美國(guó)政府歐安會(huì)政策考察（1969-1975）
發(fā)布時(shí)間：2019-05-15 15:55
【摘要】：本文以美國(guó)政府解密檔案為主要支撐,在借鑒國(guó)內(nèi)外新近研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上,擬就1969-1975年間美國(guó)政府歐安會(huì)政策的評(píng)估、制定和實(shí)施進(jìn)行考察,分析美國(guó)政府歐安會(huì)政策背后的深層原因,并闡述這一時(shí)期的外交戰(zhàn)略理念,最終探討歐安會(huì)對(duì)冷戰(zhàn)結(jié)束的影響。 長(zhǎng)期以來,歐安會(huì)一直被學(xué)界視為冷戰(zhàn)期間東西方緩和的頂峰,而通向歐安會(huì)的“赫爾辛基進(jìn)程(Helsinki Process)"及其后續(xù)會(huì)議對(duì)美國(guó)外交決策、美蘇關(guān)系以及冷戰(zhàn)的結(jié)束皆產(chǎn)生了深遠(yuǎn)影響,并加速了東歐地區(qū)民族民主意識(shí)的高漲,促成了東歐集團(tuán)內(nèi)部改革派力量壯大,且在引發(fā)蘇東劇變、促成兩極體系在持續(xù)了五十年之后宣告終結(jié)的過程中發(fā)揮了重要作用。與歐安會(huì)這般深遠(yuǎn)影響所不同的是,美國(guó)在整個(gè)會(huì)議期間的態(tài)度和立場(chǎng)卻顯得并不那么積極,這與尼克松——福特當(dāng)局的歐洲安全政策有直接的關(guān)系。其中,基辛格個(gè)人的歐洲安全理念對(duì)當(dāng)局的歐安會(huì)對(duì)策制定影響尤為明顯。 全文共分為五個(gè)部分： 第一部分闡述歐安會(huì)問題的由來、發(fā)展及各方對(duì)策,重點(diǎn)分析蘇聯(lián)政府提出歐安會(huì)的動(dòng)機(jī)和北約盟國(guó)的態(tài)度。蘇聯(lián)歐安會(huì)倡議是旨在尋求對(duì)戰(zhàn)后歐洲邊界的國(guó)際認(rèn)可、在美國(guó)與西歐各國(guó)之間打入楔子,同時(shí)與西方開展經(jīng)濟(jì)合作,但該倡議卻一再被西方拒絕,這與冷戰(zhàn)肇始的國(guó)際環(huán)境、蘇聯(lián)自身的策略密切相關(guān)。在敵對(duì)尚未消退而緩和尚未開啟之時(shí),美國(guó)政府不可能輕易將歐安會(huì)納入雙邊或者多邊對(duì)話中,而處于馬歇爾計(jì)劃援助之下西歐各國(guó),對(duì)美依存度尚高,更不可能擺脫美國(guó)追求獨(dú)立自主的外交政策。但隨著歐洲走上復(fù)興之路,西歐各國(guó)開始在美蘇之間逐漸發(fā)出自己的聲音,歐安會(huì)召開的時(shí)機(jī)尚不成熟但卻慢慢發(fā)生變化。 第二部分則重點(diǎn)闡述緩和形勢(shì)下,尼克松當(dāng)局對(duì)歐安會(huì)政策的初步形成過程。在歐洲緩和浪潮推動(dòng)下,召開歐安會(huì)的倡議逐漸被西歐各國(guó)所接受。尼克松-基辛格上臺(tái)后對(duì)歐洲政策進(jìn)行修訂,根據(jù)關(guān)聯(lián)的策略,相繼提出了以柏林問題的解決和確定共同均衡裁軍談判召開日期作為召開歐安會(huì)的條件。這一時(shí)期美國(guó)政府的主要政策是盡可能借蘇聯(lián)的迫切心情來獲取更多的戰(zhàn)略利益,諸如首腦訪問等。 第三部分重點(diǎn)分析美國(guó)在籌備會(huì)議召開過程中的立場(chǎng)。這一時(shí)期美國(guó)對(duì)歐安會(huì)政策進(jìn)一步形成發(fā)展。隨著籌備會(huì)議各項(xiàng)議程的開展,美國(guó)與蘇聯(lián)、歐洲政治委員會(huì)之間的分歧日益凸顯。在尼克松當(dāng)局對(duì)歐關(guān)系原則指導(dǎo)下,尼克松當(dāng)局成功地實(shí)現(xiàn)了籌備會(huì)議的召開與共同均衡裁軍之間的關(guān)聯(lián)。與此同時(shí),對(duì)歐安會(huì)的“損害限制”政策也成為了美國(guó)在正式會(huì)議期間的基本政策。 第四部分著重闡釋歐安會(huì)政策的推進(jìn)與執(zhí)行。在這一階段,蘇聯(lián)與西歐各國(guó)分歧重重導(dǎo)致會(huì)期相當(dāng)冗長(zhǎng),談判甚至一度陷入僵局。因需考量與盟國(guó)的微妙關(guān)系,以及受到蘇聯(lián)的催促和輿論的質(zhì)疑,基辛格不得不在蘇聯(lián)和西歐各國(guó)中間調(diào)停。至水門事件后,福特總統(tǒng)上臺(tái),在基辛格領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的國(guó)家安全委員會(huì)指導(dǎo)下,美國(guó)與歐洲政治委員會(huì)之間依然保持了有效的溝通。經(jīng)過長(zhǎng)期的討價(jià)還價(jià),在基辛格的斡旋下,最終協(xié)定得以達(dá)成。 第五部分是結(jié)論。赫爾辛基協(xié)定的簽署是一次謀求集體安全的嘗試,也是理想主義者和現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者之間的交鋒,短期的歷史也證明了這點(diǎn)。該協(xié)定是對(duì)60年代中期以來歐洲緩和的肯定,也是對(duì)美蘇之間均勢(shì)的一種認(rèn)可。事實(shí)上,協(xié)定也并沒有阻止蘇聯(lián)入侵阿富汗,所達(dá)成的協(xié)定也并沒有有效地實(shí)施。但從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來看,赫爾辛基協(xié)定第三個(gè)籃子所開啟的人員、信息、文化交流,卻給西方分化瓦解蘇聯(lián)提供了良好的機(jī)會(huì),在二十年內(nèi)加速了蘇聯(lián)陣營(yíng)的解體,卻是尼克松和基辛格等政策決策者當(dāng)時(shí)并未預(yù)料到的。
[Abstract]:Based on the recent research results from home and abroad, this paper, based on the recent research results from home and abroad, is to make a survey on the evaluation, formulation and implementation of the CSCE policy in the United States of America from 1969 to 1975, and to analyze the deep reason behind the policy of the United States government's CSCE. The paper also discusses the concept of the diplomatic strategy in this period, and finally discusses the influence of CSCE on the end of the cold war. For a long time, the CSCE has been regarded as the peak of the transition between the East and the West during the cold war, and the "Helsinki Process" to the CSCE and its follow-up meetings have far-reaching effects on the United States diplomatic decision-making, the U.S.-Soviet relations and the end of the cold war The sound of the national democratic consciousness in the eastern European region has led to the expansion of the internal reformers in the Eastern European Group, and has played an important role in the process of ending the declaration of the two-pole system after 50 years after the change of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the far-reaching implications of the CSCE, the attitude and position of the United States during the entire session is not so positive, which is directly related to the European security policy of the Nixon _ Ford authorities This is the case in which Kissinger's personal European security concept has an impact on the authorities' CSCE response The full text is divided into five. Part I: The first part addresses the problems of the CSCE, the development of the CSCE and the responses of the parties, with a focus on the motives of the CSCE and the NATO The Soviet Union's initiative is to seek international recognition of the post-war European border, to strike a wedge between the United States and the Western European countries and to cooperate with the West, but the initiative has repeatedly been rejected by the West, which is contrary to the international environment since the beginning of the cold war and the Soviet Union's own policy The United States government is not likely to include the CSCE in a bilateral or multilateral dialogue, while the Western European countries, which are under the Marshall Plan's assistance, are not likely to get rid of the United States for their independence. But as Europe is on the way to the recovery, the Western European countries have begun to make their own voice between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the time for the CSCE to be held is not yet mature but slow The second part focuses on the easing of the situation and the Nixon administration's policy on the CSCE The initial process of the formation of the CSCE, driven by the European mitigation wave, is gradually being called upon to convene the CSCE initiative Western European countries accepted. Nixon-Kissinger, who came to power, revised the European policy and, on the basis of the associated strategy, put forward the resolution of the Berlin issue and the establishment of a co-balanced Conference on Disarmament as a call. On the condition of the CSCE, the main policy of the United States Government during this period is to obtain more strategic interests as far as possible through the pressing mood of the Soviet Union, The third part focuses on the U.S. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The position in the process of convening. The United States of the United States to the CSCE Further development of the policy. With the development of the agendas of the preparatory meetings, the United States and the Soviet Union and the European Political Commission The differences between the Nixon Administration and the Nixon Administration, under the guidance of the Nixon administration on the principle of the relationship between the two countries, have succeeded in achieving the holding and common of the preparatory meeting. At the same time, the "damage limit" policy on the CSCE has also become the United States in the United States The basic policy during the session. The fourth part focuses on the interpretation The advance and implementation of the CSCE policy. In this stage, the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries have led to a considerable length of time The talks are even in a stalemate, and Kissinger has to be in a position to consider the delicate relationship with the allies, as well as the challenge of the Soviet Union's urging and public opinion. In the middle of the Soviet and Western European countries, after the Watergate incident, President Ford took office and under the guidance of the National Security Council led by Kissinger, the United States and the European Political Committee An effective communication is still in place. After long-term bargaining, Kissinger's head Screw off, final agreement The fifth part is the conclusion. The signing of the Helsinki agreement is an attempt to seek collective security and an intersection between the idealist and the realist. The short-term history has also proved that. The agreement is an affirmation of Europe's relaxation since the mid-1960s, too. A recognition of the balance between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. In fact, the agreement did not prevent the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan. The agreement also has not been implemented effectively. But in the long run, the people, information and cultural exchanges opened by the third basket of the Helsinki Agreement have provided a good opportunity for the Western to break down the Soviet Union, at two The disintegration of the Soviet Union was accelerated in ten years, but Nixon and Kissinger, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：K712;D871.2
本文編號(hào)：2477617
[Abstract]:Based on the recent research results from home and abroad, this paper, based on the recent research results from home and abroad, is to make a survey on the evaluation, formulation and implementation of the CSCE policy in the United States of America from 1969 to 1975, and to analyze the deep reason behind the policy of the United States government's CSCE. The paper also discusses the concept of the diplomatic strategy in this period, and finally discusses the influence of CSCE on the end of the cold war. For a long time, the CSCE has been regarded as the peak of the transition between the East and the West during the cold war, and the "Helsinki Process" to the CSCE and its follow-up meetings have far-reaching effects on the United States diplomatic decision-making, the U.S.-Soviet relations and the end of the cold war The sound of the national democratic consciousness in the eastern European region has led to the expansion of the internal reformers in the Eastern European Group, and has played an important role in the process of ending the declaration of the two-pole system after 50 years after the change of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the far-reaching implications of the CSCE, the attitude and position of the United States during the entire session is not so positive, which is directly related to the European security policy of the Nixon _ Ford authorities This is the case in which Kissinger's personal European security concept has an impact on the authorities' CSCE response The full text is divided into five. Part I: The first part addresses the problems of the CSCE, the development of the CSCE and the responses of the parties, with a focus on the motives of the CSCE and the NATO The Soviet Union's initiative is to seek international recognition of the post-war European border, to strike a wedge between the United States and the Western European countries and to cooperate with the West, but the initiative has repeatedly been rejected by the West, which is contrary to the international environment since the beginning of the cold war and the Soviet Union's own policy The United States government is not likely to include the CSCE in a bilateral or multilateral dialogue, while the Western European countries, which are under the Marshall Plan's assistance, are not likely to get rid of the United States for their independence. But as Europe is on the way to the recovery, the Western European countries have begun to make their own voice between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the time for the CSCE to be held is not yet mature but slow The second part focuses on the easing of the situation and the Nixon administration's policy on the CSCE The initial process of the formation of the CSCE, driven by the European mitigation wave, is gradually being called upon to convene the CSCE initiative Western European countries accepted. Nixon-Kissinger, who came to power, revised the European policy and, on the basis of the associated strategy, put forward the resolution of the Berlin issue and the establishment of a co-balanced Conference on Disarmament as a call. On the condition of the CSCE, the main policy of the United States Government during this period is to obtain more strategic interests as far as possible through the pressing mood of the Soviet Union, The third part focuses on the U.S. in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The position in the process of convening. The United States of the United States to the CSCE Further development of the policy. With the development of the agendas of the preparatory meetings, the United States and the Soviet Union and the European Political Commission The differences between the Nixon Administration and the Nixon Administration, under the guidance of the Nixon administration on the principle of the relationship between the two countries, have succeeded in achieving the holding and common of the preparatory meeting. At the same time, the "damage limit" policy on the CSCE has also become the United States in the United States The basic policy during the session. The fourth part focuses on the interpretation The advance and implementation of the CSCE policy. In this stage, the differences between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries have led to a considerable length of time The talks are even in a stalemate, and Kissinger has to be in a position to consider the delicate relationship with the allies, as well as the challenge of the Soviet Union's urging and public opinion. In the middle of the Soviet and Western European countries, after the Watergate incident, President Ford took office and under the guidance of the National Security Council led by Kissinger, the United States and the European Political Committee An effective communication is still in place. After long-term bargaining, Kissinger's head Screw off, final agreement The fifth part is the conclusion. The signing of the Helsinki agreement is an attempt to seek collective security and an intersection between the idealist and the realist. The short-term history has also proved that. The agreement is an affirmation of Europe's relaxation since the mid-1960s, too. A recognition of the balance between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union. In fact, the agreement did not prevent the Soviet Union from invading Afghanistan. The agreement also has not been implemented effectively. But in the long run, the people, information and cultural exchanges opened by the third basket of the Helsinki Agreement have provided a good opportunity for the Western to break down the Soviet Union, at two The disintegration of the Soviet Union was accelerated in ten years, but Nixon and Kissinger, and so on.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：陜西師范大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2012
【分類號(hào)】：K712;D871.2
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，本文編號(hào)：2477617
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