本文選題：專家咨詢 + 行政決策過程　； 參考：《南京師范大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：專家咨詢是指專家利用自身特有專業(yè)知識(shí)和技能,在政府部門進(jìn)行決策的過程中,中立地提供專業(yè)化、科學(xué)化的咨詢論證,以提升政府決策的科學(xué)化,保障決策的民主化。雖然專家咨詢已廣泛應(yīng)用于社會(huì)生活各個(gè)領(lǐng)域,也深入至行政活動(dòng)多個(gè)階段,但由于我國理論界和實(shí)務(wù)界對(duì)此關(guān)注時(shí)間不長,在法律規(guī)范和實(shí)踐層面還存在諸多不完善的地方。 行政決策過程中,專家咨詢主要存在五方面的不足：第一,專家組成員選擇具有隨意性。行政機(jī)關(guān)在選擇專家時(shí)擁有幾乎不受限制的權(quán)力,為其左右專家咨詢結(jié)果提供可趁之機(jī)。同時(shí)專家自身也存在不足,這就使專家組的質(zhì)量得不到有效保障。第二,專家咨詢范圍不確定。作為決策程序,專家咨詢是否應(yīng)用以及具體應(yīng)用范圍往往由行政機(jī)關(guān)說了算,很難保障專家咨詢?cè)跊Q策過程中的應(yīng)用。此外,由于技術(shù)問題與價(jià)值問題易混淆,專家往往“越位”對(duì)其不具優(yōu)勢(shì)的價(jià)值問題展開咨詢,誤導(dǎo)最終決策。第三,專家咨詢意見公布滯后,不透明。我國現(xiàn)有規(guī)范并未對(duì)行政決策過程中專家咨詢意見是否對(duì)外公布進(jìn)行明確規(guī)定,實(shí)踐中多采取“不公開”做法,這就為決策機(jī)構(gòu)逃避公眾監(jiān)督提供可能。第四,專家責(zé)任追究機(jī)制不健全�，F(xiàn)有專家咨詢“無責(zé)任風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”狀態(tài)使專家和政府可以利用這一情況規(guī)避內(nèi)外責(zé)任,導(dǎo)致責(zé)任追究落空。第五,專家合法權(quán)益保障措施不完善。專家咨詢?cè)谛姓䴖Q策過程中地位不明確,無法保障其自身的話語權(quán)和知情權(quán)。另外,大部分規(guī)定中也并無相應(yīng)獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)及救濟(jì)措施保障專家合法權(quán)益。在我國,以上五方面出現(xiàn)的問題已嚴(yán)重影響專家咨詢功能的發(fā)揮。 本文通過分析專家咨詢?cè)谛姓䴖Q策過程中的法律性質(zhì),最終確定其民營化類型之一——專家參與的法律屬性。根據(jù)其具有的特點(diǎn),針對(duì)上述五方面暴露的問題提出具體解決措施。第一,設(shè)立專家?guī)?完善其運(yùn)作模式,限制行政機(jī)關(guān)自由裁量權(quán)。以“均衡性”為標(biāo)準(zhǔn),實(shí)現(xiàn)專家組在知識(shí)和利益兩方面的平衡。第二,明確專家咨詢作為行政決策法定程序的地位,確定專家咨詢的應(yīng)用范圍以及專家咨詢的具體內(nèi)容。第三,借鑒美國關(guān)于行政過程中信息公開的相關(guān)規(guī)定,明確行政機(jī)關(guān)對(duì)專家咨詢意見公開的義務(wù),從遴選專家到專家最終意見進(jìn)行全過程公開,同時(shí)要求決策機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)專家及公眾的意見進(jìn)行及時(shí)回應(yīng),追究不公開責(zé)任。第四,追究專家的內(nèi)部責(zé)任,監(jiān)督專家開展中立咨詢。與此同時(shí),區(qū)分政府及專家的責(zé)任,防止相互利用,推卸責(zé)任。第五,一方面為專家充權(quán),保障其在行政決策中的參與權(quán)和知情權(quán)。另一方面,建立相應(yīng)的激勵(lì)機(jī)制,為專家參與咨詢提供物質(zhì)支持。此外,為專家咨詢提供保護(hù)自身合法權(quán)益的救濟(jì)途徑。
[Abstract]:Expert consultation means that experts use their own specialized knowledge and skills to provide professional and scientific advice and argumentation neutral in the process of government decision-making in order to promote the scientific nature of government decisions and to guarantee the democratization of decision-making. Although expert consultation has been widely used in various fields of social life and has reached many stages of administrative activities, it has not been paid much attention to by the theorists and practitioners of our country for a long time. There are still many imperfections in the legal norms and practice. In the process of administrative decision-making, there are five main deficiencies in expert consultation: first, the selection of expert group members is arbitrary. The agency has almost unlimited authority to select experts, providing an opportunity for them to influence expert advice. At the same time, the experts themselves also have shortcomings, which makes the quality of the expert group can not be effectively guaranteed. Second, the scope of expert advice is uncertain. As a decision-making procedure, the application and scope of expert consultation are often decided by the administrative authorities. It is difficult to guarantee the application of expert consultation in the decision-making process. In addition, because technical problems and value problems are easily confused, experts often "offside" to its non-advantage of the value of the consultation, mislead the final decision. Third, the publication of expert advice is delayed and opaque. The existing norms of our country have not clearly stipulated whether the expert advice in the process of administrative decision-making is published to the public, and in practice it is more likely to adopt the practice of "not making public", which provides the possibility for decision-making organizations to evade public supervision. Fourth, the expert responsibility investigation mechanism is not perfect. The existing expert consultation "no responsibility risk" state allows experts and governments to take advantage of this situation to avoid internal and external responsibilities, leading to failure of accountability. Fifth, the legal rights and interests of experts protection measures are not perfect. The position of expert consultation in the process of administrative decision is not clear, which can not guarantee its right to speak and know. In addition, most provisions also do not have corresponding incentives and relief measures to protect the legitimate rights and interests of experts. In our country, the above five problems have seriously affected the exertion of the expert consultation function. By analyzing the legal nature of the expert consultation in the administrative decision-making process, this paper finally determines the legal attribute of the expert participation, one of its privatization types. According to its characteristics, the paper puts forward concrete measures to solve the problems exposed in the above five aspects. First, set up a pool of experts, improve its operating mode, and limit the discretion of administrative organs. The balance of knowledge and interests of the expert group is realized according to the criterion of "equilibrium". Secondly, the status of expert consultation as a statutory procedure for administrative decision-making should be clarified, and the scope of application of expert consultation and the specific content of expert consultation should be determined. Third, draw lessons from the relevant provisions of the United States on the disclosure of information in the administrative process, clarify the obligation of the administrative organs to make the opinions of experts public, and make the whole process public from the selection of experts to the final opinions of experts. At the same time, policy-making agencies are required to respond to the opinions of experts and the public in a timely manner. Fourth, investigate experts' internal responsibility and supervise experts to carry out neutral consultation. At the same time, distinguish between the responsibilities of the government and experts, prevent mutual use, shirking responsibility. Fifth, on the one hand, the right of experts to participate in administrative decisions and the right to know. On the other hand, establish the corresponding incentive mechanism to provide material support for experts to participate in the consultation. In addition, to provide expert advice to protect their legitimate rights and interests of relief.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號(hào)】：D922.1

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本文編號(hào)：1995186