【摘要】：在工程供應(yīng)鏈中,工程承包商為業(yè)主供應(yīng)工程建設(shè)所需的技術(shù)、原材料、設(shè)備、人力等戰(zhàn)略資源,即承包商為業(yè)主的工程建設(shè)能力供應(yīng)商。在交通工程中,它們之間對立的關(guān)系是工程失敗的主要原因。一直以來,正式合同是工程供應(yīng)鏈成員之間關(guān)系治理的焦點,但實際上,由于合同具有敵對性和不完整性,所以關(guān)系治理機(jī)制越來越受到關(guān)注。本文首先基于社會資本理論和社會交換理論,將社會資本(例如,事前關(guān)系、共同準(zhǔn)則和信任)定義為事前關(guān)系治理機(jī)制,將業(yè)主與承包商之間的協(xié)作(例如,信息交流、共同行為)定義為事后關(guān)系治理機(jī)制,從而考察它們在不同階段對工程績效的影響。其次,盡管治理機(jī)制的選擇取決于業(yè)主和承包商測量項目團(tuán)隊行為和績效的能力以及資源分配的能力,但是治理機(jī)制對工程控制能力的影響以及它們間的交互作用仍然未知。本文借鑒控制理論,將"工程控制能力"定義為一個新的結(jié)構(gòu),并推斷"工程控制能力"不僅受到治理機(jī)制的運用的影響,而且它在治理機(jī)制與工程績效的動態(tài)關(guān)系中充當(dāng)著中介的角色。最后,本文通過交通工程過程的劃分,重點研究在合同簽署后的前期階段和合同簽署后的穩(wěn)定階段,治理機(jī)制、工程控制能力與工程績效間的動態(tài)關(guān)系。本研究主要針對中國交通工程的業(yè)主和承包商設(shè)計和發(fā)放了問卷,最終回收了 288份有效問卷。然后運用最小偏二乘法結(jié)構(gòu)方程建模處理和分析了數(shù)據(jù),檢測了研究假設(shè)、驗證了研究模型。結(jié)果表明,在兩個階段,關(guān)系治理機(jī)制和正式合同相互促進(jìn);社會資本和正式合同都通過協(xié)作的中介作用對工程控制能力具有正面影響,在合同簽署后的前期階段,社會資本對工程績效具有直接的正面促進(jìn)作用,合同通過協(xié)作的中介作用對工程績效具有間接的正面促進(jìn)作用;在合同簽署后的穩(wěn)定階段,協(xié)作通過工程控制能力的中介作用對工程績效具有正面影響,正式合同對工程績效無直接或間接的影響。
[Abstract]:In the engineering supply chain, the contractor supplies the technical, raw materials, equipment, manpower and other strategic resources needed for the construction of the project to the owner, that is, the contractor is the supplier of the engineering construction ability of the owner. In traffic engineering, the relationship between them is the main reason for the failure of the project. Formal contract has always been the focus of relationship governance among the members of engineering supply chain, but in fact, because of the hostility and incompleteness of contract, the mechanism of relationship governance has been paid more and more attention. Based on the theory of social capital and the theory of social exchange, this paper defines social capital (for example, prior relationship, common criterion and trust) as the governance mechanism of prior relationship, and defines the cooperation between owner and contractor (for example, information exchange). Common behavior) is defined as the ex post-relationship governance mechanism to examine their impact on engineering performance at different stages. Secondly, although the choice of governance mechanism depends on the ability of the employer and contractor to measure the behavior and performance of the project team and the ability to allocate resources, the impact of the governance mechanism on the engineering control ability and their interaction is still unknown. Based on the theory of control, this paper defines "engineering control ability" as a new structure, and concludes that "engineering control ability" is not only affected by the application of governance mechanism. Moreover, it acts as an intermediary in the dynamic relationship between governance mechanism and engineering performance. Finally, through the division of the traffic engineering process, this paper focuses on the dynamic relationship between the early stage after the contract signing and the stable stage after the contract signing, the governance mechanism, the engineering control ability and the engineering performance. In this study, a questionnaire was designed and distributed to the owners and contractors of Chinese traffic engineering, and 288 valid questionnaires were collected. Then the minimum partial multiplication structure equation is used to model and analyze the data, the research hypothesis is tested, and the research model is verified. The results show that, in the two stages, the relationship governance mechanism and the formal contract promote each other, the social capital and the formal contract have a positive impact on the engineering control ability through the intermediary function of collaboration, and in the early stage after the contract is signed, Social capital has a direct positive effect on project performance, while contract plays an indirect positive role in project performance through the intermediary role of cooperation; in the stable stage after the signing of the contract, the social capital plays an indirect and positive role in the project performance. Collaboration has a positive effect on engineering performance through the intermediary of engineering control ability, while formal contract has no direct or indirect effect on project performance.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2015
【分類號】：U415.1

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