本文選題：合作博弈 + 縣鄉(xiāng)公路　； 參考：《蘭州交通大學(xué)》2017年碩士論文

【摘要】：縣鄉(xiāng)公路是我國(guó)公路系統(tǒng)的主要構(gòu)成部分之一,同時(shí)也是農(nóng)村公路的重要組成部分,它的建設(shè)對(duì)于城鄉(xiāng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展起著至關(guān)重要的作用。雖然我國(guó)已經(jīng)投入大量的資金對(duì)縣鄉(xiāng)公路進(jìn)行建設(shè),但是地方政府投入的資金畢竟有限,所以就引入了BT模式來(lái)完成縣鄉(xiāng)公路的建設(shè),這種模式通過(guò)融資的方法獲得充足的建設(shè)資金,進(jìn)而減輕了政府的財(cái)政壓力。本文中縣鄉(xiāng)公路建設(shè)的最大問(wèn)題就是資金的嚴(yán)重不足,通過(guò)BT模式來(lái)完成建設(shè),在解決資金問(wèn)題的同時(shí)也產(chǎn)生了BT項(xiàng)目參與方之間收益分配的問(wèn)題,每個(gè)合作參與方都有自己的行動(dòng)策略,都想從聯(lián)盟中獲得最大的收益,所以在多種多樣分配方案的情況下,就需要制定一個(gè)科學(xué)公正的方案。最后文章就用合作博弈中的Shapley值法和Nash談判法兩個(gè)模型對(duì)項(xiàng)目參與方的收益進(jìn)行具體的分配。文章在分析了縣鄉(xiāng)公路BT項(xiàng)目的基本概述和特征后,研究了利益相關(guān)者的理論和具體的分類,為了能夠公平合理的完成項(xiàng)目參與方的收益分配,就需要對(duì)收益分配的特點(diǎn)、原則和影響因素進(jìn)行深入的研究。然后通過(guò)研究合作博弈的幾種解法,再以一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的算例分析得到不同合作博弈解法下的計(jì)算結(jié)果,分析數(shù)據(jù)后最終選擇了Shapley值法和Nash談判法。論文研究的重點(diǎn)是第四、五章,在滿足相關(guān)公理的條件下,建立了Shapley值法和Nash談判法的收益分配模型,然后對(duì)模型進(jìn)行分析求解。因模型中的系數(shù)簡(jiǎn)單,所以這樣的收益分配方案并不能做到公平公正,因此論文第五章引入了投入資金比例、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)影響因素、貢獻(xiàn)度因素和合作執(zhí)行度因素對(duì)模型進(jìn)行修正,這樣計(jì)算得出的結(jié)果更加的合理科學(xué)。論文最后以鄭州和開(kāi)封兩市間的縣鄉(xiāng)公路為例,在分析獲得相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)后,對(duì)文中的兩個(gè)合作博弈模型進(jìn)行了驗(yàn)證,最后得出模型的正確性和BT模式在建設(shè)中的可行性。合作博弈的Shapley值法和Nash談判法來(lái)研究收益分配已得到廣泛的運(yùn)用,但是在BT建設(shè)模式中的應(yīng)用是一種新的嘗試,本文通過(guò)BT這種模式來(lái)完成縣鄉(xiāng)公路的建設(shè)也是一種新的方法,在減輕政府資金壓力的同時(shí),還為以后縣鄉(xiāng)公路這種公共基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的建設(shè)提供了新的思路和方法。
[Abstract]:The county and township road is one of the main components of the highway system in China, and it is also an important part of the rural highway. Its construction plays a vital role in the development of the urban and rural economy. Although a large amount of funds have been invested in the construction of the county and township roads in China, the funds invested by the local government are limited. In the BT model to complete the construction of county and township roads, this model obtains sufficient capital for construction through the financing method, and thus alleviates the financial pressure of the government. In this paper, the biggest problem of the county and township highway construction is the serious shortage of funds, through the BT model to complete the construction, while solving the problem of funds, it also produces the participation of the BT project. Each participant has its own action strategy and wants to get the maximum benefit from the alliance, so in the case of a variety of allocation schemes, we need to make a scientific and fair scheme. Finally, the article uses two models of the Shapley value method and the Nash negotiation method in the cooperative game to participate in the project. After the analysis of the basic overview and characteristics of the county and township highway BT project, the paper studies the theory and specific classification of the stakeholders. In order to achieve a fair and reasonable completion of the income distribution of the project participants, it is necessary to make a thorough study of the special points, principles and factors of the income distribution. After studying several solutions of cooperative game, the calculation results of different cooperative game solutions are obtained by a simple example. After analyzing the data, the Shapley value method and the Nash negotiation method are selected. The focus of the thesis is fourth, fifth chapters. Under the conditions of relevant axiom, the Shapley value method and the Nash negotiation method are established. The income distribution model is analyzed and solved. Because the coefficient in the model is simple, so the income distribution scheme can not be fair and fair, so the fifth chapter of the paper introduces the proportion of investment funds, risk factors, contribution factors and cooperative execution factors to modify the model, so that the results obtained are calculated. More reasonable science. Finally, the paper takes the county and township roads in Zhengzhou and Kaifeng two cities as an example. After analyzing the relevant data, two cooperative game models are verified. Finally, the correctness of the model and the feasibility of the BT model in the construction are obtained. The Shapley value method of cooperative game and the Nash negotiation method are used to study the income distribution. It has been widely used, but the application of the BT construction model is a new attempt. This paper is a new way to complete the construction of county and township roads through the mode of BT. It also provides new ideas and methods for the construction of the public foundation of the county and township roads in the future, while reducing the pressure of the government funds.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：蘭州交通大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2017
【分類號(hào)】：F542.8;F283

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