【摘要】：承銷商聲譽(yù)與上市公司IPO盈余管理分別是金融學(xué)與會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)研究的熱點(diǎn),它們之間存在一定的聯(lián)系。然而長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)者卻將這二者區(qū)分在兩個(gè)獨(dú)立的領(lǐng)域內(nèi)研究。伴隨著經(jīng)濟(jì)飛速增長(zhǎng)和資本市場(chǎng)的不斷完善,我國(guó)證券發(fā)行市場(chǎng)IPO審核制度從最早的行政審批制到當(dāng)前核準(zhǔn)制下的保薦制先后經(jīng)歷了四個(gè)階段,新股發(fā)行審核制度的市場(chǎng)化程度逐步提高。在證券市場(chǎng)改革不斷向前推進(jìn)的浪潮中,承銷商等金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)在新股發(fā)行中扮演著非常重要的角色,越來(lái)越多的人開(kāi)始關(guān)注承銷商作為上市公司IPO過(guò)程中重要的金融中介之一到底發(fā)揮著怎樣的作用,在當(dāng)前保薦制度下承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的有效性又如何。本文將承銷商聲譽(yù)與上市公司IPO盈余管理結(jié)合起來(lái),從承銷商聲譽(yù)的角度出發(fā)研究承銷商對(duì)上市公司IPO盈余管理程度的影響,以期為我國(guó)承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制建設(shè)提供有益的建議和決策依據(jù)。 本文首先系統(tǒng)地分類回顧了承銷商聲譽(yù)、上市公司IPO盈余管理以及二者的聯(lián)系的國(guó)內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻(xiàn)。在此基礎(chǔ)上理論分析了承銷商聲譽(yù)的作用,并用博弈模型解釋了承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制的形成機(jī)理,同時(shí)介紹了盈余管理的定義、分析了盈余管理的理論基礎(chǔ)以及歸納了盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)；然后進(jìn)-步探討承銷商聲譽(yù)對(duì)上市公司IPO盈余管理的影響并就此提出本文的假設(shè)；最后本文定義了模型的相關(guān)變量,尤其是承銷商聲譽(yù)與盈余管理程度的度量,并選取2009年9月30日—2011年12月31日之間在創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市的283家上市公司為研究樣本,采用描述性統(tǒng)計(jì)、單變量檢驗(yàn)、相關(guān)性分析及多元線性回歸的方法驗(yàn)證二者的關(guān)系,并在此基礎(chǔ)上做出進(jìn)一步分析。 研究結(jié)果表明,承銷商聲譽(yù)與上市公司IPO盈余管理程度呈負(fù)相關(guān),但是這種關(guān)系在統(tǒng)計(jì)上不顯著,我國(guó)現(xiàn)階段承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制較為弱化。方面,承銷商并未充分發(fā)揮事后的緩解作用,盡管對(duì)上市公司的盈余管理行為有一定的抑制作用,但這種作用非常的有限；另一方面,在承銷商聲譽(yù)機(jī)制不健全的情況下,承銷商聲譽(yù)未能成為發(fā)行企業(yè)事前信號(hào)顯示的載體。
[Abstract]:The reputation of underwriters and IPO earnings management of listed companies are hot topics in finance and accounting, and there are some relations between them. However, for a long time, domestic scholars have distinguished the two in two independent fields. With the rapid economic growth and the continuous improvement of the capital market, the IPO auditing system of China's securities issuance market has experienced four stages from the earliest administrative examination and approval system to the recommendation system under the current approval system. The degree of marketization of the new issue audit system has been gradually improved. In the wave of securities market reform, underwriters and other financial intermediaries play a very important role in issuing new shares. More and more people have begun to pay attention to the role of underwriters as one of the important financial intermediaries in the IPO process of listed companies and how effective the underwriter reputation mechanism is under the current recommendation system. This paper combines underwriter reputation with IPO earnings management of listed companies, and studies the influence of underwriters on IPO earnings management degree of listed companies from the perspective of underwriter reputation. In order to provide useful suggestions and decision basis for the construction of underwriter reputation mechanism in China. Firstly, this paper systematically reviews the domestic and foreign literature on underwriter reputation, IPO earnings management of listed companies and the relationship between them. On this basis, this paper theoretically analyzes the role of underwriter reputation, explains the formation mechanism of underwriter reputation mechanism with game model, and introduces the definition of earnings management. This paper analyzes the theoretical basis of earnings management and induces the motivation of earnings management, then further discusses the influence of underwriter reputation on IPO earnings management of listed companies and puts forward the hypothesis of this paper. Finally, this paper defines the relevant variables of the model. Especially, the measurement of underwriter reputation and earnings management degree, and 283 listed companies listed on the gem from September 30, 2009 to December 31, 2011 are selected as the research samples, using descriptive statistics and univariate test. Correlation analysis and multivariate linear regression were used to verify the relationship and further analysis was made. The results show that there is a negative correlation between underwriter reputation and IPO earnings management, but this relationship is not statistically significant, and the underwriter reputation mechanism is weaker in China at present. On the other hand, the underwriters do not give full play to the mitigation effect after the event. Although they can inhibit the earnings management behavior of listed companies to some extent, this effect is very limited. On the other hand, when the underwriter reputation mechanism is not perfect, Underwriter reputation failed to become the carrier of prior signal display for issuers.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：安徽財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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