【摘要】：本文通過構(gòu)建一個行業(yè)進(jìn)入管制的混合寡頭模型,研究政府在不同制度環(huán)境下的最優(yōu)反腐敗政策。我們發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)當(dāng)腐敗成本很低且政府對就業(yè)重視程度較小時,政府最優(yōu)政策是治標(biāo)(打擊腐敗但保留進(jìn)入管制);(2)當(dāng)政府對就業(yè)重視程度非常大時,不論腐敗成本高低,政府最優(yōu)政策都是治本(去除管制);(3)當(dāng)政府對就業(yè)重視程度較大且腐敗成本較低,或政府對就業(yè)重視程度較小且腐敗成本較高時,保持現(xiàn)狀是最優(yōu)選擇;(4)治標(biāo)政策導(dǎo)致社會總產(chǎn)量最低、價格最高,治本政策導(dǎo)致社會總產(chǎn)量最高、價格最低,保持現(xiàn)狀政策的結(jié)果處于兩者之間。本文結(jié)論對于當(dāng)前反腐敗政策和簡政放權(quán)改革具有重要的理論啟示。
[Abstract]:By constructing a mixed oligopoly model of industry entry regulation, this paper studies the optimal anti-corruption policy of government in different institutional environments. We find that: (1) when the cost of corruption is very low and the government attaches less importance to employment, the government's best policy is to remedy (combat corruption but retain entry control); (2) when the government attaches great importance to employment, no matter the cost of corruption, the government's best policy is to cure the root (remove the control); (3) when the government pays more attention to employment and the cost of corruption is lower, or the government pays less attention to employment and the cost of corruption is high, the best choice is to maintain the status quo; (4) the palliative policy leads to the lowest total social output and the highest price, while the radical policy leads to the highest total social output and the lowest price. The result of the policy of maintaining the status quo is between the two. The conclusion of this paper has important theoretical implications for the current anti-corruption policy and the reform of decentralization.
【作者單位】： 中國人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金委面上項(xiàng)目(71572190) 教育部青年長江學(xué)者項(xiàng)目 中國人民大學(xué)科學(xué)研究基金項(xiàng)目(17XNH036)的資助
【分類號】：D262.6;F279.2
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本文編號：2393155