本文選題：寬大制度　切入點(diǎn)：個(gè)人寬大制度　出處：《安徽大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：自1978年美國開始實(shí)施寬大制度以來,反壟斷法中的寬大制度就陸續(xù)被一些國家效仿。國際經(jīng)驗(yàn)表明,寬大制度是一個(gè)重要的卡特爾調(diào)查工具,通過激勵(lì)卡特爾違法行為人主動(dòng)承認(rèn)其犯罪行為、配合有關(guān)機(jī)關(guān)的調(diào)查,增加了檢測和處罰卡特爾的機(jī)會。同時(shí)寬大制度使得證據(jù)可以通過速度更快、成本更低的方式取得,使其成為阻止和懲罰卡特爾最具成本效益的工具。為了進(jìn)一步發(fā)現(xiàn)與打擊卡特爾,1994年8月10日,美國在公司寬大制度的基礎(chǔ)上公布了《個(gè)人寬大制度》,并明確規(guī)定這里的寬大僅指個(gè)人基于自己的利益不受損害而在公司申請寬大之前向有關(guān)機(jī)關(guān)申請的寬大,這一方法通過對壟斷行為的源頭施加法律責(zé)任,進(jìn)而提高了發(fā)現(xiàn)與偵查卡特爾的效率。個(gè)人寬大制度的實(shí)施將提高壟斷行為的發(fā)現(xiàn)率、確保個(gè)人在壟斷組織的自主選擇。隨著市場經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展,反壟斷工作成為目前中國反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)的一項(xiàng)常態(tài)而又艱巨的任務(wù)。第一,實(shí)踐證明越是加強(qiáng)對卡特爾的打擊,其活動(dòng)就越具有隱秘性,證據(jù)也愈發(fā)難以收集。目前的公司寬大制度下僅對公司處以罰款,沒有觸及個(gè)人利益的情況下,個(gè)人不會主動(dòng)向反壟斷執(zhí)法機(jī)關(guān)"告密",使得寬大制度存在激勵(lì)性不足的問題。第二,現(xiàn)有寬大制度容易給一些大型的跨國公司造成錯(cuò)誤的印像,使他們認(rèn)為如果公司積極申請寬大,即使交了罰款也值得,從而不利于打擊潛在卡特爾。第三,近年來反壟斷案件數(shù)量快速增長,案件的查處難度在增加,查處的時(shí)間也越來越長,現(xiàn)有寬恕制度下寄希望于公司申請寬大從而獲得查處壟斷行為的證據(jù)將嚴(yán)重降低壟斷行為的查處效率。故個(gè)人寬大適度在我國有構(gòu)建的必要性。串通招投標(biāo)是最為人民熟悉的壟斷行為之一,故我國在構(gòu)建個(gè)人寬大制度時(shí)可以串通招投標(biāo)為例,分析其如何適用個(gè)人寬大制度,形成典型,從而為以后壟斷案件的處理起到示范的作用。為此,還要處理好以下關(guān)系:首先,正如串通招投標(biāo)行為規(guī)定了刑事責(zé)任與行政責(zé)任一樣,在立法中也只有對壟斷行為既規(guī)定刑事責(zé)任又規(guī)定行政責(zé)任,才能增加壟斷責(zé)任的威懾力,從而刺激個(gè)人寬大的申請。其次,在申請的實(shí)體條件方面要通過制訂《關(guān)于壟斷協(xié)議個(gè)人寬大適用的一般性條件和程序的指南》將個(gè)人寬大申請的主體條件、證據(jù)條件與合作程度等具體要求加以明確。再次,在申請的程序方面應(yīng)明確規(guī)定個(gè)人寬大申請的受理機(jī)關(guān)、申請方式與實(shí)施方式,從而使得寬大待遇的給予方式及步驟更加詳細(xì)、透明。最后,應(yīng)營造一個(gè)良好的申請寬大的外部環(huán)境,一方面要注意與反壟斷私人實(shí)施的協(xié)調(diào),可以通過對壟斷責(zé)任中的民事賠償責(zé)任給予一定的減免來確保個(gè)人申請寬大的積極性,另一方面要通過完善行政復(fù)議與行政訴訟來確保反壟斷法中的個(gè)人寬大申請的權(quán)利救濟(jì)。
[Abstract]:Since the United States began to implement leniency in 1978, leniency in anti-monopoly laws has been followed by some countries. International experience shows that leniency is an important tool for cartel investigation. By encouraging cartel offenders to take the initiative to admit their criminal acts and to cooperate with investigations by the relevant authorities, opportunities for detecting and punishing cartels are increased. At the same time, lenient regimes enable evidence to be obtained in a faster and cheaper way. Making it the most cost-effective tool to deter and punish cartels. In order to further detect and combat cartels, in August 10th 1994, The United States published the "personal leniency regime" on the basis of the corporate leniency regime, and explicitly stipulated that leniency here refers only to leniency that individuals apply to the relevant authorities before the company applies for leniency on the grounds that their own interests are not harmed. This method increases the efficiency of cartel detection and investigation by imposing legal responsibility on the source of monopoly behavior. The implementation of individual leniency system will increase the detection rate of monopoly behavior. With the development of the market economy, antitrust work has become a normal and arduous task for China's anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies. First, practice has proved that the more the crackdown on cartels is strengthened, The more secretive its activities are, the more difficult it is to collect evidence. Under the current lenient system, companies are fined only, without touching their personal interests. Individuals will not take the initiative to "report" to antitrust law enforcement agencies, resulting in inadequate incentives for leniency regimes. Second, the existing leniency regime can easily give some large multinational corporations the wrong impression. It makes them think that if companies actively apply for leniency, even if they pay a fine, it is worth it, which is not conducive to cracking down on potential cartels. Third, the number of antitrust cases has increased rapidly in recent years, and the investigation of cases has become more difficult. The time for investigation and punishment is also getting longer and longer. Under the existing leniency system, it is hoped that the company will apply for leniency so as to obtain evidence of the investigation of monopoly behavior, which will seriously reduce the efficiency of the investigation of monopoly behavior. Therefore, it is necessary for individual leniency to be moderate in our country. Collusive bidding is the most important. For one of the people's familiar monopolies, Therefore, when constructing individual leniency system in our country, we can collude bidding for example, analyze how to apply individual leniency system and form a typical model, thus play an exemplary role in dealing with monopoly cases in the future. We should also deal with the following relations: first, just as collusive bidding acts stipulate criminal liability and administrative liability, in legislation, only by stipulating both criminal and administrative responsibilities for monopolistic acts can the deterrent power of monopoly liability be increased. In order to stimulate individual applications for leniency. Secondly, with regard to the substantive conditions of an application, the main conditions of an individual application for leniency should be determined through the "Guide on General conditions and procedures for the Application of individual leniency under Monopoly agreements". The conditions of evidence and the degree of cooperation should be clarified. Thirdly, the procedure for applying for leniency should be clearly defined as the organ that accepts the application for leniency, the mode of application and the mode of implementation. In order to make the way and steps of granting leniency more detailed and transparent. Finally, a good external environment for applications for leniency should be created. On the one hand, attention should be paid to coordination with private antitrust implementation. We can guarantee the enthusiasm of individual to apply for leniency by granting certain relief to civil liability in monopoly liability, on the other hand, we should ensure the right relief of individual leniency application in antitrust law by perfecting administrative reconsideration and administrative litigation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：D922.294

【參考文獻(xiàn)】

相關(guān)碩士學(xué)位論文 前1條

1 宋會行;串通招投標(biāo)的反壟斷法規(guī)制[D];昆明理工大學(xué);2014年

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本文編號：1559869