【摘要】： 本論文以臺(tái)灣的民主政治為研究對(duì)象,分析為什么臺(tái)灣平順的民主轉(zhuǎn)型卻無(wú)法帶來(lái)有效的民主運(yùn)作?為回答這個(gè)問(wèn)題,本論文分析1949年以后臺(tái)灣社會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)的變化,以及這種結(jié)構(gòu)變化對(duì)于民主轉(zhuǎn)型過(guò)程和后轉(zhuǎn)型期民主運(yùn)作的影響。 1945年臺(tái)灣光復(fù)后,便進(jìn)入了中國(guó)“國(guó)家建設(shè)”的大邏輯之中,在這個(gè)歷史進(jìn)程中,臺(tái)灣在光復(fù)之初經(jīng)歷了“二二八”、土地改革和地方自治這三個(gè)重要的歷史事件�！岸恕笔录屯恋馗母锸沟脗鹘y(tǒng)臺(tái)灣社會(huì)的中間結(jié)構(gòu)——地主士紳階級(jí)徹底瓦解。在地方自治中,一些熱衷于地方選舉的人士依靠傳統(tǒng)的社會(huì)關(guān)系網(wǎng)絡(luò)進(jìn)行選票動(dòng)員,國(guó)民黨對(duì)這些地方精英采取既拉攏又限制的策略,由此形成地方派系。同時(shí),在臺(tái)灣經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展過(guò)程中,民間資本日益壯大,并逐漸發(fā)展成為財(cái)團(tuán)。由于國(guó)民黨向下扎根的努力始終無(wú)法竟其功,使得地方派系和財(cái)團(tuán)形成為臺(tái)灣社會(huì)新的中間結(jié)構(gòu),其實(shí)力不斷增大,并日益結(jié)合在一起,本論文將其稱(chēng)為“中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)”。 中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)是國(guó)民黨政權(quán)和民間社會(huì)之外的第三種權(quán)力結(jié)構(gòu),其與國(guó)民黨政權(quán)以及與民間社會(huì)的互動(dòng)機(jī)制主要是兩個(gè)。第一個(gè)是經(jīng)紀(jì)機(jī)制(broker),中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)一方面是國(guó)民黨政權(quán)動(dòng)員民間社會(huì)的經(jīng)紀(jì),另一方面是民間社會(huì)保護(hù)自身利益的經(jīng)紀(jì),所以它在國(guó)民黨政權(quán)和民間社會(huì)之間扮演一種“雙重經(jīng)紀(jì)”的角色,并從“雙重經(jīng)紀(jì)”中謀求自身利益最大化。第二個(gè)是“非正式政治”機(jī)制,即“關(guān)系”機(jī)制,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)無(wú)論是與國(guó)民黨政權(quán)的互動(dòng),還是與“民間社會(huì)”的互動(dòng)都不是制度性的,而是按照非制度性的直接人際互動(dòng)模式來(lái)運(yùn)作。 1980年代,臺(tái)灣內(nèi)外政經(jīng)局勢(shì)發(fā)生重大變化,迫使“黨國(guó)體制”向憲政民主回歸。臺(tái)灣的民主轉(zhuǎn)型實(shí)際上要完成兩個(gè)艱巨任務(wù),實(shí)現(xiàn)“雙重轉(zhuǎn)型”,首先是黨國(guó)體制向民主體制轉(zhuǎn)型,再者是國(guó)民黨這一按照列寧主義改組的革命型政黨向民主選舉的大眾型政黨轉(zhuǎn)型。臺(tái)灣之所以順利完成這兩大任務(wù),實(shí)現(xiàn)政治轉(zhuǎn)型的“軟著陸”,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)在其中發(fā)揮了關(guān)鍵性作用。一方面,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)憑借其“經(jīng)紀(jì)”機(jī)制和“關(guān)系”機(jī)制,有效抑制和化解農(nóng)民運(yùn)動(dòng)和工人運(yùn)動(dòng),讓中產(chǎn)階級(jí)(中小企業(yè)主和白領(lǐng)階層)成為臺(tái)灣1980年代風(fēng)起云涌的社會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力量。臺(tái)灣的中產(chǎn)階級(jí)主張改良而反對(duì)革命,這給國(guó)民黨駕馭民主轉(zhuǎn)型留下了時(shí)間和空間。另一方面中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)幫助國(guó)民黨持續(xù)贏得地方和“中央”層級(jí)的選舉,降低了國(guó)民黨與公權(quán)力相分離的阻力,實(shí)現(xiàn)從“公權(quán)力”向“社會(huì)”的移動(dòng),從而促成了臺(tái)灣的平順民主轉(zhuǎn)型。同時(shí),在這一移動(dòng)過(guò)程中,國(guó)民黨逐步從革命型政黨轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榇蟊娺x舉型政黨。 但是中問(wèn)權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)在臺(tái)灣民主轉(zhuǎn)型過(guò)程中不斷坐大,并對(duì)后轉(zhuǎn)型期的民主運(yùn)作產(chǎn)生一系列負(fù)面影響。首先,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)主要是通過(guò)“經(jīng)紀(jì)”機(jī)制和“關(guān)系”機(jī)制來(lái)進(jìn)行選舉動(dòng)員,為了最大程度動(dòng)員選票,就通過(guò)金錢(qián)甚至黑惡勢(shì)力來(lái)鞏固、強(qiáng)化和擴(kuò)大其動(dòng)員網(wǎng)絡(luò),讓賄選買(mǎi)票現(xiàn)象日益普遍。其次,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)由于其“經(jīng)紀(jì)”地位,必然要犧牲公權(quán)力的利益以謀取自己的利益,但是其與公權(quán)力的互動(dòng)并不是制度性的,而是通過(guò)“私下交易”的方式,由此形成政商勾結(jié)和金權(quán)政治。第三,臺(tái)灣社會(huì)存在“階級(jí)動(dòng)員”與“族群動(dòng)員”這兩種相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的社會(huì)動(dòng)員模式。為了緩解階級(jí)動(dòng)員,緩解民間社會(huì)對(duì)于金權(quán)政治的不滿,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)直接推動(dòng)了“族群動(dòng)員”,讓臺(tái)灣的民主在一定程度上呈現(xiàn)為以省籍一族群動(dòng)員為特征的民粹式民主。第四,通過(guò)中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)的作用,臺(tái)灣的金權(quán)政治和民粹主義結(jié)合在一起,一方面是訴諸省籍-族群的民粹動(dòng)員,另一方面則是金權(quán)政治,由此臺(tái)灣的公權(quán)力的治理能力大幅下降。所以,臺(tái)灣在后轉(zhuǎn)型期出現(xiàn)的民主困境,與其說(shuō)是民主不成熟的現(xiàn)象,毋寧是中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)的必然產(chǎn)物。 臺(tái)灣要走出民主困境,實(shí)現(xiàn)民主深化,必須加強(qiáng)公權(quán)力建設(shè)和公民社會(huì)建設(shè)。就前者而言,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)一方面通過(guò)“經(jīng)紀(jì)”機(jī)制讓公權(quán)力出現(xiàn)了“內(nèi)卷化”發(fā)展的態(tài)勢(shì),另一方面通過(guò)“關(guān)系”機(jī)制侵蝕了民主政治的制度化建設(shè)。就后者而言,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)一方面不斷強(qiáng)化其與民間社會(huì)的“感情”和“關(guān)系”,另一方面侵蝕民間社會(huì)朝向“合理化”組織的方向發(fā)展。雖然社會(huì)中不斷形成各種社團(tuán)組織,但是它們更多的是按照“經(jīng)紀(jì)”機(jī)制和“關(guān)系”機(jī)制來(lái)運(yùn)作的,而不是真正的公民社會(huì)團(tuán)體。從這兩個(gè)方面講,中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)將對(duì)臺(tái)灣的民主深化形成抑制作用。而且由于臺(tái)灣選舉非常頻繁,迫使政黨必須不斷進(jìn)行基層動(dòng)員,但是無(wú)論是國(guó)民黨還是民進(jìn)黨,其基層組織非常薄弱,這就使得政黨必須繼續(xù)依靠中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)進(jìn)行基層動(dòng)員,在未來(lái)一段時(shí)間內(nèi)無(wú)法形成對(duì)中間權(quán)力網(wǎng)絡(luò)的有效替換。從這一意義上講,臺(tái)灣的民主困境可能長(zhǎng)期化,并可能形成低質(zhì)民主體制。
[Abstract]:This paper takes Taiwan's democratic politics as the research object, and analyzes why the smooth democratic transition in Taiwan can not bring about effective democratic operation. To answer this question, this paper analyzes the changes of Taiwan's social structure after 1949, and the impact of this structural change on the democratic transition process and democratic operation in the post-transition period.
After Taiwan's restoration in 1945, it entered the general logic of China's "national construction". In this historical process, Taiwan experienced the three important historical events of "228", land reform and local autonomy at the beginning of the restoration. The gentry class was completely disintegrated. In local self-government, some people who were keen on local elections mobilized votes by relying on traditional social networks. The Kuomintang adopted a strategy of both drawing and restricting local elites, thus forming local factions. Meanwhile, in the process of Taiwan's economic development, private capital grew stronger and developed gradually. As the Kuomintang's efforts to take root downward have never been able to achieve its success, local factions and financial groups have become a new intermediate structure of Taiwan society. Their strength has been growing and increasingly integrated. This paper calls them the "intermediate power network".
Intermediate power network is the third power structure outside the Kuomintang regime and civil society, and its interaction with the Kuomintang regime and civil society is mainly two. The first one is broker. Intermediate power network is on the one hand the Kuomintang regime mobilizes the brokers of civil society, on the other hand the civil society protects itself. As a broker of personal interests, it acts as a "double broker" between the Kuomintang regime and civil society, and seeks to maximize its own interests from the "double broker." The second is the "informal political" mechanism, i.e. the "relationship" mechanism, and the intermediate power network, whether it is an interaction with the Kuomintang regime or with the "civil society." The interaction of society is not institutionalized, but operates according to the non-institutionalized direct interpersonal interaction model.
In the 1980s, Taiwan's domestic and foreign political and economic situation changed dramatically, forcing the "party-state system" to return to constitutional democracy. In fact, Taiwan's democratic transformation has to accomplish two arduous tasks, namely, the transformation of the party-state system into a democratic system, and the transformation of the Kuomintang, a revolutionary political party reorganized according to Leninism, to the people. Taiwan has successfully accomplished these two tasks and achieved a "soft landing" in the political transformation. On the one hand, the intermediate power network, with its "brokerage" mechanism and "relationship" mechanism, effectively suppresses and dissolves the peasant movement and the workers'movement, so as to make China a center. The middle class in Taiwan advocated reform and opposed revolution, which left time and space for the KMT to control the Democratic transition. On the other hand, the middle power network helped the KMT to continue to win local and "central" levels. The KMT's election reduced the resistance to the separation of the KMT from the public power and realized the movement from "public power" to "society", thus facilitating the smooth and democratic transition of Taiwan. Meanwhile, in the process of the movement, the KMT gradually changed from a revolutionary party to a popular election party.
However, the power network of China Interrogation continues to expand in the process of Taiwan's democratic transition, and has a series of negative effects on the Democratic operation in the post-transition period. First, the power network of China Interrogation is mainly mobilized through the "brokerage" mechanism and the "relationship" mechanism for elections. In order to mobilize votes to the greatest extent, the power network of China Interrogation will be mobilized through money or even the black and evil forces. Secondly, because of its "brokerage" status, the intermediate power network will inevitably sacrifice the interests of public power to seek its own interests, but its interaction with public power is not institutional, but through "private transactions", thus forming collusion and cooperation between government and business. Third, there are two competing social mobilization modes in Taiwan society: class mobilization and ethnic mobilization. In order to alleviate class mobilization and civil society's dissatisfaction with gold power politics, the intermediate power network directly promotes "ethnic mobilization" and makes Taiwan's democracy appear as provincial nationality to a certain extent. Fourthly, through the role of the intermediate power network, Taiwan's gold power politics and populism are combined. On the one hand, it resorts to Provincial-Ethnic populism mobilization, on the other hand, it is gold power politics, thus Taiwan's ability to govern public power has declined dramatically. The current democratic dilemma, rather than the phenomenon of immature democracy, is rather the inevitable outcome of the middle power network.
In order to get out of the dilemma of democracy and realize the deepening of democracy in Taiwan, we must strengthen the construction of public power and civil society. For the former, the intermediate power network, on the one hand, makes the development of public power "involution" through the "brokerage" mechanism, on the other hand, erodes the institutionalization of democratic politics through the "relationship" mechanism. On the one hand, the network of intermediate power constantly strengthens its "feelings" and "relations" with civil society, on the other hand, erodes the development of civil society towards "rationalization" organizations. In both respects, the intermediate power network will inhibit the deepening of democracy in Taiwan. Moreover, the frequent elections in Taiwan have forced the political parties to mobilize at the grass-roots level, but the grass-roots organizations of both the Kuomintang and the DPP are very weak, which makes it necessary for the political parties to continue. In this sense, Taiwan's democratic dilemma may be long-term and a low-quality democratic system may be formed.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：復(fù)旦大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2010
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：D675.8

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