本文選題：收益共享契約 + 公平偏好��； 參考：《生態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì)》2017年05期

【摘要】：針對(duì)現(xiàn)有低碳供應(yīng)鏈決策相關(guān)研究中忽略了公平偏好的問(wèn)題,以Nash討價(jià)還價(jià)解作為判斷收益分配是否公平的參考標(biāo)準(zhǔn),基于收益共享契約建立Stackelberg博弈模型,求解得到碳減排量和批發(fā)價(jià)格等供應(yīng)鏈決策,并分析公平偏好的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),收益共享契約有利于供應(yīng)鏈的碳減排;零售商和供應(yīng)商的公平偏好都會(huì)促進(jìn)碳減排;而且,公平偏好會(huì)影響收益共享契約的批發(fā)價(jià)格和收益共享比例兩個(gè)參數(shù)的取值。因此,選擇公平偏好較強(qiáng)的企業(yè)構(gòu)建供應(yīng)鏈,并根據(jù)自身和供應(yīng)鏈伙伴公平偏好強(qiáng)度確定恰當(dāng)?shù)氖找婀蚕砥跫s參數(shù)值,對(duì)促進(jìn)供應(yīng)鏈碳減排都具有重要意義。
[Abstract]:In view of the neglect of fairness preference in the existing research on low carbon supply chain decision making, a Stackelberg game model based on the income sharing contract is established by using Nash bargaining solution as the reference standard to judge whether the income distribution is fair or not. The supply chain decisions such as carbon abatement and wholesale price are obtained and the influence of fairness preference is analyzed. The study found that revenue-sharing contracts are conducive to carbon emissions reduction in supply chains; that both retailers and suppliers' fair preferences contribute to carbon emissions reduction; and, Fair preference will affect the wholesale price and income sharing ratio of the revenue sharing contract. Therefore, it is of great significance to select enterprises with strong equity preference to construct supply chain, and to determine appropriate benefit sharing contract parameters according to their fair preference intensity and supply chain partners' fair preference, which is of great significance to promote carbon emission reduction in supply chain.
【作者單位】： 重慶交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;重慶理工大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家社會(huì)科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目“基于社會(huì)偏好及其認(rèn)知?jiǎng)討B(tài)演進(jìn)的供應(yīng)鏈契約優(yōu)化與協(xié)調(diào)研究”(16CGL017)
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F274;X32
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本文編號(hào)：2104355