本文選題：法定資本制度 + 債權(quán)人保護(hù)　； 參考：《四川省社會(huì)科學(xué)院》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著2013年公司法的修改,我國(guó)債權(quán)人保護(hù)的立法邏輯有了重大的調(diào)整,立法制度也隨著立法思路的調(diào)整有了重大變化,最直接的表現(xiàn)就是資本制度從實(shí)繳制度變更為認(rèn)繳制度。然而,資本制度的變革僅僅是一個(gè)開(kāi)始,我國(guó)整個(gè)債權(quán)人保護(hù)的機(jī)制都隨著資本制度的變革發(fā)生了顛覆性的轉(zhuǎn)變,然而接續(xù)性的債權(quán)人保護(hù)機(jī)制目前又尚未構(gòu)建。因此,有必要理清本次改革的基本理論基礎(chǔ)、意圖和方向,以及當(dāng)下債權(quán)人保護(hù)機(jī)制的現(xiàn)狀與不足,從而正確的重構(gòu)債權(quán)人保護(hù)機(jī)制。以下就改革的原因和問(wèn)題進(jìn)行簡(jiǎn)單的梳理。改革的原因,從宏觀的層面來(lái)看,立法者致力于借助市場(chǎng)的力量構(gòu)建債權(quán)人自主博弈爭(zhēng)取權(quán)利的基礎(chǔ),而非長(zhǎng)期家長(zhǎng)式借助行政力量保護(hù)債權(quán)人。這其中的本質(zhì)是立法者意識(shí)到契約自治才能根本性的降低成本提升效率促進(jìn)繁榮,這也是各國(guó)對(duì)公司法價(jià)值的認(rèn)識(shí)共識(shí)。從微觀的層面看,立法者長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)認(rèn)為資本充足才能保證公司的償債能力,進(jìn)而保護(hù)債權(quán)人的利益。然而,著研究的深入和實(shí)踐的弊病不斷出現(xiàn),立法者逐步意識(shí)到公司真正的清償能力不是靜態(tài)不變的資本,而是公司不斷變化的資產(chǎn)。因此,強(qiáng)制實(shí)繳、驗(yàn)資以及最低注冊(cè)資本并不能有效的實(shí)現(xiàn)債權(quán)人保護(hù),反而會(huì)增加社會(huì)運(yùn)行監(jiān)管成本、增加公司設(shè)立門(mén)檻、阻礙市場(chǎng)發(fā)展,帶來(lái)諸多負(fù)面效應(yīng)。問(wèn)題是,我國(guó)長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)奉行國(guó)家中心主義,政府干預(yù)深入社會(huì)各個(gè)層面。資本制度的改革后債權(quán)人并沒(méi)有足夠的博弈工具和博弈意識(shí)。從短期看,原債權(quán)人保護(hù)機(jī)制業(yè)已崩塌,新債權(quán)人保護(hù)機(jī)制尚未構(gòu)建,債權(quán)人反而處于更加不利的地位。此時(shí),應(yīng)當(dāng)準(zhǔn)確把握立法改革方向,正確梳理各種學(xué)派的制度建議。本文主要就以構(gòu)筑債權(quán)人自主博弈基礎(chǔ)為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)進(jìn)行衡量,梳理重構(gòu)債權(quán)人保護(hù)方式。
[Abstract]:With the revision of company law in 2013, the legislative logic of creditor protection in China has been greatly adjusted, and the legislative system has changed greatly with the adjustment of legislative thinking. The most direct expression is that the capital system has changed from the actual payment system to the subscription system. However, the reform of capital system is only a beginning, the whole creditor protection mechanism of our country has undergone a subversive change with the change of capital system, but the successive creditor protection mechanism has not yet been constructed. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the basic theoretical basis, intention and direction of this reform, as well as the current situation and shortcomings of creditor protection mechanism, so as to correctly reconstruct the creditor protection mechanism. The following is a simple combing of the causes and problems of the reform. The reason of the reform is from the macroscopic aspect, the legislator devotes to build the creditor independent game to fight for the right foundation by the market force, but not the long-term paternalistic way to protect the creditor with the administrative force. The essence of this is that legislators realize that contractual autonomy can fundamentally reduce costs and enhance efficiency to promote prosperity, which is also the common understanding of the value of corporate law in various countries. At the micro level, legislators have long believed that capital is sufficient to ensure the company's solvency and thus protect the interests of creditors. However, with the development of research and practice, legislators gradually realize that the real solvency of a company is not a static capital, but a constantly changing asset. Therefore, compulsory payment, capital verification and minimum registered capital can not effectively protect creditors, but will increase the cost of social operation supervision, increase the threshold of the establishment of the company, hinder the development of the market, and bring a lot of negative effects. The problem is that our country has long pursued state-centrism and government intervention has penetrated into all levels of society. After the reform of capital system, creditors do not have enough game tools and game consciousness. In the short term, the original creditor protection mechanism has collapsed, the new creditor protection mechanism has not been constructed, and the creditor is in a more disadvantageous position. At this time, we should accurately grasp the direction of legislative reform and correctly sort out the institutional suggestions of various schools. This paper is mainly to construct the basis of independent game of creditors as a standard to sort out the reconstruction of creditor protection.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：四川省社會(huì)科學(xué)院
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D922.291.91

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本文編號(hào)：2009685