斯大林與聯(lián)合國的成立
發(fā)布時間:2019-01-29 02:12
【摘要】: 國內(nèi)外有關斯大林的研究幾乎汗牛充棟,然而,關于斯大林與聯(lián)合國的專題研究,卻鮮有人問津。本文選定這一在我國迄今尚未見到相關專著而近乎空白的研究課題,利用歷史文獻資料,梳理斯大林與英美兩國在成立聯(lián)合國問題上較量的過程,分析和揭示斯大林在聯(lián)合國問題上的戰(zhàn)略考量和得失。 本文從第二次世界大戰(zhàn)后期蘇英美三國醞釀聯(lián)合國起,梳理了斯大林與英美兩國關于成立聯(lián)合國方案的磋商與協(xié)調(diào),探討了斯大林與英美兩國在聯(lián)合國憲章問題上的矛盾和討價還價,分析了斯大林對業(yè)已建立的聯(lián)合國的態(tài)度,最后對斯大林聯(lián)合國政策作了總結(jié)性評價。 斯大林在聯(lián)合國成立問題上既表現(xiàn)出國際主義,也表現(xiàn)出大國利己主義,并且后者的比重大于前者。斯大林參與籌建聯(lián)合國的出發(fā)點,是為了防止對蘇聯(lián)的侵略戰(zhàn)爭,同時也為了確保本國的利益——勢力范圍和“安全帶”,并通過與美、英戰(zhàn)后維持合作而“和平共處”地一起主宰世界。其最終目的乃是為了未來的世界革命而為蘇聯(lián)積蓄實力和等待時機。以大國利己主義為主、國際主義為輔。 聯(lián)合國成立后的運轉(zhuǎn)并沒有實現(xiàn)斯大林的戰(zhàn)后維持與美、英合作的設想。面對美國咄咄逼人的要求取消“大國一致原則”的進攻,蘇聯(lián)處于只有招架之功的守勢。在戰(zhàn)后嚴峻的國際形勢下,雖然蘇聯(lián)在聯(lián)合國取得一定的政治和道義上的勝利,但斯大林在其晚年對聯(lián)合國的看法是悲觀的:聯(lián)合國“注定要瓦解”。 斯大林在聯(lián)合國成立問題上體現(xiàn)的大國利己主義,與他在戰(zhàn)后世界安排的其他問題上的做法是毫無二致的。對于斯大林在聯(lián)合國的成立中所起的作用應該一分為二地客觀評價,不應由于意識形態(tài)的緣故,一邊倒的褒獎或一邊倒的否定。
[Abstract]:Domestic and foreign studies on Stalin are almost abundant, however, there is little interest in the monographic study of Stalin and the United Nations. This article chooses this research subject which has not seen the related monograph but nearly blank in our country up to now, uses the historical literature material, combs Stalin and Britain and the United States on the establishment United Nations question contest process, To analyze and reveal Stalin's strategic considerations and gains and losses on the UN issue. This paper, starting from the brewing of the United Nations in the Soviet Union and the United States in the late part of the second World War, combs the consultations and coordination between Stalin and the United States on the establishment of the United Nations. This paper probes into the contradiction and bargaining between Stalin and Britain on the issue of UN Charter, analyzes Stalin's attitude towards the established UN, and finally makes a summary evaluation of Stalin's UN policy. Stalin showed both internationalism and great-power egoism in the founding of the UN, and the latter outweighed the former. Stalin's participation in the United Nations was designed to prevent the war of aggression against the Soviet Union, and also to ensure his country's interests-its sphere of influence and its "seat belt," and its adoption with the United States. After the war Britain maintained cooperation and "peaceful coexistence" to dominate the world together. The ultimate aim was to build power and wait for the Soviet Union for a future world revolution. Major power egoism, internationalism as a supplement. The operation of the United Nations after its founding did not realize Stalin's postwar vision of cooperation with the United States and Britain. The Soviet Union was on the defensive in the face of America's aggressive demands to abolish the "great power consensus principle". In the severe international situation after the war, although the Soviet Union won a certain political and moral victory in the United Nations, Stalin's view of the United Nations in his later years was pessimistic: the United Nations was "doomed to collapse". Stalin's great-power egoism on the founding of the United Nations is no different from what he did on other postwar world issues. Stalin's role in the founding of the United Nations should be evaluated objectively in two, not because of ideology, one-sided praise or one-sided negation.
【學位授予單位】:外交學院
【學位級別】:博士
【學位授予年份】:2010
【分類號】:A74;D813.2
本文編號:2417538
[Abstract]:Domestic and foreign studies on Stalin are almost abundant, however, there is little interest in the monographic study of Stalin and the United Nations. This article chooses this research subject which has not seen the related monograph but nearly blank in our country up to now, uses the historical literature material, combs Stalin and Britain and the United States on the establishment United Nations question contest process, To analyze and reveal Stalin's strategic considerations and gains and losses on the UN issue. This paper, starting from the brewing of the United Nations in the Soviet Union and the United States in the late part of the second World War, combs the consultations and coordination between Stalin and the United States on the establishment of the United Nations. This paper probes into the contradiction and bargaining between Stalin and Britain on the issue of UN Charter, analyzes Stalin's attitude towards the established UN, and finally makes a summary evaluation of Stalin's UN policy. Stalin showed both internationalism and great-power egoism in the founding of the UN, and the latter outweighed the former. Stalin's participation in the United Nations was designed to prevent the war of aggression against the Soviet Union, and also to ensure his country's interests-its sphere of influence and its "seat belt," and its adoption with the United States. After the war Britain maintained cooperation and "peaceful coexistence" to dominate the world together. The ultimate aim was to build power and wait for the Soviet Union for a future world revolution. Major power egoism, internationalism as a supplement. The operation of the United Nations after its founding did not realize Stalin's postwar vision of cooperation with the United States and Britain. The Soviet Union was on the defensive in the face of America's aggressive demands to abolish the "great power consensus principle". In the severe international situation after the war, although the Soviet Union won a certain political and moral victory in the United Nations, Stalin's view of the United Nations in his later years was pessimistic: the United Nations was "doomed to collapse". Stalin's great-power egoism on the founding of the United Nations is no different from what he did on other postwar world issues. Stalin's role in the founding of the United Nations should be evaluated objectively in two, not because of ideology, one-sided praise or one-sided negation.
【學位授予單位】:外交學院
【學位級別】:博士
【學位授予年份】:2010
【分類號】:A74;D813.2
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