本文選題：收費公路PPP項目 + 收益補償　； 參考：《蘭州交通大學》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：收費公路的建設不僅能帶動區(qū)域經(jīng)濟發(fā)展,而且能進一步提升區(qū)域交通區(qū)位優(yōu)勢、改善投資環(huán)境、為區(qū)域產(chǎn)業(yè)布局提供有力支撐。收費公路項目屬于資金、技術密集型項目,由于其建設周期長、建設環(huán)境復雜及社會對其越來越高的建設和服務要求,僅僅依靠政府一方提供已經(jīng)完全不現(xiàn)實。近年來迅速發(fā)展起來的PPP模式以“特許經(jīng)營權”的方式將政府部門部分支出責任轉(zhuǎn)移給私人部門,不僅緩解了政府財政壓力,也使得私人部門的閑置資本得到合理有效的利用。因此,對于收費公路領域來說,PPP模式的引入能夠極大促進其發(fā)展。然而,由于收費公路準公共產(chǎn)品屬性和正外部性等特征,私人部門并不能夠獲得合理的收益,為此政府需要承擔一定的補償責任。通過文獻研究發(fā)現(xiàn)目前的PPP項目補償模型只能補償私人部門的投資缺口,并沒有對私人部門起到激勵性作用。因此,建立有效且具有激勵性質(zhì)的收益補償模型,為收費公路PPP項目的順利實施提供保障顯得尤為重要。本文綜合運用文獻研究法、博弈分析法、定性和定量分析相結(jié)合的方法,對收費公路PPP項目的收益補償模型進行了研究。首先,對目前我國收費公路的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀進行闡述,對PPP模式的國內(nèi)外補償現(xiàn)狀進行梳理和分析。隨后對收費公路PPP項目收益補償?shù)南嚓P理論進行闡述,分析了收費公路PPP項目的四大經(jīng)濟特性及補償?shù)谋匾?同時對博弈論和委托代理理論進行了介紹,并對收費公路PPP項目收益補償中的委托代理關系進行了研究,為后文理論模型的構(gòu)建做好鋪墊。其次,對收費公路PPP項目收益補償問題進行描述,介紹了目前PPP項目補償主流的兩種補償模式:建設期補償模式和運營期補償模式;在明確政府和私人部門是委托代理關系的情況下,借用委托代理模型分別構(gòu)建了“補建設”和“補運營”兩種情形下的“固定補償+激勵補償”的收益補償委托代理博弈模型,并對模型進行求解和分析,探討了信息對稱下和信息不對稱下政府給予私人部門的固定補償,企業(yè)努力水平和政府激勵報酬之間的關系,以及企業(yè)的風險規(guī)避度、外部影響因素對最優(yōu)補償合約的影響,進而從理論上分析了激勵補償模型的有效性和可行性。最后,結(jié)合具體實際案例,重點對信息不對稱情況下“補建設”和“補運營”兩種補償模型進行了定量分析,并提出基于運營成本的補償模型選擇是政府的最優(yōu)補償決策,同時根據(jù)本文構(gòu)建的補償模型及計算結(jié)果提出了幾條補償實施建議。
[Abstract]:The construction of toll roads can not only promote the regional economic development, but also further enhance the regional transportation location advantages, improve the investment environment, and provide strong support for the regional industrial distribution. Toll road project is a kind of capital and technology-intensive project. Because of its long construction cycle, complex construction environment and the society's increasing demands on its construction and service, it is completely unrealistic to rely solely on the government to provide it. In recent years, the PPP mode, which has developed rapidly, transfers part of government expenditure responsibility to the private sector in the form of "franchise", which not only alleviates the government financial pressure, but also makes the idle capital of the private sector reasonably and effectively utilized. Therefore, the introduction of PPP model can greatly promote the development of toll roads. However, due to the characteristics of quasi-public goods and positive externalities of toll roads, the private sector can not obtain reasonable income, so the government should bear certain compensation responsibilities. It is found that the current PPP project compensation model can only compensate for the investment gap of the private sector, and does not play an incentive role to the private sector. Therefore, it is very important to establish an effective and incentive revenue compensation model to guarantee the smooth implementation of PPP project of toll road. In this paper, the revenue compensation model of toll road PPP project is studied by means of literature research, game analysis, qualitative and quantitative analysis. Firstly, the development of toll roads in China is expounded, and the compensation status of PPP at home and abroad is analyzed. Then it expounds the relevant theories of PPP project income compensation, analyzes the four economic characteristics of toll road PPP project and the necessity of compensation, and introduces the game theory and principal-agent theory. The principal-agent relationship in the revenue compensation of PPP project of toll road is studied, which lays the foundation for the construction of the theoretical model. Secondly, the paper describes the revenue compensation of PPP project of toll road, and introduces two main compensation modes of PPP project: compensation mode in construction period and compensation mode in operation period; Under the condition that the government and the private sector are principal-agent relationship, the principal-agent game model of "fixed compensation incentive compensation" and "fixed compensation incentive compensation" is constructed by using the principal-agent model. By solving and analyzing the model, the paper discusses the fixed compensation given by the government to the private sector under information symmetry and information asymmetry, the relationship between the level of enterprise effort and the government incentive reward, and the risk aversion of the enterprise. The influence of external factors on the optimal compensation contract is analyzed, and the validity and feasibility of the incentive compensation model are analyzed theoretically. Finally, combined with practical cases, the paper focuses on the quantitative analysis of compensation models of "compensation construction" and "compensation operation" under the condition of asymmetric information, and points out that the choice of compensation model based on operation cost is the optimal compensation decision of the government. At the same time, according to the compensation model constructed in this paper and the results of calculation, several suggestions for the implementation of compensation are put forward.
【學位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2017
【分類號】：F542;F283

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