本文選題：“招拍掛”　切入點(diǎn)：地方政府　出處：《華中科技大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：無(wú)論是在短期經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)還是長(zhǎng)期經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)領(lǐng)域，投資在宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)中有著重要的作用。與發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家、發(fā)展中國(guó)家和世界平均水平相比，我國(guó)的資本形成率都嚴(yán)重偏高。土地“招拍掛”實(shí)施一方面使土地價(jià)格快速上漲，直接影響著廠商的投資決策，，另一方面地方政府的收入增加，而地方政府無(wú)論出于政治還是經(jīng)濟(jì)利益都將加強(qiáng)對(duì)地方投資的干預(yù)，也間接影響著廠商的投資行為。 本文分析土地“招拍掛”制度對(duì)總量投資的影響機(jī)制，簡(jiǎn)單分析了政府的投資行為，并按國(guó)有和非國(guó)有兩種廠商的性質(zhì)分類，運(yùn)用數(shù)理模型重點(diǎn)分析了兩種類型廠商在此背景下的行為�！罢信膾臁敝贫仁沟胤秸杖朐黾樱瑢⒓哟笸顿Y，并有效地帶動(dòng)了企業(yè)投資，從而表現(xiàn)為總投資量上升，這種效應(yīng)在我國(guó)東、中和西部沒(méi)有明顯的差異。實(shí)證結(jié)果也表明，地方政府的從以前的政策支持投資，到對(duì)投資的直接拉動(dòng)，并沒(méi)有改變總量投資的結(jié)構(gòu)，也即總量投資中國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)投資占比并沒(méi)有明顯的變化。 從擴(kuò)大投資的角度來(lái)講，政府對(duì)投資的激勵(lì)作用，相比于隱性的支持，運(yùn)用市場(chǎng)機(jī)制的公開(kāi)引導(dǎo)更加有效，并且這種引導(dǎo)行為不會(huì)對(duì)區(qū)域投資差距產(chǎn)生負(fù)面的影響，投資結(jié)構(gòu)中的國(guó)有經(jīng)濟(jì)投資占全社會(huì)總投資的比重也不會(huì)有明顯上升。我國(guó)目前的資本形成率已經(jīng)很高，而土地“招拍掛”制度的實(shí)施使其更進(jìn)一步地走高，這不利于經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)的調(diào)整，因此，惟有限制地方政府對(duì)土地收入的支配權(quán)才能解決該問(wèn)題。
[Abstract]:Investment plays an important role in both short-term economic fluctuations and long-term economic growth.Compared with the developed countries, developing countries and the world average, China's capital formation rate is on the high side.On the one hand, land prices rise rapidly, which directly affects the investment decisions of manufacturers; on the other hand, local governments' income increases.The local government will strengthen the intervention in the local investment both for political and economic benefit, and indirectly affect the investment behavior of the firms.This paper analyzes the influence mechanism of the land "bidding system" on the total investment, and simply analyzes the government's investment behavior, and classifies it according to the nature of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.The mathematical model is used to analyze the behavior of two types of manufacturers in this context.The system of "recruitment, auction and hanging" will increase the local government's income, increase the investment, and effectively promote the enterprise's investment, thus the total investment quantity will increase. This effect has no obvious difference in the east, middle and west of our country.The empirical results also show that the structure of the total investment has not changed from the previous policies to the direct pull of the local government, that is, the proportion of the total investment in the state-owned economy has not changed significantly.From the angle of expanding investment, the incentive function of the government to investment is more effective than the implicit support, and the public guidance of market mechanism is more effective, and this kind of guidance behavior will not have a negative impact on the regional investment gap.Investment structure in the state-owned economy investment in the total investment in the whole society will not have a significant increase.The current capital formation rate in China is already very high, and the implementation of the land "recruitment, shooting and hanging" system makes it go further higher, which is not conducive to the adjustment of the economic structure.The problem can only be solved by restricting the local government's power to control land income.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：華中科技大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F301;F124

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1 李名良;土地“招拍掛”對(duì)投資總額及其結(jié)構(gòu)的影響[D];華中科技大學(xué);2013年

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