【摘要】：網(wǎng)絡(luò)既是網(wǎng)民參與政治、評(píng)論是非的重要場(chǎng)所,也是網(wǎng)民通過(guò)網(wǎng)媒與政府進(jìn)行溝通、交流的主流形式。新環(huán)境下的網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情,既涉及了網(wǎng)民自身需求的有效表達(dá),也挑戰(zhàn)著網(wǎng)媒在網(wǎng)民與政府之間的協(xié)調(diào)能力,更是考驗(yàn)著政府的治理能力。基于演化博弈論來(lái)研究網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)的治理,能夠使我們清晰地了解到:網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)中網(wǎng)絡(luò)參與主體之間相互博弈的動(dòng)態(tài)演變過(guò)程,進(jìn)而知道如何選擇最優(yōu)化策略來(lái)達(dá)到平衡,最終優(yōu)化網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)的有效治理。圍繞著演化博弈論來(lái)研究網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)治理的具體策略。以相關(guān)的文獻(xiàn)研究為基礎(chǔ),針對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)生活中具體的網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)事件,分析網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)事件中關(guān)鍵性博弈主體,對(duì)各博弈主體的相關(guān)參數(shù)與概率作出假設(shè),通過(guò)構(gòu)建各博弈主體之間的演化博弈模型來(lái)進(jìn)行分析。分析認(rèn)為,網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)事件中主要的博弈主體為三個(gè):政府、網(wǎng)媒、網(wǎng)民。在網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)事件中,博弈主體可以根據(jù)自身或?qū)Ψ降那闆r進(jìn)行選擇,政府可以選擇積極治理,消極治理的方式,網(wǎng)媒可以選擇推動(dòng),阻滯的方式,網(wǎng)民可以選擇積極參與,消極參與的方式,他們會(huì)根據(jù)對(duì)方的選擇相對(duì)應(yīng)地調(diào)整自己的選擇。博弈模型的結(jié)果表明:第一,通過(guò)減少政府積極治理成本,增加政府積極治理收益,增加網(wǎng)媒選擇推動(dòng)策略時(shí)的罰金收益,增加政府消極治理成本,能提高政府選擇積極治理網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)的概率以及治理的效率。第二,通過(guò)增加網(wǎng)媒推動(dòng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)發(fā)展時(shí)的固定成本,增加政府對(duì)網(wǎng)媒推動(dòng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)發(fā)展的罰金,降低網(wǎng)媒推動(dòng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)發(fā)展帶來(lái)的收益,降低網(wǎng)媒采取阻滯策略的損失成本,來(lái)提高網(wǎng)媒采取阻滯策略的概率。第三,通過(guò)減少網(wǎng)民積極參與網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)所需要花費(fèi)的固定成本,減少網(wǎng)民積極參與網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)時(shí),獲得信息所需要支付的其它途徑成本,增加網(wǎng)民積極參與網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)的自身收益,減少網(wǎng)民消極參與網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)的潛在成本,增加網(wǎng)民積極參與網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)獲得的收益,來(lái)提高網(wǎng)民積極參與網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)的概率。最終得出結(jié)論:為提高網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)治理的有效性,完善網(wǎng)絡(luò)輿情危機(jī)的治理策略,需要從政府、網(wǎng)媒、網(wǎng)民三個(gè)層面進(jìn)行反思。提出以下若干建議:第一,樹立合理地思維意識(shí)。第二,建立科學(xué)的治理流程。第三,構(gòu)建完備的治理保障。第四,端正參與態(tài)度。第五,培養(yǎng)健康的參與素養(yǎng)。第六,維護(hù)有序的參與秩序。第七,發(fā)揮網(wǎng)絡(luò)大“V”的積極作用。第八,完善教育培訓(xùn)內(nèi)容。第九,增強(qiáng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)參與能力。
[Abstract]:The Internet is not only an important place for netizens to participate in politics and comment on right and wrong, but also a mainstream form of communication between Internet users and the government. The network public opinion under the new environment not only involves the effective expression of the Internet users' own needs, but also challenges the coordination ability of the network media between the netizens and the government, and also tests the governance ability of the government. To study the governance of network public opinion crisis based on evolutionary game theory can make us understand clearly the dynamic evolution process of the game between network participants in network public opinion crisis. Then we know how to choose the optimal strategy to achieve balance and finally optimize the effective management of network public opinion crisis. Around the evolution game theory to study the network public opinion crisis management specific strategy. On the basis of relevant literature research, this paper analyzes the key players of network public opinion crisis events in real life, and makes assumptions about the relevant parameters and probability of each game subject. The evolutionary game model between the players is constructed to analyze. The analysis shows that there are three main players in the crisis of network public opinion: government, network media and Internet users. In the crisis event of network public opinion, the main body of the game can choose according to their own or the other party's situation, the government can choose the way of positive governance, negative governance, network media can choose to push, block the way, the netizen can choose to participate actively. In the way of negative participation, they adjust their choices according to each other's choices. The results of the game model show that: first, by reducing the cost of active governance of the government, increasing the revenue of the positive governance of the government, increasing the fines when the network media choose the promotion strategy, and increasing the cost of the negative governance of the government. It can improve the probability that the government chooses to manage network public opinion crisis actively and the efficiency of governance. Second, by increasing the fixed cost of the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, increasing the government penalty for the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, reducing the net media to promote the network public opinion crisis development to bring the income. The loss cost of blocking strategy is reduced to increase the probability of adopting blocking strategy. Third, by reducing the fixed cost of Internet users to actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, reduce the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, access to information needs to pay other way costs. Increase the self-income of the Internet public opinion crisis, reduce the potential cost of the negative participation in the network public opinion crisis, increase the income that the netizen actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, To improve the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis probability. Finally the conclusion is drawn: in order to improve the effectiveness of network public opinion crisis governance and improve the governance strategy of network public opinion crisis, it is necessary to reflect on it from three levels: government, network media and Internet users. Put forward the following several suggestions: first, set up reasonable thinking consciousness. Second, establish a scientific governance process. Third, the construction of complete governance protection. Fourth, correct participation attitude. Fifth, cultivate healthy participation literacy. Sixth, to maintain an orderly order of participation. Seventh, give play to the positive role of the network "V". Eighth, improve the content of education and training. Ninth, enhance the ability of network participation.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湘潭大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：C912.63

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本文編號(hào)：2391814