本文選題：政治關(guān)系　切入點(diǎn)：市場(chǎng)化改革　出處：《吉林大學(xué)社會(huì)科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào)》2017年05期

【摘要】：結(jié)合中國(guó)市場(chǎng)化改革的現(xiàn)實(shí)情景,從"代理假說(shuō)"、"干預(yù)假說(shuō)"和"擠占假說(shuō)"進(jìn)行對(duì)比分析并考察政治關(guān)系給公司股東帶來(lái)的價(jià)值預(yù)期及其財(cái)富效應(yīng)。通過(guò)公司高管變更的事件研究發(fā)現(xiàn),高管的政治關(guān)系減少了股東的價(jià)值,其財(cái)富效應(yīng)顯著為負(fù),但僅體現(xiàn)在市場(chǎng)化高的地方,而在市場(chǎng)化低的地方,高管的政治關(guān)系沒(méi)有明顯的股東財(cái)富效應(yīng)。這說(shuō)明,在市場(chǎng)化高的地方,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力比政治關(guān)系對(duì)公司的發(fā)展更重要,但是政治關(guān)系會(huì)擠占公司對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力建設(shè)的資源投入,讓公司的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力遭受損害。研究結(jié)論支持政治關(guān)系的"擠占假說(shuō)"。
[Abstract]:Combined with the reality of China's market-oriented reform, From the perspective of "agency hypothesis", "intervention hypothesis" and "crowding hypothesis", this paper makes a comparative analysis of the value expectation and wealth effect brought by political relations to shareholders. The political relationship of executives reduces the value of shareholders, and the wealth effect is significantly negative, but only in places where the market is high, and where the market is low, there is no obvious shareholder wealth effect in the political relationship of executives. In places where marketization is high, competitiveness is more important to the development of the company than political relations, but political relations will crowd out the resources invested by the company in the construction of competitiveness. The results support the "crowding hypothesis" of political relations.
【作者單位】： 四川大學(xué)商學(xué)院;對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)國(guó)際商學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(71302132) 中央高�；究蒲袠I(yè)務(wù)費(fèi)研究專項(xiàng)項(xiàng)目(SKQY201650)
【分類號(hào)】：D0;F123.9;F271
，

本文編號(hào)：1658578