發(fā)布時(shí)間：2021-04-02 16:00

　　本文旨在探討公司治理對(duì)中國(guó)企業(yè)績(jī)效和盈余管理的影響。本人將確定影響經(jīng)營(yíng)決策和會(huì)計(jì)選擇的最重要的公司治理機(jī)制,調(diào)查管理者用來(lái)提高工業(yè)企業(yè)收益和業(yè)績(jī)的工具,最后確定哪種應(yīng)計(jì)模型更適合于中國(guó)工業(yè)企業(yè)的收益管理檢測(cè)。鋁公司。此前,公司治理機(jī)制被認(rèn)為是評(píng)估和監(jiān)測(cè)財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告有效性的最重要因素（Brown、Pottb及W?mpenerb,2014年）,也是一般控制的基石。高級(jí)管理人員實(shí)施了內(nèi)部和外部公司治理,以提高運(yùn)營(yíng)效率,減少會(huì)計(jì)系統(tǒng)中的錯(cuò)誤或操縱發(fā)生率（Lee,2006年）。盈余管理被認(rèn)為是與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告有關(guān)的最重要問(wèn)題之一,特別是在安然和世通丑聞之后。盈余管理行為也與企業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)任水平較低有關(guān),這兩個(gè)方面的改善都有望提高公司治理的質(zhì)量。以印度為例,以往的研究表明,由于獨(dú)立董事的監(jiān)督作用不佳,董事會(huì)獨(dú)立并不能保證公司業(yè)績(jī)的提高。關(guān)于美國(guó)、英國(guó)、新西蘭或韓國(guó)的調(diào)查結(jié)果并非一致同意。隨著中國(guó)正在成為一個(gè)蓬勃發(fā)展的商業(yè)國(guó)家。我們應(yīng)該問(wèn)“推動(dòng)這種成功的核心價(jià)值觀是什么?與其他國(guó)家有什么不同嗎?“為了研究這些問(wèn)題,我們將利用2008年至2014年的更新數(shù)據(jù),對(duì)2098家中國(guó)上市公司進(jìn)行實(shí)證研究。公司的業(yè)績(jī)是通過(guò)股... 

【文章來(lái)源】：對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)北京市 211工程院校 教育部直屬院校

【文章頁(yè)數(shù)】：133 頁(yè)

【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士

【文章目錄】：
摘要
ABSTRACT
LISTE OF ABBREVIATION
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
    1.1 Study background
    1.2 Context,earning management and corporate governance initiatives in China
    1.3 Research objectives
    1.4 Research question
    1.5 Contributions and significance of the research
    1.6 Research methodology
    1.7 Study organization
CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
    2.1 China general background
    2.2 China stock exchanges
        2.2.1 Shanghai Stock Exchange
        2.2.2 Shenzhen Stock Exchange
    2.3 China Securities Regulatory Commission
        2.3.1 The role of CSRC
        2.3.2 Experience from the West
    2.4 Background of listed firms in China
        2.4.1 Ownership structure
        2.4.2 Share market reforms
        2.4.3 SOEs in China
        2.4.4 Two-tier board
    2.5 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW
    3.1 Definition of corporate governance
        3.1.1 Corporate governance models
        3.1.2 Corporate governance in China
    3.2 Agency theory-General
        3.2.1 Agency theory’s application in China
        3.2.2 Agency theory issues in China
        3.2.3 Summation
    3.3 Institutional theory-General
        3.3.1 Institutional theory’s application in China
        3.3.2 Summation
    3.4 Earning Management
        3.4.1 Board independence and earning management
        3.4.2 Board Size and Earning Management
        3.4.3 CEO duality and Earning Management
    3.5 Firm performance
        3.5.1 Board independence and Firm Performance
        3.5.2 Board Size and Firm Performance
        3.5.3 CEO duality and Firm Performance
    3.6 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHSES DEVELOPMENT
    4.1 Corporate Governance and Earning Management
        4.1.1 Board independence and earning management
        4.1.2 Board Size and earning management
        4.1.3 CEO duality and Earning Management
    4.2 Corporate governance and firm performance
        4.3.1 Board independence and firm performance
        4.3.2 Board Size and firm performance
        4.3.3 CEO duality and firm performance
    4.3 Summary of the chapter
CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
    5.1 Sample profile and data collection
    5.2 Corporate governance on firm’s performance: variables measurement and modelsspecification
        5.2.1 Measurements of the dependent Variables
        5.2.2 Measurement of the independent and control variables
        5.2.3 Specification model between firm performance and mechanismscorporate governance
    5.3 Corporate governance on earnings management: variables measurement and modelsspecification
        5.3.1 Measurements of the dependent Variables
        5.3.2 Measurement of the independent and control variables
        5.3.3 Specification model between earning management and mechanisms corporategovernance
    5.4 Research hypotheses
CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
    6.1 Regression Results
    6.2 Results on the corporate governance and firm performance
        6.2.1. Board size on firms’ performance
        6.2.2 Board independence on firms’ performance
        6.2.3 CEO duality on firms’ performance
    6.3 Results on the corporate governance and earning management
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
    7.1 Conclusions
    7.2 Future research directions
    7.3 Policy Recommendation
RFFERENCES
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Personal resume,academic papers published at school and research results


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期刊論文
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