本文選題：產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新 + 技術(shù)許可��； 參考：《華北電力大學(xué)》2013年博士論文

【摘要】：長(zhǎng)期以來(lái),國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的影響因素已進(jìn)行了大量的實(shí)證研究,結(jié)果表明,隨著時(shí)間的推移,技術(shù)進(jìn)步在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)中的作用日益提高,并逐步取代了生產(chǎn)要素投入在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)中的主導(dǎo)地位。要保持我國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)持續(xù)高速增長(zhǎng),就必須加強(qiáng)技術(shù)進(jìn)步的力度,轉(zhuǎn)變經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)方式,提高技術(shù)創(chuàng)新能力,使經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)逐步實(shí)現(xiàn)從要素驅(qū)動(dòng)型向創(chuàng)新驅(qū)動(dòng)型轉(zhuǎn)變。知識(shí)和技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新和創(chuàng)造性應(yīng)用越來(lái)越成為當(dāng)今知識(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)時(shí)代技術(shù)進(jìn)步、經(jīng)濟(jì)社會(huì)發(fā)展的推動(dòng)力。創(chuàng)新的成果水平衡量指標(biāo)專(zhuān)利尤其是對(duì)發(fā)明專(zhuān)利的創(chuàng)造、擁有和運(yùn)用,成為一個(gè)企業(yè)乃至一個(gè)國(guó)家在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中獲得優(yōu)勢(shì)的關(guān)鍵因素。然而,不容樂(lè)觀的是,專(zhuān)利成果轉(zhuǎn)化率并沒(méi)有明顯提高,大量專(zhuān)利得不到應(yīng)用而成為“沉睡專(zhuān)利”,科技成果轉(zhuǎn)化不成生產(chǎn)力。要徹底改變這種科技與經(jīng)濟(jì)脫節(jié)、科技向現(xiàn)實(shí)生產(chǎn)力轉(zhuǎn)化能力薄弱的局面,充分發(fā)揮知識(shí)和技術(shù)在推動(dòng)我國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)方式轉(zhuǎn)變中的重要作用,需要積極研究和探討我國(guó)的技術(shù)市場(chǎng)交易與科技成果轉(zhuǎn)化。 技術(shù)許可是在技術(shù)市場(chǎng)上實(shí)現(xiàn)技術(shù)交易的主要形式之一,是技術(shù)要素流動(dòng)的一種重要方式,也是技術(shù)充分發(fā)揮其經(jīng)濟(jì)主導(dǎo)力量的主要路徑。如何確定被轉(zhuǎn)移技術(shù)的價(jià)格契約方式是技術(shù)許可決策的核心。因此,隨著以創(chuàng)新為基礎(chǔ)的市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)日益激烈、科技水平的快速提升以及世界范圍內(nèi)對(duì)知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)的不斷加強(qiáng),在許多產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)轉(zhuǎn)移及擴(kuò)散過(guò)程中,技術(shù)許可將不可避免地發(fā)揮越來(lái)越重要的作用。技術(shù)許可價(jià)格決策過(guò)程是十分復(fù)雜和困難的。研究技術(shù)許可的內(nèi)在價(jià)格決策行為無(wú)論對(duì)于提高企業(yè)、高校等市場(chǎng)主體的技術(shù)交易效率,促進(jìn)科技成果向現(xiàn)實(shí)生產(chǎn)力轉(zhuǎn)化,提高創(chuàng)新技術(shù)對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的貢獻(xiàn)力,還是擴(kuò)展技術(shù)許可契約理論研究的深度和廣度都是有一定的價(jià)值的。 本文提出產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可策略理論,是考慮與產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可活動(dòng)相關(guān)的政府、研發(fā)者、許可方、被許可方以及消費(fèi)者等決策主體,關(guān)于產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新許可相關(guān)的技術(shù)獲取模式、市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)結(jié)構(gòu)、需求結(jié)構(gòu)、產(chǎn)品耐用性、信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)、不確定性等因素作用下的系統(tǒng)性產(chǎn)業(yè)組織框架下的技術(shù)許可決策模型研究。其中,產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新是技術(shù)創(chuàng)新的一種重要類(lèi)型,實(shí)踐數(shù)據(jù)表明,產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新在技術(shù)創(chuàng)新中占據(jù)很大的比例。本文進(jìn)行的主要工作如下： (1)比較分析了企業(yè)創(chuàng)新技術(shù)獲取策略。針對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)中企業(yè)創(chuàng)新技術(shù)獲取問(wèn)題,首先運(yùn)用包含創(chuàng)新及產(chǎn)出階段的博弈模型分析了合作創(chuàng)新模式；然后構(gòu)建了包含創(chuàng)新、許可及產(chǎn)出階段的博弈模型,并根據(jù)模型重點(diǎn)比較分析了技術(shù)許可模式；最后比較分析得出企業(yè)較優(yōu)的創(chuàng)新技術(shù)獲取策略。 (2)研究了寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策。按照典型寡頭壟斷市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)Cournot(古諾)市場(chǎng)、Stackelberg(斯坦伯格)市場(chǎng)、Bertrand(伯川德)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)等,分別討論了不同市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的許可決策問(wèn)題。由于產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可行為受到市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)的影響,考慮了基于產(chǎn)量競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的靜態(tài)博弈和動(dòng)態(tài)博弈模型,并分別比較不同市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下固定費(fèi)用許可、提成許可、兩部制許可的市場(chǎng)均衡,以及相應(yīng)的最優(yōu)許可決策及消費(fèi)者剩余和社會(huì)剩余。同時(shí),討論了產(chǎn)品差異Bertrand競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)下質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策問(wèn)題。 (3)論證了創(chuàng)新技術(shù)應(yīng)用后,產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)需求結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響。按照市場(chǎng)需求假設(shè)為線性市場(chǎng)需求、logit市場(chǎng)需求,分析不同市場(chǎng)需求條件下的質(zhì)量提高型創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策問(wèn)題,并且討論了許可方為同時(shí)參與市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的內(nèi)部創(chuàng)新者時(shí)的技術(shù)許可決策問(wèn)題。其中,logit需求框架下的分析使得考慮新品牌產(chǎn)品相對(duì)于替代者的相對(duì)吸引力、邊際成本、產(chǎn)品差異水平以及消費(fèi)者偏好的差異對(duì)于創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響成為可能。 (4)研究了耐用品在縱向一體化結(jié)構(gòu)情況下的創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可相關(guān)決策問(wèn)題。分析了創(chuàng)新產(chǎn)品是耐用品時(shí),壟斷市場(chǎng)結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)于創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響。在前人研究的基礎(chǔ)上,結(jié)合上下游縱向獨(dú)立產(chǎn)業(yè)和產(chǎn)品耐用性的分析思路,重點(diǎn)討論了上游原料供應(yīng)市場(chǎng)不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng),即存在壟斷勢(shì)力時(shí),下游兩階段耐用品獨(dú)占?jí)艛鄰S商的質(zhì)量提高型和成本降低型技術(shù)創(chuàng)新激勵(lì),以及在此背景下外部創(chuàng)新者的最優(yōu)許可方式的選擇問(wèn)題。由于完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界中不可能也從來(lái)沒(méi)有存在過(guò),不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)條件下的技術(shù)許可決策分析更具有現(xiàn)實(shí)意義。 (5)論證了信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)性對(duì)創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可決策的影響。由產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新者對(duì)創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的創(chuàng)新規(guī)模,及技術(shù)應(yīng)用者對(duì)創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的應(yīng)用價(jià)值,擁有私有信息而產(chǎn)生的產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)的產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量信息不對(duì)稱(chēng),以及技術(shù)創(chuàng)新市場(chǎng)價(jià)值信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)情況下的技術(shù)許可決策比較分析,尋求信息不對(duì)稱(chēng)條件下的技術(shù)許可混同均衡、分離均衡以及對(duì)應(yīng)的最優(yōu)許可策略。 (6)提出了不確定性條件下產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新技術(shù)許可相關(guān)的決策模型。分析新產(chǎn)品研發(fā)不確定性條件下同時(shí)考慮研發(fā)、事前許可、事后許可以及政府補(bǔ)貼的博弈模型,討論了研發(fā)產(chǎn)品的差異性以及研發(fā)過(guò)程中的技術(shù)溢出效應(yīng)對(duì)于不確定條件下政府研發(fā)補(bǔ)貼的影響。基于期權(quán)博弈建立了新產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新面臨的市場(chǎng)需求不確定條件下的技術(shù)許可決策模型。
[Abstract]:For a long time, domestic and foreign scholars on the influencing factors of economic growth has carried out empirical research, a large number of results show that with the passage of time, the role of technological progress in economic growth is increasing, and gradually replaced the input of production factors in the economic growth in the leading position. To maintain China's sustained and rapid economic growth and we must strengthen efforts in technological progress, change the mode of economic growth, improve the ability of technological innovation, economic growth and gradually realize the transition from factor driven to innovation driven. Knowledge and technology innovation and creative applications increasingly become the era of knowledge economy and technology progress, economic and social development impetus innovation indicators to measure the level of. Created especially for the patent invention patents, and has become a key factor in use, an enterprise and even a country to obtain the advantage in the competition. However, not Optimistic is that the patent conversion rate was not significantly increased, a large number of patent applications do not become "sleeping patents", the transformation of scientific and technological achievements into productive forces. To change the gap between science and technology and the economic situation thoroughly, weak ability of science and technology into practical productive forces, give full play an important role in promoting the knowledge and technology transformation in the mode of economic growth, need to actively study and explore the technology of our country market and the transformation of scientific and technological achievements.
Technology licensing is one of the main forms of technology trading in the technology market, is an important means of technology factor mobility, but also give full play to the main path leading technology strength of its economy. How to determine the price of contract transfer technology is the core technology licensing decision. Therefore, with the innovation based market competition intense, continue to strengthen the rapid technological upgrading of the world and within the scope of protection of intellectual property rights in many industries, technology transfer and diffusion process, technology licensing will inevitably play an increasingly important role. The technology licensing price decision process is very complicated and difficult. The price decision behavior of technology licensing for both to improve the enterprise, universities and other market players technology transaction efficiency, promote scientific and technological achievements into practical productive forces, improve the technology innovation for The contribution of economic growth, or the depth and breadth of the theory of expanding the theory of licensing contracts, is of certain value.
This product innovation licensing strategy theory, is to consider the related technology licensing and product innovation activities of the government, developers, Licensor, Licensee and consumer decision-making body, acquisition mode for product innovation licensing related technology, market competition structure, demand structure, product durability, information asymmetry, technology licensing decision model the system of industrial organization framework under uncertainty. Among them, product innovation is an important type of technological innovation, practical data show that the product innovation in technology innovation occupies a large proportion in the new. The main work of this paper is as follows:
(1) a comparative analysis of the strategy of acquiring enterprise innovation technology. Aiming at the problem of obtaining the real economy innovation technology, firstly using the game model including the innovation and output stage analysis of cooperative innovation mode; then constructs the game model including the innovation, licensing and output stage, and according to the model focus on comparative analysis of the mode of technology licensing; the comparative analysis of the enterprise technology innovation strategy of getting better.
(2) on the quality of the oligopoly market structure and improve the innovative technology licensing decision. According to the typical oligopoly market structure Cournot (Cournot) market, Stackelberg (Steinberg), Bertrand (Bo Chuande) market structure, are discussed under different market structure to improve the quality of innovative technology licensing decision problem. The behavior of innovation technology licensing products are influenced by the structure of the market, considering the static and dynamic game model based on output competition, and to compare the different market structures of fixed fee licensing, licensing, licensing two market equilibrium, and the corresponding optimal licensing decision and the consumer surplus and social surplus. At the same time, discusses the quality structure difference Bertrand product market competition to improve innovative technology licensing decision problems.
(3) demonstrates the application of innovative technology, product market demand structure to improve the quality of influence of innovative technology licensing decision. According to the market demand is assumed to be linear logit market demand, market demand, quality analysis of different market demand under the condition of improving innovation technology licensing decision problem, and discussed the Licensor for licensing decision problems at the same time to participate in the market competition inside innovators. Among them, logit demand analysis under the framework of the consideration of the new brand products relative to the attractiveness of alternatives marginal cost, differences in the level of product differentiation and consumer preferences for innovative technology licensing decision possible.
(4) research on innovative technology licensing related decision problems of durable goods in the vertical integration of the structure. The analysis of innovative products are durable goods, influence of monopoly market structure to the innovation of technology licensing decision. On the basis of previous studies, combined with the analysis of the longitudinal independent industry and product durability, focus on the upstream raw material supply market is not perfectly competitive, namely the existence of monopoly power, downstream of the two stage quality durable goods monopoly manufacturers improve the type and cost reducing technology innovation incentive, selection of optimal licensing and external innovation under the background of the competition. Due to completely impossible in the real world has never existed. Technology licensing, decision analysis of incomplete market conditions is more practical significance.
(5) demonstrates the impact of information asymmetry on innovation of technology licensing decision. By the innovator of products of innovation innovation scale, application value and application of innovative technology, product quality information asymmetry product innovation technology which has private information, comparative analysis of technology licensing decision and technology innovation market value of information asymmetry under the condition of seeking under the condition of asymmetric information technology licensing pooling equilibrium separating equilibrium and the corresponding optimal licensing strategy.
(6) this paper proposes a decision model related to product innovation technology licensing under uncertainty analysis. The research and development of new products under uncertainty and consider the development, prior permission, after the game model permit and government subsidies, discusses the technology spillover effect of differences in product research and development process for the uncertain impact of government R & D the subsidy conditions. Based on option game built facing new product innovation and market demand uncertainty decision-making model under the condition of technology licensing.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：華北電力大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：博士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F124.3

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