【摘要】：進(jìn)入二十世紀(jì)以來(lái),公司出現(xiàn)了所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營(yíng)權(quán)相分離的趨勢(shì),董事會(huì)逐步成為公司組織機(jī)構(gòu)的核心和公司的主宰者。為了切實(shí)維護(hù)股東權(quán)利,防止公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理人濫用職權(quán),法律設(shè)計(jì)了各種對(duì)少數(shù)股東進(jìn)行救濟(jì)的方法,股東代表訴訟制度即為其中之一。但毋庸置疑的是,由于存在著對(duì)公司政策的誤解、不合理的異議甚至敲詐的企圖,股東提起代表訴訟的權(quán)利也存在著被濫用的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。公司如果無(wú)謂的頻頻被訴,在造成牽扯大量的人力、物力、財(cái)力不利后果的同時(shí)；另一方面也會(huì)對(duì)其聲譽(yù)造成消極的影響,最終損害到全體股東的利益。因此,在對(duì)股東代表訴訟制度進(jìn)行激勵(lì)的同時(shí),如何也對(duì)其進(jìn)行一定的制約便成為了現(xiàn)今各國(guó)制度設(shè)置的關(guān)鍵之處。 在此問(wèn)題上,作為股東代表訴訟制度典范的美國(guó),可謂已經(jīng)構(gòu)建了一套較為完善的程序規(guī)則；而作為限制性規(guī)則之一的特別訴訟委員會(huì),其之所以能夠生成,并成為一種特別的制度化應(yīng)對(duì)之道,被法院認(rèn)可并延續(xù)至今,必定是有其存在的意義的。因此,本文試圖通過(guò)對(duì)特別訴訟委員會(huì)這一制度進(jìn)行分析,探究其在代表訴訟制度中的價(jià)值定位；并希望透過(guò)對(duì)特別訴訟委員會(huì)運(yùn)行模式的詳細(xì)論述,更好地完善我國(guó)代表訴訟中相關(guān)的程序保障制度。 本文共分為四章： 第一章是對(duì)股東代表訴訟制度的概述,從股東代表訴訟的發(fā)展過(guò)程中概括出它的價(jià)值；在此基礎(chǔ)上,引出作為限制性規(guī)則之一的特別訴訟委員會(huì)制度。 第二章主要是對(duì)特別訴訟委員會(huì)制度進(jìn)行理論上的探討,分別從特別訴訟委員會(huì)的設(shè)立要求、調(diào)查工作的時(shí)間長(zhǎng)度和范圍廣度以及所作出的訴訟決定類型三個(gè)方面來(lái)展開(kāi)。 第三章通過(guò)對(duì)大量司法案例的分析,歸納出美國(guó)法院在對(duì)特別訴訟委員會(huì)的訴訟決定進(jìn)行司法審查時(shí),所關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)和采納的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 第四章則結(jié)合之前分析,總結(jié)出特別訴訟委員會(huì)在股東代表訴訟中的制度價(jià)值；并根據(jù)我國(guó)發(fā)展實(shí)踐,對(duì)監(jiān)事制度中監(jiān)事會(huì)的獨(dú)立性和人員素質(zhì)的完善以及法院司法審查標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的確立兩方面提出了一些改進(jìn)意見(jiàn)。
[Abstract]:Since the 20th century, the company has appeared the trend of separation of ownership and management, and the board of directors has gradually become the core of the organization and the master of the company. In order to protect shareholders' rights and prevent managers from abusing their power, the law has designed various methods to remedy minority shareholders, among which shareholder representative litigation system is one of them. However, there is no doubt that due to the misunderstanding of company policy, unreasonable dissent and even extortion, shareholders' right to bring representative action is also at risk of abuse. If the company is frequently sued, it will cause a lot of human, material and financial consequences; on the other hand, it will also have a negative impact on its reputation, and ultimately damage the interests of all shareholders. Therefore, while encouraging the shareholder representative litigation system, how to restrict it has become the key point of the system setting. On this issue, the United States, as a model of shareholder representative litigation system, has already constructed a set of relatively perfect procedural rules. As one of the restrictive rules, the Special Litigation Committee, which can be generated and becomes a special way of institutionalized response, must have its existence significance when it is recognized by the court and continues to this day. Therefore, this paper attempts to analyze the system of Special Litigation Committee, and explore its value orientation in the system of Representative Litigation. Through the detailed discussion of the operation mode of the Special Litigation Committee, we hope to perfect the relevant procedural protection system in our country's Representative Litigation. This paper is divided into four chapters: the first chapter is an overview of the shareholder representative litigation system, from the development of shareholder representative litigation summed up its value; on this basis, the introduction of one of the restrictive rules of the special litigation committee system. The second chapter mainly discusses the system of special litigation committee in theory, starting from three aspects: the requirements of the establishment of the special litigation committee, the length and scope of the investigation work and the types of litigation decisions made. By analyzing a large number of judicial cases, the third chapter summarizes the focus and standards that American courts pay attention to and adopt in the judicial review of the decisions of special litigation committees. The fourth chapter combines the previous analysis, summarizes the special litigation committee in the shareholder representative litigation system value; According to the development practice of our country, this paper puts forward some suggestions on the improvement of the independence and personnel quality of the board of supervisors in the supervisory system and the establishment of the standard of judicial review of the court.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：D971.2;DD912.29

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