我國(guó)股權(quán)眾籌的信息監(jiān)管制度研究
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-11-08 12:55
【摘要】：股權(quán)眾籌是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)信息技術(shù)和金融結(jié)合的產(chǎn)物,股權(quán)眾籌的產(chǎn)生深刻的改變了金融市場(chǎng)的結(jié)構(gòu),也對(duì)傳統(tǒng)的法律監(jiān)管制度提出了新的挑戰(zhàn)。關(guān)于股權(quán)眾籌法律監(jiān)管制度的構(gòu)建是各方研究的重點(diǎn),但對(duì)于股權(quán)眾籌產(chǎn)生的信息不對(duì)稱風(fēng)險(xiǎn),現(xiàn)有研究卻未能提出具有建設(shè)性的監(jiān)管對(duì)策。有鑒于此,本文以矯正股權(quán)眾籌信息不對(duì)稱為主線,分四個(gè)部分對(duì)股權(quán)眾籌的信息監(jiān)管制度進(jìn)行研究。首先是對(duì)股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管制度的基本界定和信息監(jiān)管理論基礎(chǔ)的研究。股權(quán)眾籌是指初創(chuàng)小微企業(yè)通過互聯(lián)網(wǎng)股權(quán)眾籌平臺(tái)公開發(fā)布線上融資項(xiàng)目,以股權(quán)作為對(duì)價(jià)向公眾公開募集資金的一種新型融資方式。具有對(duì)信息高度依賴性、依托互聯(lián)網(wǎng)完成投融資流程等多項(xiàng)特征。作為信息監(jiān)管的對(duì)象,股權(quán)眾籌的信息是指在交易中能夠?yàn)楣蓹?quán)眾籌市場(chǎng)主體提供決策依據(jù)的各類數(shù)據(jù)集合,包含融資信息、交易信息等多種類型,具有不對(duì)稱性和可遷移性等特征。股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管制度構(gòu)成中,行使信息監(jiān)管權(quán)力的機(jī)構(gòu)是證監(jiān)會(huì)、互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融協(xié)會(huì)和地方金融監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)。監(jiān)管的內(nèi)容是股權(quán)眾籌市場(chǎng)中的信息披露、傳遞等一系列行為。通常運(yùn)用的監(jiān)管手段包括信息披露、信息共享等。從理論上講政府有必要監(jiān)管股權(quán)眾籌信息的原因在于,股權(quán)眾籌存在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)理論上的信息不對(duì)稱問題,通過市場(chǎng)機(jī)制無法妥善解決,需要政府監(jiān)管的介入,以政府的信息監(jiān)管實(shí)現(xiàn)法學(xué)上要求的公平與效率價(jià)值。其次對(duì)我國(guó)股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管的現(xiàn)狀進(jìn)行規(guī)范分析。目前的股權(quán)眾籌監(jiān)管立法中,雖然涉及到股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的確定與職能分配,信息披露和信息共享機(jī)制等內(nèi)容。但通過規(guī)范分析可以發(fā)現(xiàn),股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管存在監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)間職能配置不合理、缺少協(xié)調(diào)機(jī)制;信息披露規(guī)定模糊;信息共享機(jī)制尚需落實(shí)和信息服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)監(jiān)管制度缺失等一系列問題。再次為域外經(jīng)驗(yàn)的比較借鑒。筆者選取了股權(quán)眾籌監(jiān)管立法較為成熟的英國(guó)和美國(guó),對(duì)二者相關(guān)立法中監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的選擇與職能配置;信息披露規(guī)則的構(gòu)建等方面進(jìn)行研究�？偨Y(jié)出應(yīng)依托現(xiàn)有監(jiān)管框架,合理配置監(jiān)管職能;構(gòu)建與股權(quán)眾籌相適應(yīng)的信息披露規(guī)則等兩方面可以為我國(guó)借鑒的先進(jìn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。最后,作為全文的結(jié)論,給出了優(yōu)化我國(guó)股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管制度的具體方案。我國(guó)股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管制度的優(yōu)化需要遵循適度和差異化兩大原則。優(yōu)化我國(guó)股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管制度的具體內(nèi)容包括:合理配置股權(quán)眾籌信息監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)職能,注重監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)間的協(xié)調(diào)。對(duì)股權(quán)眾籌信息披露規(guī)則進(jìn)行整體性重構(gòu),明確信息披露的內(nèi)容、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和形式,并探索建立信息披露等級(jí)制度。構(gòu)建信息共享機(jī)制,實(shí)現(xiàn)股權(quán)眾籌監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間、市場(chǎng)主體之間的信息共享。最后是健全信息服務(wù)機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)管制度,包括完善征信法律制度,出臺(tái)規(guī)范信息中介的監(jiān)管制度。
[Abstract]:Crowdfunding is the result of the combination of Internet information technology and finance. The emergence of crowdfunding has profoundly changed the structure of financial market and put forward new challenges to the traditional legal supervision system. The construction of the legal supervision system of stock rights crowdfunding is the focus of all parties' research, but the existing research has failed to put forward constructive regulatory countermeasures for the asymmetric information risk caused by stock rights crowdfunding. In view of this, this paper studies the information supervision system of stock crowdfunding in four parts, taking the information asymmetry of stock crowdfunding as the main line. Firstly, the basic definition of information supervision system and the theoretical basis of information supervision are studied. Crowdfunding is a new type of financing method in which small and micro start-up enterprises publicly publish online financing projects through Internet crowdfunding platform and use equity as a new way to raise funds to the public on consideration. With a high degree of dependence on information, relying on the Internet to complete the investment and financing process and many other characteristics. As the object of information supervision, the information of stock crowdfunding refers to all kinds of data set which can provide decision basis for the main body of stock raising market in the transaction, including financing information, transaction information and so on. It is characterized by asymmetry and mobility. In the constitution of the information supervision system, the power of information supervision is exercised by the Securities Regulatory Commission, the Internet Finance Association and the local financial regulatory bodies. The content of supervision is a series of behaviors such as information disclosure, transmission and so on. The regulatory measures usually used include information disclosure, information sharing and so on. Theoretically speaking, it is necessary for the government to supervise the information of stock crowdfunding. The reason is that the problem of information asymmetry in economics exists in crowdfunding, which can not be properly solved through the market mechanism, and needs the intervention of government supervision. The value of fairness and efficiency required by law should be realized by the government's information supervision. Secondly, the current situation of information supervision of stock capital raising in China is analyzed. In the current legislation of crowdfunding, although it involves the determination and distribution of functions, information disclosure and information sharing mechanism, etc. However, through normative analysis, it can be found that there are unreasonable function allocation among regulatory agencies, lack of coordination mechanism, vague regulation of information disclosure, and lack of coordination mechanism in the supervision of crowdfunding information. A series of problems such as the implementation of information sharing mechanism and the lack of supervision system of information service institutions are still needed. Again for the foreign experience of comparison. The author selects the United Kingdom and the United States, which have mature legislation on crowdfunding, to study the choice and function of regulatory bodies and the construction of information disclosure rules in the relevant legislation of the two countries. It is concluded that we should rely on the existing regulatory framework, reasonably allocate the regulatory functions, and construct the information disclosure rules suitable to the stock rights crowdfunding, which can be used for reference by our country. Finally, as the conclusion of the paper, the concrete scheme of optimizing the information supervision system of stock capital raising in China is given. The optimization of information supervision system of stock capital raising should follow the principles of moderation and differentiation. The specific contents of optimizing the information supervision system of stock rights crowdfunding in China include: rationally allocating the functions of the information regulatory agencies and paying attention to the coordination among the regulatory agencies. This paper reconstructs the rules of information disclosure of stock rights crowdfunding, clarifies the contents, standards and forms of information disclosure, and explores the establishment of information disclosure hierarchy system. Construct the information sharing mechanism to realize the information sharing among the stock rights public funding regulators and the market subjects. Finally, we should perfect the supervision system of the information service organization, including perfecting the credit investigation legal system and introducing the regulation system of regulating the information intermediary.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D922.287
本文編號(hào)：2318568
[Abstract]:Crowdfunding is the result of the combination of Internet information technology and finance. The emergence of crowdfunding has profoundly changed the structure of financial market and put forward new challenges to the traditional legal supervision system. The construction of the legal supervision system of stock rights crowdfunding is the focus of all parties' research, but the existing research has failed to put forward constructive regulatory countermeasures for the asymmetric information risk caused by stock rights crowdfunding. In view of this, this paper studies the information supervision system of stock crowdfunding in four parts, taking the information asymmetry of stock crowdfunding as the main line. Firstly, the basic definition of information supervision system and the theoretical basis of information supervision are studied. Crowdfunding is a new type of financing method in which small and micro start-up enterprises publicly publish online financing projects through Internet crowdfunding platform and use equity as a new way to raise funds to the public on consideration. With a high degree of dependence on information, relying on the Internet to complete the investment and financing process and many other characteristics. As the object of information supervision, the information of stock crowdfunding refers to all kinds of data set which can provide decision basis for the main body of stock raising market in the transaction, including financing information, transaction information and so on. It is characterized by asymmetry and mobility. In the constitution of the information supervision system, the power of information supervision is exercised by the Securities Regulatory Commission, the Internet Finance Association and the local financial regulatory bodies. The content of supervision is a series of behaviors such as information disclosure, transmission and so on. The regulatory measures usually used include information disclosure, information sharing and so on. Theoretically speaking, it is necessary for the government to supervise the information of stock crowdfunding. The reason is that the problem of information asymmetry in economics exists in crowdfunding, which can not be properly solved through the market mechanism, and needs the intervention of government supervision. The value of fairness and efficiency required by law should be realized by the government's information supervision. Secondly, the current situation of information supervision of stock capital raising in China is analyzed. In the current legislation of crowdfunding, although it involves the determination and distribution of functions, information disclosure and information sharing mechanism, etc. However, through normative analysis, it can be found that there are unreasonable function allocation among regulatory agencies, lack of coordination mechanism, vague regulation of information disclosure, and lack of coordination mechanism in the supervision of crowdfunding information. A series of problems such as the implementation of information sharing mechanism and the lack of supervision system of information service institutions are still needed. Again for the foreign experience of comparison. The author selects the United Kingdom and the United States, which have mature legislation on crowdfunding, to study the choice and function of regulatory bodies and the construction of information disclosure rules in the relevant legislation of the two countries. It is concluded that we should rely on the existing regulatory framework, reasonably allocate the regulatory functions, and construct the information disclosure rules suitable to the stock rights crowdfunding, which can be used for reference by our country. Finally, as the conclusion of the paper, the concrete scheme of optimizing the information supervision system of stock capital raising in China is given. The optimization of information supervision system of stock capital raising should follow the principles of moderation and differentiation. The specific contents of optimizing the information supervision system of stock rights crowdfunding in China include: rationally allocating the functions of the information regulatory agencies and paying attention to the coordination among the regulatory agencies. This paper reconstructs the rules of information disclosure of stock rights crowdfunding, clarifies the contents, standards and forms of information disclosure, and explores the establishment of information disclosure hierarchy system. Construct the information sharing mechanism to realize the information sharing among the stock rights public funding regulators and the market subjects. Finally, we should perfect the supervision system of the information service organization, including perfecting the credit investigation legal system and introducing the regulation system of regulating the information intermediary.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：D922.287
【參考文獻(xiàn)】
相關(guān)期刊論文 前6條
1 人民銀行石家莊中心支行征信管理處課題組;劉旭;趙玉清;;大數(shù)據(jù)環(huán)境下互聯(lián)網(wǎng)征信發(fā)展與監(jiān)管研究[J];河北金融;2016年04期
2 生蕾;;信息不對(duì)稱與互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融發(fā)展[J];征信;2015年12期
3 程茂軍;徐聰;;投資者導(dǎo)向信息披露制度的法理與邏輯[J];證券市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)報(bào);2015年11期
4 袁康;;資本形成、投資者保護(hù)與股權(quán)眾籌的制度供給——論我國(guó)股權(quán)眾籌相關(guān)制度設(shè)計(jì)的路徑[J];證券市場(chǎng)導(dǎo)報(bào);2014年12期
5 龔鵬程;臧公慶;;美國(guó)眾籌監(jiān)管立法研究及其對(duì)我國(guó)的啟示[J];金融監(jiān)管研究;2014年11期
6 謝平;鄒傳偉;;互聯(lián)網(wǎng)金融模式研究[J];金融研究;2012年12期
，本文編號(hào)：2318568
本文鏈接：http://www.sikaile.net/falvlunwen/jingjifalunwen/2318568.html
最近更新
教材專著
