本文選題：德沃金 + 權(quán)利論　； 參考：《吉林大學(xué)》2011年碩士論文

【摘要】：為什么是權(quán)利理論?為什么是德沃金?為什么是筆者? 對(duì)于為何要研究權(quán)利理論的回答是：權(quán)利理論是中國(guó)轉(zhuǎn)型社會(huì)中法理學(xué)轉(zhuǎn)型的重要契機(jī)。對(duì)于為什么要研究德沃金的權(quán)利論,而不是研究其他學(xué)者的權(quán)利理論的回答是：中國(guó)學(xué)者對(duì)于德沃金權(quán)利論的研究,相對(duì)于中國(guó)學(xué)者對(duì)其他西方權(quán)利理論的研究,開展得更早,研究規(guī)模更大,德沃金的權(quán)利論在事實(shí)上對(duì)中國(guó)法理論從義務(wù)本位向權(quán)利本位轉(zhuǎn)型發(fā)揮了重要作用。那么就出現(xiàn)了第三個(gè)問題,既然中國(guó)學(xué)者對(duì)于德沃金的權(quán)利論已經(jīng)比較早就展開了規(guī)模比較大的研究,那么筆者為什么還要研究德沃金權(quán)利論?筆者認(rèn)為原因在于本文有兩個(gè)創(chuàng)新之處：其一,本文注重理論的預(yù)設(shè)與理論的結(jié)論之區(qū)分,而現(xiàn)有的國(guó)內(nèi)二手研究文獻(xiàn)中很多都忽視了這一重要區(qū)分,而忽視這一區(qū)分,可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致誤讀；其二,本文全文注重畫結(jié)構(gòu)圖與邏輯圖來輔助理解與研究,作為一種寫作方式上的創(chuàng)新,這種方式能夠更為簡(jiǎn)潔、清晰地體現(xiàn)需要用語言進(jìn)行繁瑣敘述且不易被理解的抽象理論。以上就是筆者為何要寫德沃金權(quán)利論這個(gè)被國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)人研究已久的論題。 德沃金的權(quán)利論緣起于二十世紀(jì)五、六十年代,美國(guó)的整個(gè)社會(huì)思想領(lǐng)域出現(xiàn)混亂,西方社會(huì)傳統(tǒng)的自由主義態(tài)度受到保守主義者和激進(jìn)主義者的攻擊。保守主義者把社會(huì)行為的放任歸咎于自由主義,認(rèn)為自由主義給予個(gè)人以過多的自由,造成色情泛濫、性解放、墮胎、吸毒等社會(huì)道德的敗壞。激進(jìn)主義者則批評(píng)自由主義不重視財(cái)富的再分配與消滅貧窮。這場(chǎng)社會(huì)思想混亂導(dǎo)致了美國(guó)社會(huì)出現(xiàn)信仰危機(jī),延續(xù)數(shù)個(gè)世紀(jì)的西方傳統(tǒng)價(jià)值受到懷疑和出現(xiàn)動(dòng)搖。德沃金以其法律與政治哲學(xué)思想,回應(yīng)這種沖擊。德沃金認(rèn)為：法律的不確定反映了一個(gè)傳統(tǒng)的政治態(tài)度的不確定,即傳統(tǒng)的自由主義政治態(tài)度的不確定導(dǎo)致了法律的不確定。德沃金上世紀(jì)六、七十年代寫作一些列論文的目的就是定義和捍衛(wèi)一種法律的自由主義理論。德沃金的一系列論文尖銳批判了另一種被廣泛認(rèn)為是一種自由主義的法理論——法實(shí)證主義。一種法律的一般理論是由描述性面向和規(guī)范性面向兩個(gè)部分組成的。德沃金從批判法實(shí)證主義的描述性面向,即作為法實(shí)證主義架構(gòu)的中心性和組織性的命題：規(guī)則命題、系譜命題、裁量命題、法律義務(wù)的來源命題入手,構(gòu)建了其早期法理論的描述性面向——原則論。而為了批判法實(shí)證主義的規(guī)范性面向——功利主義,德沃金發(fā)展了其早期法理論的規(guī)范性面向——權(quán)利論。本文即是對(duì)德沃金權(quán)利論從其理論之預(yù)設(shè)到其理論之具體展開的追根溯源式研究。 包括導(dǎo)論和結(jié)論,本文共分為五個(gè)部分。第一部分為導(dǎo)論,介紹了權(quán)利論產(chǎn)生的時(shí)空背景,以及本文的研究動(dòng)機(jī)、問題意識(shí)、研究方法與本文結(jié)構(gòu)安排。 第二部分討論權(quán)利論之性質(zhì)。一種一般法理論的描述性部分根植于語言哲學(xué),并且通過語言哲學(xué)而運(yùn)用邏輯學(xué)和形而上學(xué)；規(guī)范性部分根植于政治哲學(xué)和道德哲學(xué),而政治哲學(xué)和道德哲學(xué)則轉(zhuǎn)而依賴于關(guān)于人類本性的哲學(xué)理論與關(guān)于道德的客觀性的哲學(xué)理論。作為一種一般性法理論的規(guī)范性部分,德沃金的權(quán)利論是一種政治理論。政治理論需要符合政治責(zé)任原則。政治責(zé)任原則所要求的是同樣的情況同樣對(duì)待,即清晰的前后一致。所以,如同任何一種政治理論一樣,權(quán)利論也有前后一致的要求。至于是哪一方面的前后一致,就要看該理論的預(yù)設(shè)。 第三部討論德沃金權(quán)利論之預(yù)設(shè)。德沃金對(duì)法實(shí)證主義之規(guī)范性批判的方法是找出法實(shí)證主義理論之預(yù)設(shè)。德沃金權(quán)利論的預(yù)設(shè)來自于對(duì)于羅爾斯正義理論之論證特點(diǎn)的接受,并且在接受的基礎(chǔ)上進(jìn)行了進(jìn)一步的分析和延伸,探尋羅爾斯未言之的其論證特點(diǎn)背后更深層次的預(yù)設(shè)。德沃金從反思性平衡、社會(huì)契約、原初狀態(tài)這三個(gè)羅爾斯正義理論的論證特點(diǎn)延伸得出,羅爾斯正義理論最根本的預(yù)設(shè)是建構(gòu)模式下的“平等的關(guān)心與尊重”的權(quán)利,這是羅爾斯正義理論中最為基礎(chǔ)的價(jià)值,德沃金將其接受,作為權(quán)利論的預(yù)設(shè)。 第四部分以以上三個(gè)部分的論證為基礎(chǔ),描述德沃金權(quán)利論之展開。德沃金從三個(gè)方向：權(quán)利的概念分析、法律的原則體系、法官的個(gè)人信念與社會(huì)的政治道德上展開其權(quán)利論之論證。第一,在權(quán)利的概念分析方向上：德沃金是從兩個(gè)方向來解釋“權(quán)利”的：政治論證的使用的角度、社會(huì)中的利益和負(fù)擔(dān)的分配的特點(diǎn)。第二,在法律的原則體系面向上,德沃金建立了在單獨(dú)的每一個(gè)權(quán)威層級(jí)上,為各個(gè)先例所提供證立的原則必須為這一權(quán)威層級(jí)上的為其他先例提供證立的原則前后一致,而對(duì)于任何一個(gè)原則來說,在每個(gè)權(quán)威層級(jí)上的這個(gè)原則,都要與更高權(quán)威層級(jí)上的這個(gè)原則前后一致,如此建構(gòu)了一張法律原則的無縫之網(wǎng)。第三,在法官的個(gè)人道德和社會(huì)的政治道德面向上,德沃金強(qiáng)調(diào)其審判理論根本就沒有提供法官在其自己的政治信念和法官認(rèn)為的社會(huì)的政治信念之間選擇的問題,相反,社會(huì)道德是法律和社會(huì)制度所以之為先決的政治道德,而法官必須依賴其自己的判斷來決定社會(huì)道德包含有哪些原則,社會(huì)道德不是社會(huì)成員彼此競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的主張之總和,而是依其各自主張的每一種競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的主張。 第五部分為結(jié)論。德沃金與法實(shí)證主義的論戰(zhàn)始于對(duì)法官的司法自由裁量權(quán)是否存在的爭(zhēng)論,本文用原則論和權(quán)利論兩幅論證邏輯圖展現(xiàn)了德沃金前期法理論批判法實(shí)證主義之自由裁量權(quán)的兩種論證邏輯路徑,并且指出了這種論證邏輯的改變的原因,在于德沃金在提出原則論之后,受到了羅爾斯1971年出版的《正義論》的影響,接受了羅爾斯的預(yù)設(shè),并對(duì)其預(yù)設(shè)進(jìn)行了延伸,進(jìn)而進(jìn)一步發(fā)展出其權(quán)利論。從原則論到權(quán)利論,德沃金一以貫之,建構(gòu)了“無縫之網(wǎng)”的法律的原則體系。權(quán)利論雖然描述的是美國(guó)法體系的一個(gè)解釋,但是對(duì)中國(guó)現(xiàn)實(shí)亦具有非常大的借鑒意義。德沃金的權(quán)利論產(chǎn)生于美國(guó)社會(huì)迅速變革、以功利主義思想為規(guī)范性面向的法理論占統(tǒng)治地位的時(shí)期,作為一個(gè)有社會(huì)責(zé)任感和歷史使命感的知識(shí)分子,德沃金強(qiáng)調(diào)那個(gè)時(shí)代被占統(tǒng)治地位的法理論所一定程度忽視的個(gè)人權(quán)利。中國(guó)大陸這三十余年來也正在歷經(jīng)著巨大的變革,經(jīng)濟(jì)高速發(fā)展,人民的個(gè)人權(quán)利有所擴(kuò)大,政府已經(jīng)在一定程度上已經(jīng)意識(shí)到法律不僅僅是統(tǒng)治階級(jí)的工具,法律也要更大程度的保護(hù)個(gè)人權(quán)利,權(quán)利神圣。而作為一個(gè)人,作為一個(gè)公民,擁有什么權(quán)利以及為什么擁有權(quán)利,德沃金給出了一種解釋,值得中國(guó)社會(huì)研究與借鑒。
[Abstract]:Why is the theory of rights? Why is Dworkin? Why is it the author?
The answer to why the theory of right is to be studied is that the theory of rights is an important opportunity for the transformation of jurisprudence in China's transitional society. The answer to why Dworkin's theory of rights is to be studied, rather than the study of other scholars' rights theory, is: the Chinese scholars' Study on the theory of Dworkin's rights is relative to the other western countries. The research on the theory of square rights has been carried out earlier and the research scale is larger. In fact, Dworkin's theory of rights plays an important role in the transformation of Chinese law theory from duty standard to right standard. Then there are third problems. Since Chinese scholars have already carried out a relatively large scale of Research on Dworkin's theory of rights. Why do I have to study the theory of Dworkin's rights? The author thinks that the reason is that there are two innovations in this article: first, this article pays attention to the distinction between theoretical presupposition and theoretical conclusion, and many of the existing domestic second-hand literature ignores this important distinction, but neglecting this distinction may lead to misreading; secondly, The full text of this article focuses on drawing structure and logic to assist in understanding and research. As an innovation in a writing style, this method can be more concise and clearly embodies the abstract theory that needs to be tedious and uneasily understood in language. This is why the author has been writing Dworkin's theory of rights for a long time. An argument.
Dworkin's theory of rights originated from the five and 60s twentieth Century, in 60s, the whole social ideological field of the United States was confused. The liberal attitude of the western society was attacked by the Conservatives and radicalists. The Conservatives blamed liberalism on the release of social behavior, and the liberalism gave the individual too much self. It causes the deterioration of social morality such as pornography, sexual liberation, abortion, and drug abuse. The Radicalist criticised liberalism for not paying attention to the redistribution of wealth and the eradication of poverty. This social ideological confusion led to the emergence of a belief crisis in American society, which lasted for several centuries to the suspicion and wavering of western traditional values. Dworkin took its law. Dworkin believes that the uncertainty of the law reflects the uncertainty of a traditional political attitude, that is, the uncertainty of the traditional liberal political attitude leads to the uncertainty of the law. The purpose of writing a number of papers in the six and 70s of the last century was to define and defend a law of Dworkin. The liberal theory of law. A series of Dworkin's papers sharply criticize another kind of legal theory, which is widely regarded as a liberalism - legal positivism. A general theory of law consists of two parts: descriptive orientation and normalization. Dworkin's descriptive orientation of critical law positivism is the law. The central and organizational propositions of the positivist structure: the rule proposition, the pedigree proposition, the discretionary proposition, the source proposition of the legal obligation, and the descriptive orientation of its early legal theory - the principle theory. In order to criticize the normative positivism of the legal positivism, Dworkin developed the rules of his early law theory. The right orientation is the theory of rights. This article is a traceable study of Dworkin's theory of rights from the presupposition of his theory to the concrete development of his theory.
Including introduction and conclusion, this article is divided into five parts. The first part is an introduction, which introduces the background of the time and space of the theory of rights, as well as the motivation of the study, the consciousness of the problem, the method of research and the arrangement of the structure of this article.
The second part discusses the nature of the theory of rights. A descriptive part of the theory of general law is rooted in the philosophy of language, and uses logic and metaphysics through the philosophy of language; the normative part is rooted in political philosophy and moral philosophy, while political philosophy and moral philosophy are dependent on philosophical theories and customs about human nature. The philosophical theory of Yu Daode's objectivity. As a normative part of the general law theory, Dworkin's theory of rights is a political theory. Political theory needs to conform to the principle of political responsibility. The principle of political responsibility is required to be treated the same way, that is, clear and consistent. So, like any kind of political theory, There is also a consistent requirement for the theory of rights. As to which aspect is consistent, it depends on the presupposition of the theory.
The third part discusses the presupposition of Dworkin's theory of rights. The method of Dworkin's normative criticism of legal positivism is to find out the presupposition of the theory of legal positivism. The presupposition of Dworkin's right theory comes from the acceptance of the characteristics of Rawls's theory of justice, and further analyzes and extends it on the basis of acceptance. Dworkin's unspoken argument has a deeper level of presupposition. From the demonstration characteristics of the three Rawls justice theories of reflective balance, social contract and original state, the most fundamental presupposition of Rawls's justice theory is the right of "equal heart and respect" under the construction model, which is the justice theory of Rawls. Dworkin accepted it as the most basic value in the theory of rights.
The fourth part, based on the argument of the above three parts, describes the expansion of Dworkin's theory of rights. Dworkin is from three directions: the analysis of the concept of rights, the principle system of the law, the individual belief of the judge and the political morality of the society. First, in the direction of the conceptual analysis of the rights and interests, Dworkin is from two The direction is to explain the "right": the angle of use of political argument, the characteristics of the distribution of interests and burdens in society. Second, on the basis of the principle of law, Dworkin established the principle of providing evidence for each precedent at each level of authority, which must be provided for other precedents at this level of authority. The principle of evidence is consistent, and for any principle, this principle at each level of authority should be consistent with this principle at the higher level of authority, so as to construct a seamless net of legal principles. Third, Dworkin emphasizes his judgment on the individual morality of the judge and the political and moral orientation of the society. The theory does not provide a choice between the judges in their own political beliefs and the political beliefs that the judges think of the society. On the contrary, the social morality is the first political morality of the law and the social system, and the judge must rely on its own judgment to determine the principles of the social morality, and the social morality is not. The sum of the competing opinions of members of a society is based on every competing proposition advocated by them.
The fifth part is the conclusion. The debate between Dworkin and legal positivism begins with the debate on the existence of judicial discretion in the judge. This article shows the two logic paths of the free discretion of the critical law positivism of Dworkin's early legal theory with the two logic diagrams of principle and right theory, and points out the argument. The reason for the change of logic is that Dworkin, after putting forward the principle of principle, was influenced by Rawls's "theory of justice" published in 1971, accepted the presupposition of Rawls, and extended its presupposition, and further developed his theory of rights. From principle theory to right theory, the law of devo gold was established and the law of "seamless net" was constructed. The theory of rights. Although the theory of rights describes an explanation of the American law system, it also has a great reference to the reality of China. Dworkin's theory of rights came from the rapid change in American society, a period of legal theory dominated by utilitarianism as a normative theory, and a sense of social responsibility and history. The intelligentsia with a sense of mission, Dworkin, stressed the personal rights of a certain degree that was overlooked by the dominant legal theory of that era. The Chinese mainland has also undergone tremendous changes over the past thirty years, the rapid economic development, the expansion of the people's personal rights, and the government, to a certain extent, that the law has already realized that the law is not only As a man, as a citizen, what rights and why, as a citizen, as a citizen, as a citizen, as a citizen, Dworkin gives a kind of explanation which deserves the study and reference of Chinese society.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：吉林大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2011
【分類號(hào)】：D90

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