發(fā)布時(shí)間：2018-04-23 12:47

  本文選題：金融 + 控股公司��； 參考：《華東政法大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：美國公司法學(xué)者Howell Jackson在其論述中開篇提及:自20世紀(jì)70年代初,大量的實(shí)踐證實(shí)“混業(yè)經(jīng)營”逐漸成為一種金融業(yè)的主流經(jīng)營模式1。最初以“價(jià)格發(fā)現(xiàn)”和“價(jià)值實(shí)現(xiàn)”為核心的金融需求逐漸讓位于更強(qiáng)流動(dòng)性過程中潛在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素和安全性考量,也即:“信用擔(dān)�！焙汀皟r(jià)值穩(wěn)定”功能2。由此資金鏈中所蘊(yùn)涵的“時(shí)間價(jià)值”和“資產(chǎn)的動(dòng)態(tài)安全”更為各國金融日益重視。在虛擬經(jīng)濟(jì)較為發(fā)達(dá)的西方國家,一些學(xué)者,對(duì)那些以“混業(yè)形式”存在,對(duì)國民經(jīng)濟(jì)具有明顯影響力和控制力的金融控股集團(tuán),在原有商法制度群之外,富于針對(duì)性的采用了一組較為特殊的治理規(guī)則。這些規(guī)則雖各有側(cè)重,但共通之處都在于單方面強(qiáng)調(diào)掌握控制權(quán)一方主體所必須承擔(dān)額外的一系列積極或消極的“財(cái)產(chǎn)性”責(zé)任,被學(xué)者們普遍稱為“金融控股公司加重責(zé)任”�？v觀文獻(xiàn),目前“加重責(zé)任”的法理討論暫時(shí)滯留在“道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”的提出或“市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管”的退化,規(guī)則層面也并沒有超越民商事“有限責(zé)任否認(rèn)”和“多級(jí)代理成本”的傳統(tǒng)治理方式3。同時(shí),對(duì)比“從公司行為角度”出發(fā)或“從公司治理角度”考慮,其具體規(guī)則概念界定方面存在“義務(wù)”與“責(zé)任”的取舍判斷難點(diǎn)。本文通過對(duì)“加重責(zé)任”理論的概述、對(duì)商制度群較早存在的類似規(guī)則——英美法系的“刺破公司面紗”和大陸法系的“直索制度”的對(duì)比研究和對(duì)“法律關(guān)系”中“義務(wù)”、“責(zé)任”等概念的重新梳理,初步提出了有別于傳統(tǒng)民商治理規(guī)則的“雙重風(fēng)險(xiǎn)——基于金融業(yè)外部性的公共利益保護(hù)和控股公司不完全契約中的授信基礎(chǔ)濫用(從治理角度出發(fā))”是“加重責(zé)任”得以存在的根本基礎(chǔ)。同時(shí),傾向性的認(rèn)為:“加重責(zé)任”應(yīng)當(dāng)歸為含有治理意圖的“責(zé)任”而非單純的救濟(jì)“責(zé)任”或公司行為限制規(guī)則性的“附隨義務(wù)”。相較而言,中國金融制度體系構(gòu)建起步較晚,大多借鑒西方先進(jìn)的立法和司法經(jīng)驗(yàn),本土化程度不高,實(shí)踐中明顯存在適用盲點(diǎn)和障礙。但是,經(jīng)濟(jì)生活中“加重責(zé)任”存在巨大的現(xiàn)實(shí)需求。故文本在結(jié)合“公司治理”的現(xiàn)有規(guī)則的優(yōu)化改進(jìn)過程中,初步提出了構(gòu)建一個(gè)具有統(tǒng)一原則指導(dǎo)之下的“加重責(zé)任”制度體系。其具體體現(xiàn)在對(duì)“混業(yè)經(jīng)營”且對(duì)國民經(jīng)濟(jì)具有顯著影響力的一類金融控股公司全過程的嚴(yán)格管控之中;體現(xiàn)在圍繞特殊控股主體的一系列“非義務(wù)性”前置責(zé)任和程序性要求之中;體現(xiàn)在于“財(cái)產(chǎn)性”責(zé)任的基礎(chǔ)上,適當(dāng)引入了部分“身份性”責(zé)任的意圖之中;體現(xiàn)在,經(jīng)濟(jì)法特有的“橫、縱兼顧”“軟、硬兼施”調(diào)整方法之中;同時(shí),結(jié)合現(xiàn)有中國國情,為“加重責(zé)任”后續(xù)實(shí)證留下了相對(duì)開放性的制度設(shè)定。是為“金融控股公司加重責(zé)任芻議”。
[Abstract]:Howell Jackson, an American scholar of corporate law, mentioned at the beginning of his exposition: since the beginning of 1970s, a large number of practices have proved that "mixed operation" has gradually become a mainstream mode of operation in the financial industry. Initially, the financial demand with "price discovery" and "value realization" as the core gradually gave way to the potential risk factors and security considerations in the process of stronger liquidity, that is, "credit guarantee" and "value stability" function 2. Therefore, the "time value" and "dynamic security of assets" implied in the financial chain have been paid more and more attention. In the western countries where the virtual economy is more developed, some scholars, for those financial holding groups which exist in the form of "mixed operation" and have obvious influence and control on the national economy, are in addition to the original commercial law system group. The rich pertinence has adopted a group of relatively special governance rules. Although these rules have their own emphases, what is common is that they unilaterally emphasize that the subject of control must bear an additional set of positive or negative "property" responsibilities. By scholars generally known as "financial holding companies to increase responsibility." Throughout the literature, the current legal discussion of "aggravated liability" is temporarily stranded in the proposed "moral hazard" or the degradation of "market regulation". The rule level does not exceed the traditional governance mode of "limited liability denial" and "multilevel agency cost" in civil and commercial enterprises. At the same time, compared with "from the angle of corporate behavior" or "from the perspective of corporate governance", there are difficulties in the determination of "obligation" and "responsibility" in defining the concept of specific rules. By summarizing the theory of "aggravated liability", this paper makes a comparative study on the similar rules that existed earlier in the group of commercial systems-"piercing the corporate veil" in Anglo-American law system and "straight claim system" in civil law system, and "obligation" in "legal relationship". The rearrangement of the concepts of "responsibility", This paper puts forward that "double risk", which is different from the traditional civil and commercial governance rules, is "the public interest protection based on the externality of the financial industry and the abuse of credit basis in the incomplete contract of the holding company (from the perspective of governance)". The fundamental foundation of the existence of "heavy responsibility". At the same time, the tendentiousness holds that "aggravated liability" should be classified as "responsibility" with governance intention rather than as "liability" of relief alone or "collateral obligation" of company behavior restriction rules. In contrast, the construction of China's financial system started relatively late, most of the western advanced legislative and judicial experience, the degree of localization is not high, there are obvious blind spots and obstacles in practice. However, in the economic life, "aggravation responsibility" has the huge realistic demand. Therefore, in the process of optimizing and improving the existing rules of "corporate governance", the text puts forward a system of "aggravated responsibility" under the guidance of unified principles. It is embodied in the strict control of the whole process of a kind of financial holding company with "mixed operation" and significant influence on the national economy. Embodied in a series of "non-obligatory" pre-liability and procedural requirements around the special holding subject, the intention of introducing part of "identity" responsibility is appropriately introduced on the basis of "property" responsibility. The special adjustment method of "horizontal and vertical consideration" of economic law "soft, hard and hard"; at the same time, combined with the current situation of China, it leaves a relatively open system for the follow-up demonstration of "aggravated responsibility". Is for "financial holding company aggravation responsibility ruminant discussion".
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華東政法大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D912.29

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