐洲法院因此創(chuàng)立了一系列規(guī)制知識產權濫用的原則和判例。歐盟對知識產權濫用的規(guī)制主要是通過競爭法來實現(xiàn)。與美國那種對知識產權反競爭行為，尤其是知識產權濫用市場支配地位行為較為寬松的態(tài)度相比，歐盟的經驗更適合今天的中國。 在濫用市場支配地位的規(guī)制上，我國《反壟斷法》更多地借鑒了歐盟競爭法的模式。我國已頒布并實施的《反壟斷法》對知識產權反壟斷行為只有原則性的規(guī)定，具體內容言之甚少，反壟斷法在知識產權領域的適用成了理論和實踐中的難點問題。在知識產權濫用市場支配地位方面，歐盟積累了一些案例和行政執(zhí)法經驗，出臺了《歐盟運行條約》第102條(下文簡稱TFEU第102條)的執(zhí)法指南，學術研究成果也較為豐富，這些為我國在知識產權領域濫用市場支配地位行為方面的立法和執(zhí)法提供了借鑒；此外，歐盟一直在探討的效果分析方法改革對我國知識產權領域濫用市場支配問題分析方法具有一定的參考意義�；谝陨险J識，本文對知識產權領域濫用市場支配地位的歐盟競爭法規(guī)制進行了研究，具體內容如下。 第一章從知識產權保護與競爭法的關系著手，從經濟學、競爭法學角度對這一問題展開分析，比較了各種學說的優(yōu)劣，回顧了歐美等競爭執(zhí)法先進國家和地區(qū)對二者關系處理的歷史，就競爭法能否干預知識產權領域問題形成研究的基本立場。 第二章對歐盟競爭法規(guī)制知識產權濫用市場支配地位的一般方法做了深入探討，闡述了歐盟競爭判例法中傳統(tǒng)的形式主義分析方法和歐盟委員會一直在呼吁采用的TFEU第102條效果分析方法，并就效果方法能否適用于知識產權濫用市場支配地位案件做了比較分析。 第三章和第四章，針對歐盟知識產權領域濫用市場支配地位案件中涉及的具體行為分別進行了分析，對構成要件、判斷標準等逐一展開了論述，并指出了歐盟委員會和法院對具體案件處理中存在的不足。拒絕許可是歐盟知識產權反競爭行為中最為典型的一種，在例外情況下可能構成知識產權濫用市場支配地位行為。典型案例主要有IBM案、Volvo案和Renault案、Magill案、IMSHealth案和微軟案。這些案例的發(fā)展，使歐盟對拒絕許可反競爭行為的構成要件越來越明晰，新產品規(guī)則、二級市場標準和關鍵設施標準等都在本文中得到了詳細的論述。濫用專利申請制度是一種新型的知識產權領域濫用市場支配地位行為，歐盟委員會的制藥行業(yè)調查報告和最新的案例對該行為都持積極的規(guī)制態(tài)度，有一定的可取之處，但也存在一些遺留的問題，對此本文也做了相應探討。 最后，結合我國的知識產權立法狀況，國際知識產權保護水平，我國知識產權保護與經濟增長的關系以及我國知識產權領域濫用市場支配地位現(xiàn)狀和我國知識產權反壟斷立法現(xiàn)狀等，在借鑒歐盟經驗的基礎上，對完善我國知識產權領域濫用市場支配地位規(guī)制從原則到具體分析方法都提出了對策與建議，以期對《關于知識產權領域反壟斷執(zhí)法的指南》的制定提供一些有益的參考。
[Abstract]:Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law have been intertwined from the very day of their emergence. They have both common objectives and conflicting and contradictory aspects. Competition is controlled and effective competition is maintained in the market to achieve the goal, because restriction of competition will damage the actual and potential competition; while intellectual property law encourages people to innovate in the field of knowledge economy by granting some form of restriction of competition, such as protection of exclusive rights and granting the obligee exclusive rights for a period of time. Intellectual property law protects the exclusive rights of the obligee, but there is no fundamental difference between intellectual property rights and general property rights in anti-monopoly law, because intellectual property rights also have the possibility of restricting competition and will inevitably be subject to anti-monopoly law. That is to say, on the one hand, the obligee has the right to be protected by intellectual property rights through his invention and creation. On the other hand, because the essence of market economy is competition, competition is also one of the ways to promote innovation, anti-monopoly law does not allow intellectual property owners to rely on their monopoly status to seriously hinder, restrict or distort market competition.
There are two opposing views on whether competition law should intervene in intellectual property rights. One is non-intervention, which holds that even if a particular intellectual property right does bring monopoly power to the obligee, the exclusive right should be protected from the review of competition law. The incentive mechanism of the intellectual property system has a negative impact. The likelihood of policymakers making mistakes in combating restrictive competition and the cost of all kinds of mistakes determine that the cost of condemning competitive behavior is higher than that of exempting restrictive competition. When Microsoft faces the danger of being sued for fragmentation, the American economists have reached an unprecedented tacit agreement to denounce the US antitrust law. The theory of complementarity holds that the fact that exclusive rights are granted by intellectual property law does not imply an inherent conflict between intellectual property rights and competition rules. In fact, both legal systems aim at promoting the effective distribution of consumer welfare and resources. Intellectual property promotes dynamic competition by encouraging firms to invest in new products and technologies, while competition law promotes innovation by imposing competitive pressures on firms. Therefore, both are necessary to promote innovation and competition. Competitive pressures. Without intellectual property protection, competitors can compete by imitation without having to invest in better new products; without competitive pressures, there is no guarantee that intellectual property owners will continue to invest and innovate after gaining monopoly profits. Especially in the fast-growing high-tech sector, where there are de facto or legal standards. It is easy for an intellectual property enterprise to own the whole market, and thereafter the intellectual property enterprise may eliminate the original competition in this market and start rent-seeking activities for the expansion of intellectual property rights. In this situation, a dominant firm does not need to continue to invest in future innovation to obtain monopoly profits. Therefore, the intervention theory based on complementarity theory advocates that competition law should intervene in the field of intellectual property when dynamic competition is restricted.
In recent years, multinational corporations have repeatedly abused their dominant position in the market because of their intellectual property rights, excluded competitors, endangered the development of China's national enterprises and damaged the welfare of consumers by means of intellectual property strategies such as refusing to license, overpricing, compulsory licensing package and setting up a "patent jungle". Theoretically speaking, the abuse of intellectual property rights is not only happened to transnational corporations, but also to domestic enterprises. However, at present, the domestic enterprises are still at a relative disadvantage in the aspect of intellectual property rights, and the transnational corporations are powerful, advanced in technology, and hold a lot of intellectual property rights, compared with them. Generally speaking, the abuse of intellectual property rights is more likely to occur in Chinese enterprises, and its impact is even greater. Therefore, the abuse of market dominance of intellectual property rights, which is often seen in newspapers, is mainly caused by multinational corporations.
In China, there is no real problem of abusing the dominant position of the intellectual property rights in the market, only because there are no corresponding legal norms in many cases, some acts are not subject to due sanctions. Excessive protection of the rights will inevitably lead to abuse of rights. Especially in China, the level of independent innovation is low, technology is relatively backward, and foreign intellectual property rights are powerful, intellectual property legislation has been in line with international standards, reducing the level of intellectual property protection is not feasible, therefore, we must strengthen the anti-monopoly regulation of intellectual property rights. Strong intellectual property protection and strong anti-monopoly laws and regulations are two sides of a coin, which are the two pillars of China's technological and economic development. How to find a balance between the protection of competition and the protection of intellectual property, that is, the incentive mechanism to protect intellectual property, so that it can give full play to the function of "adding oil to the fire of genius" in order to enrich public goods and improve consumer welfare, on the other hand, to maintain the balance? It is an urgent problem for China to protect the effective competition in the market, exclude the intellectual property field and limit the competition to the range necessary to stimulate innovation.
From the international experience, the primary objective of EU competition law is to establish a unified internal market and strictly regulate the use of intellectual property rights to restrict the free flow of goods and restrict free competition. Therefore, the European Court of Justice has created a series of principles and precedents to regulate the abuse of intellectual property rights. This is mainly achieved through competition law. Compared with the more relaxed attitude of the United States towards anti-competitive intellectual property rights, especially the abuse of market dominance, the EU experience is more suitable for China today.
As for the regulation of abusing the dominant position of the market, China's Anti-monopoly Law draws more lessons from the model of the EU Competition Law. The EU has accumulated a number of cases and administrative law enforcement experience in the abuse of market dominance over intellectual property rights. It has issued a law enforcement guide to Article 102 of the Operational Treaty of the EU (hereinafter referred to as Article 102 of the TFEU). The academic research results are also relatively rich. These are the legislation on abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in China. In addition, the reform of the effect analysis method which the EU has been discussing has certain reference significance to the analysis method of the abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in China. Next.
The first chapter starts with the relationship between intellectual property protection and competition law, analyzes this issue from the perspective of economics and competition law, compares the advantages and disadvantages of various theories, reviews the history of dealing with the relationship between the two in advanced countries and regions of competition law enforcement, such as Europe and the United States, and makes a basic Study on whether competition law can interfere in the field of intellectual property. Position.
Chapter 2 discusses the general methods of regulating the abuse of market dominance of intellectual property rights by EU competition law, expounds the traditional formalism analysis method in EU competition case law and the TFEU Article 102 effect analysis method which the European Commission has been calling for, and discusses whether the effect method can be applied to the abuse of intellectual property rights market. A comparative analysis of field dominance cases is made.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively analyze the specific acts involved in the cases of abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights in the European Union, discuss the constitutive requirements and the criteria of judgment one by one, and point out the deficiencies in the handling of specific cases by the European Commission and the courts. Typical cases are IBM, Volvo and Renault, Magill, IMSHealth and Microsoft. The development of these cases has made the EU increasingly clear about the components of anti-competitive refusal to license, and new product rules. The abuse of patent application system is a new type of abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property rights. The European Commission's investigation report on the pharmaceutical industry and the latest cases have a positive regulatory attitude towards the abuse of market dominance. But there are still some problems left behind, and this is also discussed in this paper.
Finally, based on the current situation of China's intellectual property legislation, the international intellectual property protection level, the relationship between China's intellectual property protection and economic growth, the abuse of market dominance in the field of intellectual property in China and the current situation of China's intellectual property anti-monopoly legislation, we can draw on the experience of the European Union to improve the field of intellectual property in China. The regulation of abuse of market dominant position has put forward countermeasures and suggestions from the principle to the concrete analysis method, with a view to providing some useful reference for the formulation of the Guidelines on Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement in the Field of Intellectual Property Rights.
【學位授予單位】：華東政法大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：D996.1

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