本文選題：聽證主體構造 + 零和博弈�。� 參考：《湖北社會科學》2017年03期

【摘要】：現(xiàn)代法治國家的憲法和行政程序法中所規(guī)定的正當行政程序要求政府在做出公共決策時,應充分聽取各方意見。價格決策無疑是一種重要的公共決策,我國《價格法》早在2002年已從制度層面將聽證制度引入政府價格決策程序中。但運行多年的價格聽證并沒有發(fā)揮預想的制度效能,這說明價格決策聽證程序中存在除法規(guī)范層面以外的其他干擾因素。從博弈論角度分析,價格聽證制度功能不彰的原因是博弈各方進行的是零和博弈或負和博弈,一方的利益增長以相對方的利益減損為代價。打破政企之間的角色合謀、實現(xiàn)博弈雙方的信息均衡化以及解除立法中的制度鎖定是我國公共價格決策聽證博弈均衡化的關鍵。
[Abstract]:The proper administrative procedure stipulated in the constitution and administrative procedure law of a modern country ruled by law requires that the government should fully listen to the opinions of all parties when making public decisions. Price decision is undoubtedly an important public decision. As early as 2002, China's "Price Law" has introduced the hearing system into the government price decision-making process from the system level. However, the price hearing which has been running for many years has not brought into full play the expected institutional efficiency, which indicates that there are other interference factors in the price decision hearing procedure except the normative level. From the point of view of game theory, the reason why the price hearing system does not function well is that the parties in the game play a zero-sum game or a negative-sum game, and the benefit increase of one party comes at the expense of the opposite party's interest loss. Breaking the role collusion between the government and enterprise, realizing the information equalization of both sides of the game and lifting the system lock in the legislation are the key to the game equalization of the public price decision hearing in our country.
【作者單位】： 武漢大學;
【基金】：中國博士后科學基金第9批特別資助(2016T90711)階段性成果 國家“2011計劃”司法文明協(xié)同創(chuàng)新中心相關成果
【分類號】：D922.294

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