【摘要】：從2014年云南昆明火車站策劃砍人事件到2015年法國巴黎雜志社武裝分子武器恐怖襲擊事件；國際恐怖主義愈演愈烈,恐怖襲擊對(duì)象轉(zhuǎn)向平民,恐怖勢(shì)力開始蔓延至各個(gè)國家的中心城市。危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)作為城市中承載危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸?shù)牡缆方煌ňW(wǎng)絡(luò),極易成為襲擊目標(biāo)�；诖�,本文就危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)恐怖襲擊風(fēng)險(xiǎn)定量問題進(jìn)行研究。首先,為解決恐怖襲擊事件中襲擊者與防御者之間對(duì)抗關(guān)系的模型描述問題,通過理論學(xué)習(xí)和文獻(xiàn)分析,建立了混合策略博弈模型,在構(gòu)建了恐怖襲擊事件博弈雙方之間為嚴(yán)格競(jìng)爭(zhēng)博弈后,通過對(duì)恐怖襲擊特點(diǎn)的研究,根據(jù)恐怖襲擊可能針對(duì)的目標(biāo),確定了博弈雙方的策略選擇方式和策略選擇對(duì)象,將可能發(fā)生的恐怖襲擊中襲擊方和防御方的行為模型化,加以數(shù)學(xué)描述,為恐怖襲擊目標(biāo)損失概率模型提供總體框架設(shè)置。其次,為解決危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)中作為恐怖襲擊目標(biāo)的網(wǎng)絡(luò)節(jié)點(diǎn)的數(shù)學(xué)描述問題,構(gòu)建了危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)模型,通過復(fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)傳統(tǒng)統(tǒng)計(jì)指標(biāo),定義新的適用于本文研究的重要度統(tǒng)計(jì)指標(biāo),通過該指標(biāo)對(duì)危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)目標(biāo)節(jié)點(diǎn)重要程度進(jìn)行排序,為恐怖襲擊目標(biāo)損失概率模型提供了參數(shù)支持�；谝陨蟽蓚�(gè)模型,本文提出了基于博弈論的危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)恐怖襲擊目標(biāo)損失概率模型；針對(duì)恐怖襲擊特性,危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)特性,提出危險(xiǎn)品運(yùn)輸網(wǎng)絡(luò)恐怖襲擊目標(biāo)損失概率模型,利用混合策略納什均衡條件,通過平衡損失期望得到混合策略納什均衡點(diǎn),根據(jù)均衡點(diǎn)實(shí)現(xiàn)模型計(jì)算；通過賦值運(yùn)算法為節(jié)點(diǎn)賦予目標(biāo)值,經(jīng)過模型計(jì)算,分析得出損失概率、目標(biāo)值、防御資源之間的關(guān)系。最后,通過復(fù)雜網(wǎng)絡(luò)模型抽象石油配送網(wǎng)絡(luò)驗(yàn)證了模型的科學(xué)有效性。研究結(jié)果表明：網(wǎng)絡(luò)目標(biāo)節(jié)點(diǎn)損失概率隨著目標(biāo)值的增長而降低,同時(shí),目標(biāo)節(jié)點(diǎn)損失概率隨著目標(biāo)防御資源的增大而減�。河�(jì)算結(jié)果總體表明目標(biāo)值越大的節(jié)點(diǎn)由于分配到的防御資源也相應(yīng)較大,該類節(jié)點(diǎn)遇襲的損失概率反而并不大,該結(jié)論符合博弈雙方在策略選擇上的邏輯合理性；本文研究結(jié)論可為政府部門分配恐怖襲擊防御資源提供參考依據(jù),為政府部門防范恐怖襲擊提供決策支持。
[Abstract]:From the planned chopping incident at Kunming Railway Station in Yunnan Province in 2014 to the 2015 terrorist attack on armed elements of Paris magazine in France; international terrorism has intensified, and the target of terrorist attacks has turned to civilians. The terrorist forces began to spread to the central cities of various countries. As a road traffic network carrying dangerous goods in cities, dangerous goods transportation network is easy to be attacked. Based on this, this paper studies the risk quantitative problem of dangerous goods transportation network terrorist attacks. First of all, in order to solve the problem of model description of the antagonistic relationship between attackers and defenders in terrorist attacks, a mixed strategy game model is established through theoretical study and literature analysis. After constructing a strict competition game between the two sides of the game of terrorist attack, through the study of the characteristics of the terrorist attack, according to the possible targets of the terrorist attack, the strategy selection mode and the target of the game are determined. The behavior of the attacking party and the defending side in the possible terrorist attack is modeled and described mathematically to provide the overall framework for the probability model of the loss of the terrorist attack target. Secondly, in order to solve the problem of mathematical description of the network nodes which are the targets of terrorist attacks in the dangerous goods transportation network, a dangerous goods transportation network model is constructed, and the traditional statistical index of the complex network is established. This paper defines a new statistical index of importance, which is suitable for the study of this paper, and sorts the importance of target nodes in dangerous goods transportation network by this index, which provides the parameter support for the probability model of loss of terrorist attack target. Based on the above two models, this paper puts forward the loss probability model of dangerous goods transportation network based on game theory, aiming at the characteristics of terrorist attack, the characteristics of dangerous goods transportation network, The loss probability model of terrorist attack target in dangerous goods transportation network is put forward. By using the Nash equilibrium condition of mixed strategy, the Nash equilibrium point of mixed strategy is obtained by balancing loss expectation, and the model is calculated according to equilibrium point. The target value is assigned to the node by assignment operation. The relationship among loss probability, target value and defense resource is obtained by model calculation. Finally, the scientific validity of the model is verified by abstracting the oil distribution network with complex network model. The results show that the loss probability of the target node decreases with the increase of the target value, and at the same time, The loss probability of the target node decreases with the increase of the target defense resource. The calculation results show that the node with the larger target value is less likely to be attacked because of the larger defense resources assigned to the node. This conclusion is in line with the logical rationality of the strategy choice of both sides of the game. The conclusion of this paper can provide a reference basis for government departments to allocate resources for the defense of terrorist attacks and provide decision support for government departments to prevent terrorist attacks.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：西南交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號(hào)】：U16;D815.5

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本文編號(hào)：2201451