本文選題：發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略 + 產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)　； 參考：《西北大學》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：本文致力于為中國近代以來的長期經(jīng)濟增長軌跡建立一個邏輯自洽的理論分析框架。我們認為：由于忽略了經(jīng)濟和制度環(huán)境的不斷動態(tài)演變,使得既有理論在解釋近代以來的長期經(jīng)濟增長軌跡存在著局限性,并在回答下述問題方面顯得力不從心：近代經(jīng)濟增長停滯的原因是什么?如果國有企業(yè)的效率是低效的,那么近代以來的工業(yè)化任務(wù)為什么是由國有企業(yè),而不是民營企業(yè)來完成(趕超戰(zhàn)略的合理性)?既然趕超戰(zhàn)略是合理的,那又是什么變化導致了趕超戰(zhàn)略的不可持續(xù)性和進一步的改革,即：發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)變的內(nèi)生機制? 為了回答上述問題,本文首先從微觀和宏觀兩個視角證明了國有企業(yè)的動態(tài)效率,并進一步從發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和最優(yōu)政府行為三個方面對近代以來的長期經(jīng)濟增長軌跡進行了解讀。本文發(fā)現(xiàn)： (1)在改制后,國有企業(yè)的績效已經(jīng)有了大幅度的提高,且與非國有企業(yè)績效的差異已經(jīng)不再明顯。除此之外,我們還探討了市場化水平和不同所有制企業(yè)績效進行了探討。我們認為,當市場化水平較低時,其將導致不同所有制企業(yè)生產(chǎn)率差異的擴大；反之,其會導致不同所有制企業(yè)生產(chǎn)率差異的縮小。 (2)國有企業(yè)的低效率需要以市場的高效率為前提。在信息不完全的前提下,本文從“生產(chǎn)風險”和“交易風險”兩個方面對Yang and Ng(1995)的企業(yè)交易效率演進模型進行了擴展,并證明出國有企業(yè)低效率的臨界交易效率條件：當交易效率較低時,生產(chǎn)風險成本較高,那么國有企業(yè)的產(chǎn)權(quán)安排將因為有利于節(jié)約生產(chǎn)風險成本而促進經(jīng)濟增長；反之,交易風險成本較高,于是民營企業(yè)將因為有利于節(jié)約交易風險成本而促進經(jīng)濟增長。 (3)鑒于現(xiàn)實經(jīng)濟中廣泛存在的金融約束和所有制歧視,本文重新從“生產(chǎn)風險”和“交易風險”兩個方面對Yang(1999)進行了擴展。我們認為,金融深化和產(chǎn)權(quán)改革之所以能促進經(jīng)濟增長,其得益于不斷推進的市場化改革和日益完善的資源配給制度。當市場缺失或失靈,生產(chǎn)風險成為效率損失的主要來源時,金融抑制和傳統(tǒng)產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)仍然有助于彌補私人投資不足,并實現(xiàn)次優(yōu)的經(jīng)濟增長。 (4)近代以來的長期經(jīng)濟增長軌跡是一個完整的不可分割的整體。基于上述認識,本文利用“外部性”對國有企業(yè)的“增長拖累”模型進行了擴展,并進一步從發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和最優(yōu)政府行為三個方面進行解讀。結(jié)果發(fā)現(xiàn),近代(1840-1949)的“增長停滯”可以歸因于錯誤的發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、低效的產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和政府的機會主義,建國前30年(1949-1978)的有限增長歸因于趕超戰(zhàn)略、國有企業(yè)和政府的有效補貼,建國后30年(1978-至今)的快速增長歸因于比較優(yōu)勢戰(zhàn)略、民營企業(yè)和中性政府,而發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)變的內(nèi)生機制則在于彌補外部性超過了“軟預算約束”和由此產(chǎn)生的“道德風險”成本。 (5)鑒于知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護和在此基礎(chǔ)上的創(chuàng)新對于跨越“中等收入陷阱”中的重要性,本文對Sun and Lio(1996)的內(nèi)生投資品種類數(shù)分工模型進行了拓展,通過剩余索取權(quán)的變化探討了知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護水平與長期經(jīng)濟增長之間的非線性關(guān)系。我們認為：在交易效率較低,分工經(jīng)濟尚未充分展開的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展早期階段,投資品的生產(chǎn)遠離世界技術(shù)前沿,那么有利于“模仿創(chuàng)新”投資品生產(chǎn)的模糊知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護將實現(xiàn)一定的經(jīng)濟增長；但隨著交易效率的演進和分工經(jīng)濟的充分展開,投資品的生產(chǎn)將逐漸接近世界技術(shù)前沿并進一步導致“模仿創(chuàng)新”促進經(jīng)濟增長的作用逐漸下降。如果沒有知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護水平的改進,傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟增長模式將面臨增長停滯以及“中等收入陷阱”,那么實現(xiàn)有利于“自主創(chuàng)新”投資品生產(chǎn)的嚴格知識產(chǎn)權(quán)保護制度的轉(zhuǎn)變將成為實現(xiàn)持續(xù)經(jīng)濟增長的必然選擇。 綜上所述,通過發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略、產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和最優(yōu)政府行為對于近代以來長期經(jīng)濟增長軌跡的考察,我們發(fā)現(xiàn)不論是發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略還是產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu),其對于經(jīng)濟增長的作用均表現(xiàn)出動態(tài)性和“階段適宜性”。這就意味著：忽略發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略本身的演變,抽象的談?wù)搰衅髽I(yè)的低效率,其合理性是值得商榷的。因此,厘清不同經(jīng)濟發(fā)展階段所依賴的經(jīng)濟和制度環(huán)境,科學的認識發(fā)展戰(zhàn)略和產(chǎn)權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)在經(jīng)濟發(fā)展中的作用,才是我們跨越“中等收入陷阱”,實現(xiàn)“大國發(fā)展道路”向“強國發(fā)展道路”轉(zhuǎn)變的重中之重。
[Abstract]:This article is devoted to the establishment of a logical and consistent theoretical analysis framework for the long-term economic growth track in modern China. We think that, owing to the neglect of the continuous dynamic evolution of the economic and institutional environment, the existing theory has been limited in explaining the long-term economic growth track since modern times, and the following questions are answered. What is the reason for the stagnation of economic growth in modern times? If the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises is inefficient, then why is the modern industrialization task done by the state-owned enterprises, not the private enterprises (the rationality of catching up the strategy)? Since the overtaking strategy is reasonable, then what changes have led to the overtaking strategy The unsustainability and further reform, that is, the endogenous mechanism of transformation of development strategy?
In order to answer the above questions, this paper first proves the dynamic efficiency of the state-owned enterprises from two perspectives of microcosmic and macro, and further interprets the long-term economic growth track from three aspects: the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government behavior.
(1) after the restructuring, the performance of the state-owned enterprises has been greatly improved, and the difference from the performance of non-state-owned enterprises is no longer obvious. Besides, we also discuss the market level and the performance of different ownership enterprises. We think that when the market level is low, it will lead to the productivity of different ownership enterprises. The enlargement of differences will result in the narrowing of productivity differences among different ownership enterprises.
(2) the low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises should be based on the high efficiency of the market. Under the premise of incomplete information, this paper extends the enterprise transaction efficiency evolution model of Yang and Ng (1995) from the two aspects of "production risk" and "transaction risk". When the rate is low, the cost of production risk is high, so the property right arrangement of the state-owned enterprises will promote the economic growth because it is beneficial to saving the cost of production risk. On the contrary, the transaction risk cost is high, so the private enterprise will promote the economic growth because it is beneficial to saving the transaction risk cost.
(3) in view of the widespread financial constraints and ownership discrimination in the real economy, this article has expanded the Yang (1999) from two aspects of "production risk" and "transaction risk". We believe that financial deepening and property rights reform can promote economic growth, which is benefited from the continuous reform of the market and the increasingly perfect capital. When the market is missing or failed and production risk becomes the main source of efficiency loss, financial restraint and traditional property structure still help to make up for private investment and achieve suboptimal economic growth.
(4) the long-term economic growth track since modern times is an integral and inseparable whole. Based on the above understanding, this paper uses "externality" to expand the "growth drag" model of state-owned enterprises, and further interprets the three aspects of the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government line. The result is that the modern (1840-19) 49) the "growth stagnation" can be attributed to the wrong development strategy, the inefficient property rights structure and the opportunism of the government. The limited growth of the 30 years (1949-1978) before the founding of the people's Republic of China is attributable to the overtaking strategy, the effective subsidy of the state-owned enterprises and the government, the rapid growth of the 30 years after the founding of the people's Republic of China (1978-) is attributable to the comparative advantage strategy, the private enterprise and the neutrality. The endogenous mechanism of the government's development strategy transformation is to make up for the externalities beyond the "soft budget constraint" and the resulting "moral hazard" cost.
(5) in view of the importance of intellectual property protection and the innovation on this basis for crossing the "middle income trap", this paper extends the Sun and Lio (1996) model of endogenous investment category number division, and discusses the nonlinear relationship between the protection level of intellectual property rights and the long-term economic growth through the change of the residual claim right. We believe that, in the early stage of economic development with low transaction efficiency and undeveloped division of labor, the production of investment goods is far from the frontier of the world technology. Then the fuzzy intellectual property protection of "imitation innovation" will achieve certain economic growth, but with the evolution of transaction efficiency and the full division of labor economy If there is no improvement in the level of intellectual property protection, the traditional economic growth model will face growth stagnation and the "medium income trap", which is beneficial to "independent innovation". The transformation of strict intellectual property protection system for investment goods production will become an inevitable choice to achieve sustained economic growth.
To sum up, through the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government behavior, we find that both the development strategy and the property right structure play a dynamic and "stage suitability" for the economic growth, which means that the evolution of the development strategy itself is ignored. It is questionable to discuss the low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises in abstract terms. Therefore, to clarify the economic and institutional environment, the scientific understanding of the development strategy and the role of the property right structure in the economic development of different economic development stages, is that we cross the "middle income trap" and realize the "great power development road" to "the powerful country". The road to development is the most important change.
【學位授予單位】：西北大學
【學位級別】：博士
【學位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F279.2

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