本文選題：運(yùn)輸經(jīng)濟(jì) + 擁擠收費(fèi)福利效應(yīng)　； 參考：《公路交通科技》2017年10期

【摘要】：客運(yùn)和貨運(yùn)用戶的邊際時(shí)間效用通常具有較大差異,這造成了用戶在出行時(shí)間選擇行為上的區(qū)別,并對(duì)城市公路運(yùn)輸通道的擁擠特性產(chǎn)生影響。既有動(dòng)態(tài)擁擠模型忽略了用戶邊際效用隨時(shí)間變化,且變化速度不同這一事實(shí)。針對(duì)這一問(wèn)題,通過(guò)對(duì)時(shí)間效用函數(shù)進(jìn)行參數(shù)化,將用戶異質(zhì)性引入了時(shí)變邊際效用瓶頸模型,解決了既有模型無(wú)法準(zhǔn)確描述客貨混合條件下?lián)頂D特性的問(wèn)題。在獲取擁擠特性的基礎(chǔ)上,以社會(huì)福利最大化為目標(biāo)確定了針對(duì)客貨混合用戶的最優(yōu)定價(jià)策略,并討論了該策略對(duì)各類用戶產(chǎn)生的福利效應(yīng)。結(jié)果表明,在目的地邊際效用增長(zhǎng)率較高的用戶會(huì)更早到達(dá),且這一擁擠特性在無(wú)收費(fèi)用戶均衡以及社會(huì)最優(yōu)收費(fèi)的狀態(tài)下均存在。社會(huì)最優(yōu)收費(fèi)由用戶在出發(fā)地和目的地的邊際時(shí)間效用決定,該定價(jià)策略可使擁擠收費(fèi)計(jì)入貨運(yùn)用戶的邊際成本,從而使貨運(yùn)用戶更容易接受擁擠收費(fèi)政策。當(dāng)社會(huì)最優(yōu)收費(fèi)完全不返給用戶時(shí),全體用戶的間接效用與無(wú)收費(fèi)均衡狀態(tài)保持一致,但擁擠排隊(duì)現(xiàn)象可以被完全消除。如果將收費(fèi)均等地返還給全體用戶,社會(huì)最優(yōu)收費(fèi)可以實(shí)現(xiàn)帕累托改進(jìn)。如果將收費(fèi)更多地返還給在目的地邊際效用較高的用戶,可以促進(jìn)用戶生產(chǎn)效率的提高。
[Abstract]:The marginal time utility of passenger and freight users is usually quite different, which causes the difference in the travel time choice behavior of the users, and has an impact on the congestion characteristics of urban road transportation channels. The existing dynamic congestion model ignores the fact that user marginal utility varies with time and changes at different speeds. In order to solve this problem, by parameterizing the time utility function, the user heterogeneity is introduced into the time-varying marginal utility bottleneck model, which solves the problem that the existing models can not accurately describe the congestion characteristics under mixed passenger and freight conditions. Based on the characteristics of congestion, the optimal pricing strategy for mixed customers is determined with the aim of maximizing social welfare, and the welfare effect of the strategy on all kinds of users is discussed. The results show that users with higher marginal utility growth rate will arrive earlier, and this congestion feature exists in the condition of no charging user equilibrium and social optimal charge. The social optimal charge is determined by the marginal time utility of the user in the origin and destination. The pricing strategy can make the congestion charge into the marginal cost of the freight user and make the freight user more easily accept the congestion pricing policy. The indirect utility of all users is consistent with the equilibrium state of no charge when the social optimal charge is not returned to the user at all, but the phenomenon of crowded queue can be completely eliminated. If charges are returned equally to all users, social optimal fees can achieve Pareto improvements. If more charges are returned to users with higher marginal utility at destination, the efficiency of user production can be improved.
【作者單位】： 北京交通大學(xué)交通運(yùn)輸學(xué)院;
【基金】：國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目(T16A800030)
【分類號(hào)】：F540.4;U491
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本文編號(hào)：2069360