【摘要】：1968—1973年的越美巴黎談判是最終促成侵越美軍撤出越南、結(jié)束干涉戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng),越南取得民族解放戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)勝利的重要?dú)v史事件。前人論述或局限于“美國(guó)中心”,或囿于史料不足,對(duì)越美談判的研究非常不充分,尤其忽視越南在其中的角色。本文以越南為研究視角,對(duì)越美談判做系統(tǒng)論述,論文主要由前言、正文和結(jié)論三部分構(gòu)成。前言部分回顧前人有關(guān)該問(wèn)題的研究狀況,提出論文的選題背景和意義,論文的研究思路和史料采集情況。正文共分六章。第一章主要討論越南黨和政府的談判準(zhǔn)備,具體分為三個(gè)層面展開(kāi)論述：一、思想認(rèn)識(shí)上的準(zhǔn)備。越南勞動(dòng)黨中央對(duì)如何解決越南問(wèn)題始終保持清醒的認(rèn)識(shí),把外交談判作為抗美救國(guó)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的必要組成部分；二、對(duì)美和談試探的斗爭(zhēng),嘗試和美國(guó)對(duì)話,為正式談判奠定了基礎(chǔ)；三、面對(duì)中國(guó)反談、蘇聯(lián)促談和由此引起的分歧,越南堅(jiān)持自己對(duì)形勢(shì)的分析和判斷,準(zhǔn)確把握談判時(shí)機(jī)。第二章主要闡述美國(guó)統(tǒng)治集團(tuán)圍繞印支戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)是戰(zhàn)是和而發(fā)生的具有重要意義的分裂。美國(guó)1968年開(kāi)始和越南談判是其侵越政策破產(chǎn)的結(jié)果,美國(guó)壟斷資本集團(tuán)的侵越政策共識(shí)在越南軍民頑強(qiáng)的斗志和軍事打擊面前逐漸破裂,并被迫開(kāi)始單方面戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)降級(jí),在此重要背景下,約翰遜政府向越南發(fā)出和談?wù)埱?越南抗美救國(guó)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)由此邁入了邊打邊談的階段。第三章論述越美談判最初九個(gè)月的情況,是為談判的第一階段。除了會(huì)談地點(diǎn)問(wèn)題外,雙方主要圍繞美國(guó)停止轟炸北越和會(huì)談模式問(wèn)題展開(kāi)較量。在越南耐心而堅(jiān)決的斗爭(zhēng)下,約翰遜政府宣布停止實(shí)施對(duì)北越長(zhǎng)達(dá)三年之久“霹靂行動(dòng)”。由于會(huì)談模式背后其實(shí)就是關(guān)于越南南方民族解放陣線的合法性問(wèn)題,進(jìn)而關(guān)系到越南南方政權(quán)問(wèn)題,所以一個(gè)看似簡(jiǎn)單的問(wèn)題在雙方會(huì)談中爭(zhēng)論不已,雙方有關(guān)桌子形狀和如何擺放以及標(biāo)識(shí)與會(huì)方等細(xì)節(jié)上的交涉其實(shí)都與此直接相關(guān)。討論最后的結(jié)果是,雙方各自解釋代表團(tuán)構(gòu)成,因此巴黎會(huì)談形式上就是四方會(huì)談。第四章主要敘述黎德壽和基辛格1970年開(kāi)始秘密談判,直到1972年5月,是為第二階段談判。雙方的立場(chǎng)差距甚遠(yuǎn),美國(guó)主張軍事、政治問(wèn)題脫鉤處理,即美國(guó)和北越討論撤軍和戰(zhàn)俘等軍事問(wèn)題,越南南方政權(quán)問(wèn)題留給越南內(nèi)部自己解決,越南堅(jiān)持軍事、政治問(wèn)題一攬子解決。為此,談判兩度中斷,各達(dá)近8個(gè)月時(shí)間,越美談判的焦點(diǎn)歸結(jié)到阮文紹的去留問(wèn)題。第五章主要論述越美第三階段談判,1972年5月到10月的會(huì)談是整個(gè)談判過(guò)程中最關(guān)鍵、也是最艱難的時(shí)期。從1972年8月起,北越向美國(guó)提出最高、中間和最低三套解決方案。越南勞動(dòng)黨中央經(jīng)過(guò)反復(fù)認(rèn)識(shí)和討論,最終明確越南的談判目標(biāo)是,簽署一份在越南結(jié)束戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、恢復(fù)和平的協(xié)議,而不再是推翻西貢偽政權(quán),建立聯(lián)合政府。這個(gè)轉(zhuǎn)變對(duì)談判取得重大突破具有極其重要的意義,它明確了談判方向,即先解決軍事問(wèn)題和有關(guān)政治問(wèn)題的原則,第二步由南越各方解決內(nèi)部問(wèn)題。北越適時(shí)、主動(dòng)地調(diào)整談判政策,大大加速了談判進(jìn)程,使得越南問(wèn)題走上了解決的道路。第六章闡述越美最后階段的談判斗爭(zhēng)。美國(guó)唆使阮文紹提出修改協(xié)議,企圖推翻協(xié)議文本。北越針?shù)h相對(duì),堅(jiān)持自己的談判底線,有效的維護(hù)了越南的正當(dāng)權(quán)益,迫使美國(guó)不得不按照1972年10月20日協(xié)議的基礎(chǔ)在和平協(xié)定書上簽字。巴黎協(xié)定的簽訂標(biāo)志著美國(guó)打著反共旗號(hào)的侵越戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)慘淡收?qǐng)?這一神圣的協(xié)定吹響了越南民族和國(guó)家統(tǒng)一的號(hào)角。結(jié)論部分在上述闡述基礎(chǔ)上,總結(jié)概括了越南在越美談判過(guò)程中以小博大,堅(jiān)持自主外交的外交藝術(shù)和獨(dú)特魅力。結(jié)論部分還談到了由越南以弱小民族之地位進(jìn)行自主外交而認(rèn)識(shí)到的兩點(diǎn)經(jīng)驗(yàn),以提升越美談判的分析層次。
[Abstract]:The Vietnam-U.S. Paris talks of 1968-1973 were an important historical event that eventually led to the withdrawal of the US forces from Vietnam, the end of the intervention, and the victory of the national liberation war in Viet Nam. The previous discussion is not limited to the "United States Center", or to the shortage of historical materials, and the research on the more beautiful negotiation is not sufficient, especially to ignore the role of the Vietnamese in it. In this paper, a systematic exposition of the more beautiful negotiation is made in the perspective of Vietnam, which is mainly composed of the preface, the text and the conclusion. In the preface, the author reviews the research status of this problem, and puts forward the background and significance of the thesis, and the research thoughts and the data collection of the thesis. The text is divided into six chapters. The first chapter mainly discusses the preparation of the negotiation between the party and the government of the Vietnam, which is divided into three aspects: one, the preparation of the thought. The Party Central Committee of Viet Nam has always maintained a clear understanding of how to solve the problem of Vietnam, as an essential part of the war on the fight against the United States, and the struggle, the attempt and the American dialogue for the negotiation of the United States, and laid the foundation for formal negotiations; and, in the face of China's anti-talk, The Soviet Union talked about and caused the differences, and Vietnam maintained its own analysis and judgment on the situation and accurately grasped the timing of the negotiations. The second chapter mainly states that the U. S. ruling group has an important and important division around the Indo-China war. The United States began in 1968 and the Vietnam negotiations were the result of its invasion and Vietnam policy. The policy consensus of the US monopoly capital group was gradually broken in the face of the strong fighting and military strike in Vietnam, and was forced to start a unilateral war, in which case, The Johnson government sent a request for peace talks to Vietnam, and the Vietnam War of Resistance to the Salvation of the U.S. led to a period of talks. The third chapter discusses the first nine months of the negotiation, which is the first stage of the negotiation. In addition to that issue of the venue, the two sides will play a major role in the United states to stop the bombing of the North and the talks. In a patient and firm struggle in Vietnam, the Johnson government announced that it would stop implementing a three-year-long "THUNDERBOLT" to the North. in that light of the question of the legitimacy of the national liberation front in the south of Viet Nam, the issue of the south's regime in the south of Viet Nam has been linked to the pattern of the talks, so that a seemingly simple question has been disputing in the talks of the two sides, The negotiations between the two parties on the shape of the table and how to place and identify the parties involved are in fact directly related to this. The final result is that the two sides have their respective explanations of the composition of the delegation, so the Paris talks are in the form of a four-party talks. The fourth chapter mainly describes the secret talks between Li Deshou and Kissinger in 1970, and in May 1972, it was the second phase of the negotiations. The two sides are far from the position, and the United States stands for the decoupling of military and political issues, namely, the United States and the North to discuss military issues such as the withdrawal of troops and prisoners of war, the issue of the southern regime of Viet Nam being left to the interior of Viet Nam for its own settlement, and Viet Nam's insistence on a package of military and political issues. For this reason, the negotiation of two-degree interruption, the time of nearly 8 months, the focus of the over-the-the-the-the-U.S. talks, to the remaining problems of the Republic of Korea. The fifth chapter mainly discusses the third phase of the negotiation, and the talks from May to October 1972 are the most critical and most difficult times in the whole negotiation process. Since August 1972, the more North has proposed the highest, middle and least three sets of solutions to the United States. Vietnam's Party Central Committee has repeatedly known and discussed, and finally, it is clear that Vietnam's negotiating goal is to sign a deal to end the war and to restore peace in Vietnam, not to overthrow the puppet regime in Saigon and to establish a coalition government. This transition is of great importance for the major breakthrough in the negotiations, and it has made clear the direction of the negotiations, namely, the first solution to the military issues and the principles of political issues, and the second step is to resolve the internal problems by the South Vietnamese. The more timely and active adjustment of the negotiation policy in the north, the process of the negotiation was greatly accelerated, so that the issue of Viet Nam was on the way to the settlement. The sixth chapter expounds the negotiation and struggle of the last stage of the beauty of the United States. The U. S. instigated a modification of the agreement to attempt to overturn the text of the agreement. North Vietnam, with its own negotiating bottom line, has effectively defended the legitimate rights and interests of Vietnam, forcing the United States to sign the peace agreement on the basis of the agreement of 20 October 1972. The signing of the Paris agreement marks the bitter end of the war in the United States against the anti-Japanese war, the sacred agreement that blew the national and national unity of the Vietnamese nation. The conclusion is based on the above-mentioned exposition, and summarizes the diplomatic art and unique charm of Vietnam in the process of the more beautiful negotiation. The conclusion part also talks about the two-point experience, which is recognized by the country's autonomous diplomacy with the status of the small minority nationality, in order to improve the analytical hierarchy of the better negotiation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類號(hào)】：D815

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