本文選題：無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)　切入點：信任管理　出處：《東華大學(xué)》2014年碩士論文

【摘要】：隨著無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)的應(yīng)用與發(fā)展,其安全問題受到越來越多研究者的關(guān)注。近年來,在傳統(tǒng)安全領(lǐng)域之外,人們開始把目光投向WSNs的信任管理問題。 WSNs主要通過節(jié)點間互助轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)的方式實現(xiàn)數(shù)據(jù)包傳輸。由于WSNs節(jié)點自身能量、資源的限制,在與其他節(jié)點配合完成任務(wù)時,往往為了減少能耗,會陷入拒絕合作的自私狀態(tài)；而某些正常節(jié)點又容易被利用,幫助惡意節(jié)點轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)包。信任管理要求建立節(jié)點間的信任機制,使得正常節(jié)點能互相信任合作,對惡意節(jié)點持不信任且拒絕合作的態(tài)度。 對每個節(jié)點來說,選擇信任而幫助其他節(jié)點轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)包可以提高信譽,從而獲得收益,同時會付出成本,如能量消耗、惡意信息的風(fēng)險等。然而,出于節(jié)點自私性考慮,節(jié)點往往不愿幫助其他節(jié)點轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)數(shù)據(jù)包從而選擇不信任并拒絕合作,這會影響節(jié)點的信譽,導(dǎo)致收益降低。本文針對這對矛盾關(guān)系,采用演化博弈的方法,通過構(gòu)建演化信任模型,引導(dǎo)整個WSNs達到演化穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)。該狀態(tài)下WSNs絕大多數(shù)甚至全部節(jié)點選擇信任策略。具體來說,本文的主要研究內(nèi)容如下： 1.簡要分析了無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)安全和信任的限制性因素,結(jié)合博弈理論對WSNs節(jié)點信任合作的矛盾點進行了闡述,并提出了本課題的研究背景、意義及主要內(nèi)容； 2.針對WSNs節(jié)點非完全理性化的特點,以演化博弈為基礎(chǔ),構(gòu)建WSNs的演化信任模型,并提出了反思與模仿兩種不同的動態(tài)選擇方法,通過動力學(xué)分析,推導(dǎo)出達到演化穩(wěn)定狀態(tài)的條件,并通過仿真實驗驗證了結(jié)論； 3.在演化信任模型中引入激勵機制、丟包率和丟包重發(fā)機制,分析了激勵程度、丟包情況對WSNs信任合作的影響,并通過仿真實驗驗證了結(jié)論。 博弈理論在無線傳感器網(wǎng)絡(luò)信任管理問題上的研究受到越來越多的重視。本文基于演化博弈的方法對WSNs節(jié)點信任合作問題進行研究,揭示了WSNs節(jié)點信任演化的動力學(xué)規(guī)律,為WSNs信任管理提供了理論基礎(chǔ)。
[Abstract]:With the development and application of wireless sensor network, its security problem attracts more and more attention of researchers. In recent years, in addition to traditional security field, people begin to pay attention to the problem of trust management of WSNs.
WSNs mainly through the way of mutual nodes forwarding packets transmission. Because WSNs nodes self energy, resource constraints, in cooperation with other nodes to complete the task, often in order to reduce energy consumption, will refuse to cooperate in selfish state; while some normal nodes are easy to be used to help malicious nodes to forward packets. Trust management requires the establishment of trust mechanism between nodes and normal nodes can make mutual trust and cooperation, distrust and refuses to cooperate on the malicious node's attitude.
For each node, the choice of trust and help other nodes to forward packets can improve the credibility, to obtain benefits, at the same time it will pay the costs, such as energy consumption, the risk of malicious information. However, for selfish considerations, nodes are often reluctant to help other nodes to forward packets to choose not to trust and refused to cooperate with the will affect the credibility of the nodes, resulting in lower earnings. In view of the contradiction between, using evolutionary game method, through building evolutionary trust model, the entire WSNs reach steady state. The state of WSNs most or all of the nodes choose trust strategy. Specifically, the main contents of this paper are as follows:
1. a brief analysis of the restrictive factors of wireless sensor network security and trust, with the contradiction of game theory to WSNs node trust and cooperation are discussed, and put forward the research background, significance and main contents;
2. according to the characteristics of non WSNs nodes completely rational, based on evolutionary game based building evolutionary trust model of WSNs, and puts forward the reflection and imitation of two different dynamic selection method, through dynamic analysis, deduced the evolution reached steady state conditions, and the conclusion is verified by simulation experiments;
3. in the evolution of trust model with incentive mechanism, packet loss rate and packet loss retransmission mechanism, analyzes the incentive degree, influence of packet loss on WSNs trust and cooperation, and verified by simulation experiment.
Study on trust management in wireless sensor network game theory has received more and more attention. This paper makes a research on the cooperation of the WSNs node trust method based on evolutionary game theory, reveals the dynamics of the WSNs node trust evolution, provides a theoretical basis for the WSNs trust management.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：東華大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2014
【分類號】：TP212.9;TN929.5

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本文編號：1712826