本文選題：網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性　切入點(diǎn)：鏈與鏈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)　出處：《電子科技大學(xué)》2016年博士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：經(jīng)濟(jì)的全球化和市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的加劇,使競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的形式在悄然發(fā)生變化,由企業(yè)相互之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)逐漸演變?yōu)楣⿷?yīng)鏈鏈際間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。同時(shí)信息技術(shù)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)的快速發(fā)展,促進(jìn)了具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征的網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展。而網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征并不是僅限于網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟(jì)中,傳統(tǒng)經(jīng)濟(jì)中也存在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征。在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的環(huán)境下,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈在縱向運(yùn)作機(jī)制上不僅會(huì)受競(jìng)爭(zhēng)因素的影響,勢(shì)必會(huì)受到網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性因素的影響。本文應(yīng)用博弈論和網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性的理論與方法,研究最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時(shí),競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的博弈均衡,以及基于供應(yīng)鏈上下游企業(yè)同時(shí)改善收益或利潤(rùn)的角度,研究競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈縱向合同選擇問(wèn)題,并分析網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度等因素對(duì)結(jié)構(gòu)選擇邊界與合同參數(shù)的影響,為處在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性環(huán)境下的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈上的企業(yè)提供理論參考。首先,研究了最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時(shí)的數(shù)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇,揭示了網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度對(duì)縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇演變路徑和均衡狀態(tài)的影響。主要結(jié)論表明:如果網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)范圍的影響很弱,在縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇上一體化結(jié)構(gòu)為占優(yōu)的均衡結(jié)構(gòu),在合同選擇策略上,縱向聯(lián)盟的收益共享合同實(shí)現(xiàn)零售商和供應(yīng)商收益的改進(jìn),數(shù)量折扣合同也會(huì)促進(jìn)制造商和零售的收益。當(dāng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)范圍的影響強(qiáng)烈時(shí),競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈上縱向聯(lián)盟的收益共享合同失效,同時(shí)數(shù)量折扣合同也會(huì)失效;如果在網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度很大,同時(shí)網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性對(duì)數(shù)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的范圍影響激烈時(shí),在供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇上,分散化結(jié)構(gòu)為占優(yōu)均衡。其次,當(dāng)市場(chǎng)存在不確定風(fēng)險(xiǎn)時(shí),研究了最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時(shí)的數(shù)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和縱向合同選擇,揭示了網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度、數(shù)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度和市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因子對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇演變路徑和均衡狀態(tài)的影響。結(jié)論表明:從節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)的績(jī)效角度出發(fā),當(dāng)產(chǎn)品的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度較弱地依賴于網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度系數(shù),同時(shí)市場(chǎng)不確定性因素波動(dòng)較大時(shí),在縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇上,一體化結(jié)構(gòu)為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈占優(yōu)的均衡結(jié)構(gòu),在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈合同選擇策略上,利潤(rùn)分享合同能實(shí)現(xiàn)節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)改進(jìn)。從供應(yīng)鏈的角度出發(fā),供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)選擇與市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)無(wú)關(guān)。最后,在供應(yīng)鏈上游企業(yè)進(jìn)行技術(shù)創(chuàng)新情形下,研究了最終產(chǎn)品具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性特征時(shí)的數(shù)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)供應(yīng)鏈的縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇,揭示了網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度對(duì)縱向結(jié)構(gòu)和合同選擇演變路徑和均衡狀態(tài)的影響。研究表明:當(dāng)產(chǎn)品的網(wǎng)絡(luò)外部性強(qiáng)度較弱、數(shù)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)強(qiáng)度也較弱時(shí),在無(wú)技術(shù)溢出效應(yīng)時(shí),利潤(rùn)分享合同能實(shí)現(xiàn)供應(yīng)鏈節(jié)點(diǎn)企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)改進(jìn),在有技術(shù)溢出效應(yīng)時(shí),一體化結(jié)構(gòu)為供應(yīng)鏈系統(tǒng)利潤(rùn)改進(jìn)的均衡。
[Abstract]:With the globalization of economy and the aggravation of market competition, the form of competition is changing quietly, from the competition among enterprises to the competition between supply chains, at the same time, the rapid development of information technology and network. It promotes the development of network economy with the characteristics of network externality, and the characteristics of network externality are not limited to the network economy, but also exist in the traditional economy. The vertical operation mechanism of competitive supply chain is not only affected by competition factors, but also by network externalities. This paper applies the theory and method of game theory and network externality. When the final product has the characteristics of network externality, the game equilibrium of the competitive supply chain vertical structure selection is studied, and the vertical contract selection problem of the competitive supply chain is studied based on the point of view that the upstream and downstream enterprises simultaneously improve the income or profit. The influence of network externality intensity and competition intensity on the structure selection boundary and contract parameters is analyzed, which provides a theoretical reference for the enterprises in the competitive supply chain under the network externality environment. This paper studies the vertical structure and contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain when the final product has the characteristics of network externality. The effects of network externality and competition intensity on vertical structure, evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection are revealed. The main conclusions are as follows: if the influence of network externality on competition scope is very weak, The integration structure is the dominant equilibrium structure in the vertical structure selection. In the contract selection strategy, the vertical alliance revenue-sharing contract realizes the improvement of retailer and supplier income. When the influence of network externality on the scope of competition is strong, the profit sharing contract of vertical alliance in competitive supply chain will be invalid, and the quantity discount contract will also be invalid. If the intensity of network externality is great and the influence of network externality on the range of quantitative competition is fierce, the decentralized structure is dominant equilibrium in the vertical structure selection of supply chain. Secondly, when there is uncertain risk in the market, This paper studies the vertical structure and vertical contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain when the final product has the characteristics of network externality, and reveals the intensity of network externality. The influence of quantity competition intensity and market risk factor on the vertical structure of competitive supply chain, the evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection. When the competitive intensity of the product depends on the network externality intensity coefficient and the market uncertainty fluctuates greatly, the integrated structure is the dominant equilibrium structure of the competitive supply chain in the vertical structure selection. In the competitive supply chain contract selection strategy, profit sharing contract can achieve the profit improvement of node enterprises. From the point of view of supply chain, the vertical structure selection of supply chain has nothing to do with market risk. Finally, In the case of technological innovation in upstream enterprises of supply chain, the vertical structure and contract selection of quantitative competitive supply chain with the characteristics of network externality are studied. The effects of network externality and competition intensity on vertical structure, evolution path and equilibrium state of contract selection are revealed. The results show that when the product network externality intensity is weak, the quantity competition intensity is also weak. When there is no technology spillover effect, the profit sharing contract can realize the profit improvement of the enterprise in the supply chain node. In the case of the technology spillover effect, the integrated structure is the equilibrium of the profit improvement in the supply chain system.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：電子科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2016
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274

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