本文選題：上市公司 + 高管薪酬　； 參考：《延邊大學(xué)》2015年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著社會經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展,企業(yè)高管薪酬問題逐步走進人們的視角。在我國,上市公司高管薪酬過高的現(xiàn)象層出不窮,似乎已經(jīng)趨向于“天價”,這樣失控的企業(yè)薪酬管理狀態(tài)受到了社會的廣泛關(guān)注和強烈譴責(zé)。1面對這樣的狀況,我國出臺了一系列政策和行政手段來規(guī)制上市公司高管薪酬,但適用的效果卻差強人意,企業(yè)高管“天價薪酬”的問題仍然得不到有效地遏制。顯然,僅僅借用行政手段和政策指引的方式并不能有效地解決企業(yè)高管薪酬問題,在處理這一問題上,還需要法律制度發(fā)揮其獨特的作用來幫助國家政策合理的解決高管薪酬問題,在美國,真正能夠規(guī)制企業(yè)高管薪酬的有效途徑是利用法律武器,因為高管薪酬問題,不僅是一個經(jīng)濟問題,嚴(yán)格來說,這更應(yīng)該是一個法律問題。法律手段才是有效規(guī)制“天價高管薪酬”的合理有效手段。隨著現(xiàn)代企業(yè)制度的不斷發(fā)展和上市公司治理機制的不斷完善,高管薪酬制度已經(jīng)逐漸占據(jù)重要地位,在降低企業(yè)運行成本和激勵高管創(chuàng)新工作模式中發(fā)揮了重要的作用。但任何一項制度都要經(jīng)過實踐的檢驗,隨著2007年金融危機的爆發(fā),企業(yè)“天價”薪酬問題不斷涌現(xiàn),人們將無處宣泄的不滿與憤怒都抨擊到高管薪酬制度上：高級管理人員享受著高額的報酬,卻承擔(dān)著過少的風(fēng)險,這顯然是不公平的,也是不成比例的。這給我們拋出了很多亟待解決的問題,其中最重要也最迫切的就是要盡快并且合理的解決爭議頗多的高管薪酬問題。在長期的對高管薪酬進行監(jiān)管的過程中,我國逐步借鑒美國等西方國家的做法,進行了相關(guān)的立法工作,并將重點放在如何規(guī)制上市公司高管薪酬。通過查閱資料,不難發(fā)現(xiàn)美國的企業(yè)高管薪酬法律制度中存在薪酬追回制度值得我們學(xué)習(xí)和借鑒,這項制度的精髓是對基于欺詐或者是計算錯誤而被錯誤支付的薪酬進行追回。它不僅可以在企業(yè)和高管之間訂立薪酬合同時進行約定,也不排除在沒有進行相關(guān)約定的情況下開展的追溯性使用。但對于這樣一個新生事物,在被賦予極大希望的同時也必然飽受質(zhì)疑2。那么,就如何轉(zhuǎn)變企業(yè)高管激勵機制,規(guī)制企業(yè)高管天價薪酬問題,本文擬對引入上市公司高管薪酬追回制度的具體規(guī)定適用問題進行探討,以期對緩解高管薪酬不合理現(xiàn)象做出貢獻。
[Abstract]:With the development of social economy, the issue of executive compensation has gradually come into people's perspective. In China, the phenomenon of excessive executive compensation of listed companies appears in endlessly, which seems to have tended to "sky-high price". The out-of-control salary management of enterprises has been widely concerned by the society and strongly condemned to face such a situation. China has issued a series of policies and administrative measures to regulate the executive compensation of listed companies, but the effect of the application is not satisfactory, and the problem of "sky-price compensation" of enterprise executives can not be effectively contained. Obviously, the issue of executive compensation cannot be effectively solved by merely using administrative means and policy guidance. It also needs the legal system to play its unique role in helping the national policy to solve the problem of executive compensation reasonably. In the United States, the effective way to regulate the executive compensation of enterprises is to use the legal weapon, because the issue of executive compensation. Not only is it an economic problem, but strictly speaking, it should be a legal issue. The legal means is the reasonable and effective means to regulate the "sky-high executive compensation". With the continuous development of modern enterprise system and the continuous improvement of listed company governance mechanism, executive compensation system has gradually occupied an important position, which has played an important role in reducing the operating cost of enterprises and encouraging executives to innovate working mode. However, any system has to be tested by practice. With the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, the issue of "sky-high" remuneration for enterprises has been emerging. People attack executive pay systems with nowhere to vent their discontent and anger: it is clearly unfair and disproportionate for senior managers to enjoy high pay but take too little risk. This gives us a lot of problems to solve, the most important and most urgent is to resolve the controversial issue of executive compensation as soon as possible and reasonably. In the process of supervising executive compensation for a long time, our country gradually draws lessons from the practices of the United States and other western countries, carries on the related legislation work, and focuses on how to regulate the executive compensation of listed companies. It is not difficult to find that there is a compensation recovery system in the corporate executive compensation legal system in the United States. The essence of this system is to recover the compensation that has been wrongly paid on the basis of fraud or calculation error. It can not only make the contract between the company and the executive, but also do not rule out the retroactive use without the relevant agreement. But such a new thing, while being given great hope, must also be questioned 2. 5%. Then, on how to change the incentive mechanism and regulate the sky-price compensation of executives, this paper intends to discuss the application of the specific provisions of the executive compensation recovery system in listed companies. In order to alleviate the unreasonable executive compensation phenomenon to make a contribution.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：延邊大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：D922.291.91

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