發(fā)布時間：2018-06-23 08:20

  本文選題：上市公司 + 薪酬　； 參考：《沈陽理工大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文

【摘要】：有關(guān)上市公司高級管理者的激勵問題一直都備受實業(yè)界和理論界的關(guān)注。近年來，我國逐漸加強了薪酬激勵問題的治理，并將完善薪酬制度的有關(guān)問題作為建立公司治理最為重要的目標(biāo)之一。幾年來，在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)治理機制中，由委托代理關(guān)系引發(fā)的股東和高管目標(biāo)不一致問題越發(fā)的嚴(yán)重，這不只體現(xiàn)在主板上市公司中，在剛剛上市不久的中小板上市公司中也有所反映。2008年金融危機之后，相比全球，中國經(jīng)濟率先顯露出復(fù)蘇跡象。對于中小板上市公司而言，這次席卷全球的金融危機既是一場挑戰(zhàn)，，也意味著一次機遇。隨著國際經(jīng)濟形勢的好轉(zhuǎn)和我國一系列刺激需求政策的出臺，預(yù)計我國中小板上市公司的外部環(huán)境將逐漸趨好，這將十分有助于中小板公司的持續(xù)發(fā)展。因此本文從中小板上市公司高管薪酬影響因素的角度切入，進行實證研究，進而為中小板上市公司的薪酬激勵機制提出相關(guān)建議，希望促使企業(yè)高管朝著股東期望的目標(biāo)前進。 在論文結(jié)構(gòu)安排上，本文首先回顧了國內(nèi)外相關(guān)文獻，立足于委托代理理論、人力資本理論、公司治理理論、產(chǎn)權(quán)理論和公平理論，并結(jié)合國內(nèi)外相關(guān)研究成果從高管個人特征、公司特征、公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)以及行業(yè)環(huán)境四個方面對高管薪酬的影響因素進行了分析，并在此基礎(chǔ)之上，提出了本研究的假設(shè)模型。隨后，選取我國中小板上市公司中的101家符合要求的上市公司2009年—2011年連續(xù)3年共303個樣本公司為研究對象，運用統(tǒng)計軟件SPSS17.0進行了實證研究，共研究了11個變量對高管薪酬的影響。得出中小板上市公司高管薪酬與公司規(guī)模變量和公司業(yè)績變量呈顯著的正相關(guān)關(guān)系；與高管持股比例變量、股權(quán)集中度變量和公司成長性變量呈顯著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系。最后，針對實證研究結(jié)果為中小板上市公司高管薪酬激勵機制提出對策建議。
[Abstract]:The incentive problem of senior managers of listed companies has always been concerned by the industry and theoretical circles. In recent years, China has gradually strengthened the governance of compensation incentive, and regard the improvement of compensation system as one of the most important objectives of establishing corporate governance. In recent years, in the modern corporate governance mechanism, the problem of inconsistent goals between shareholders and executives caused by principal-agent relationship has become more and more serious, which is not only reflected in the main board listed companies. It is also reflected in the recent listing of small and medium-sized companies. After the 2008 financial crisis, China's economy was the first to show signs of recovery compared with the global economy. For small and medium-sized listed companies, the global financial crisis is both a challenge and an opportunity. With the improvement of the international economic situation and the introduction of a series of policies to stimulate the demand, it is expected that the external environment of the small and medium-sized board listed companies will gradually improve, which will be very helpful to the sustainable development of the small and medium-sized board companies. Therefore, this paper from the perspective of the factors affecting the executive compensation of small and medium board listed companies, empirical research, and then for the small and medium board listed companies pay incentive mechanism to put forward relevant recommendations, hoping to promote corporate executives toward the goal of shareholders' expectations. In the structure of the thesis, this paper first reviews the relevant literature at home and abroad, based on the principal-agent theory, human capital theory, corporate governance theory, property rights theory and equity theory. Combined with domestic and foreign related research results from the personal characteristics of executives corporate governance structure and the industry environment four aspects of the impact of executive compensation factors were analyzed and on the basis of this the hypothetical model of this study was put forward. Then, we select the 101 listed companies which meet the requirements of the small and medium board listed companies in our country from 2009 to 2011, and use SPSS 17.0 to carry out the empirical research, which consists of 303 sample companies for three consecutive years from 2009 to 2011. This paper studies the effect of 11 variables on executive compensation. It is concluded that executive compensation has a significant positive correlation with company size variables and corporate performance variables, and has a significant negative correlation with executive shareholding ratio variables, equity concentration variables and corporate growth variables. Finally, the empirical research results for small and medium-sized listed companies executive compensation incentive mechanism proposed countermeasures.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：沈陽理工大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號】：F272.92;F832.51

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