1. Introduction介紹

關(guān)于審計(jì)師提供的非審計(jì)服務(wù)的討論（NAS）是否影響審計(jì)獨(dú)立性和審計(jì)質(zhì)量多年來一直是行業(yè)中的一個(gè)有爭議的話題（Knechel和夏爾馬，2012）。理論分析和實(shí)證的方法已被用來解決這個(gè)問題。在審計(jì)實(shí)踐中，也有一個(gè)長期的看法，審計(jì)獨(dú)立性受到損害的對客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴性費(fèi)用審計(jì)。通過提供非審計(jì)服務(wù)所獲得的額外費(fèi)用（NAS）增加審計(jì)師對客戶的經(jīng)濟(jì)依賴性，因而已被監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)威脅審計(jì)獨(dú)立性。因此，監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)已授權(quán)的NAS限制審計(jì)師（SOX法案，美國眾議院，，2002）并要求客戶披露金額和支付給他們的審計(jì)收費(fèi)類型（SEC，2000）。人們普遍認(rèn)為NAS影響審計(jì)師的獨(dú)立性，從而損害審計(jì)質(zhì)量。然而，在過去40年的實(shí)證研究已經(jīng)在很大程度上不能支持這樣的觀點(diǎn)，NAS費(fèi)受損的實(shí)際審計(jì)獨(dú)立性相關(guān)（弗蘭西斯，2006；施密特，2012）。
The discussion about auditor-provided non-audit services (NAS) and whether they adversely affect auditor independence or audit quality has been a controversial topic in the profession for many years (Knechel and Sharma, 2012). Both analytical and empirical methods have been used in tackle this problem.In the auditing practice, there is also a longstanding view that auditor independence is jeopardised by the economic dependence of an auditor on client fees. The additional fees obtained through the provision of non-audit services (NAS) increase an auditor’s economic dependence on a client, and thus have been perceived by regulators on threaten auditor independence. As a result, regulators have mandated NAS restrictions on auditors (SOX, U.S. House of Representatives, 2002) and require clients to disclose the amounts and types of fees paid to their auditors (SEC, 2000). It is generally accepted that NAS has negative impact on auditor independence thus compromise audit quality. However, empirical research over the past 40 years has been largely unable to support the view that NAS fees are associated with impaired actual auditor independence (Francis, 2006; Schmidt, 2012).
Knechelet al. (2012) state that different stakeholders in the financial reporting process, such as users, auditors, regulators, and society, are likely to have different perceptions towards audit quality on what constitutes audit quality, which will influence the type of indicators one might use to assess audit quality. For example, the users of financial reports might regard free from material misstatement as high quality audit thus indicate high level of auditor independence. The auditors might consider high audit quality as completing all tasks required by the firm’s audit methodology. The audit firm might evaluate a high audit quality as the audit work can escape from inspection, court of law or litigants. Regulators may view high quality audit as one that is compliance with professional standards. Society may expect high quality of audit to avoid economic problems for a company or the market.
The paper aims to conclude the effects of NAS on auditor independence and audit quality (favourable or adverse) on existing literature. The proposal aims to add to the existing body of literature by reviewing and synthesising both the academic and practice and propose ideas for future research.

2. Term Defining

3. Literature Review
4. Methodology and Method
5. Summary and Conclusion




本文編號：41695