本文選題：董事會(huì)監(jiān)管　切入點(diǎn)：高管變更　出處：《湖南大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：近年來(lái)，隨著我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)規(guī)模越來(lái)越大，國(guó)內(nèi)上市公司高管人員變更的大量發(fā)生，越來(lái)越受到債權(quán)人、股東等利益相關(guān)者的關(guān)注。高管變更是公司內(nèi)外部共同治理的結(jié)果，能夠識(shí)別并撤換業(yè)績(jī)不佳的高管被視為公司治理機(jī)制有效與否的重要標(biāo)識(shí)之一。同時(shí)多數(shù)上市公司無(wú)論出于什么動(dòng)機(jī)，都無(wú)法避免地從事盈余管理行為。作為公司管理的一部分，盈余管理行為很大程度是上市公司高管人員權(quán)衡利弊后而做出的選擇。同時(shí)在新的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則頒布后，盈余管理行為愈發(fā)成為公司關(guān)注的焦點(diǎn)。此外，我國(guó)公司內(nèi)部治理的核心部門董事會(huì)是決策公司高管人員變更和盈余管理行為監(jiān)督關(guān)鍵因素，但是我國(guó)上市公司普遍存在著董事會(huì)監(jiān)管機(jī)制不完善，導(dǎo)致公司委托代理問(wèn)題突出，盈余管理問(wèn)題無(wú)法得到抑制。因此，盈余管理已成為國(guó)內(nèi)外研究熱點(diǎn)問(wèn)題。 本文根據(jù)國(guó)泰安數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中披露的高管變更信息，使用中國(guó)上市公司2008-2011年數(shù)據(jù)，，檢驗(yàn)不同公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)下高管人員變更帶來(lái)的盈余管理行為，探索我國(guó)上市公司董事會(huì)監(jiān)管，高管變更與盈余管理三者的相關(guān)關(guān)系，并提出相關(guān)建議。第一章對(duì)已有的關(guān)于盈余管理，高管變更及董事會(huì)監(jiān)管三者關(guān)系的文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行綜述；然后第二章闡述高管變更的理論基礎(chǔ)，董事會(huì)監(jiān)管的理論基礎(chǔ)和盈余管理行為的理論基礎(chǔ)并且介紹了董事會(huì)監(jiān)管的四個(gè)特征手段、高管變更的機(jī)制以及盈余管理的定義、手段和計(jì)量方法，為下一章進(jìn)行機(jī)理分析做出鋪墊；其次第三章運(yùn)用規(guī)范分析研究了董事會(huì)監(jiān)管對(duì)高管變更的影響和高管變更對(duì)盈余管理的影響以及董事會(huì)監(jiān)管下高管變更產(chǎn)生的盈余管理行為的影響分析。最后在介紹本文的數(shù)據(jù)篩選情況后，運(yùn)用Spss軟件，通過(guò)多元回歸分析和二元Logistic回歸分析進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析，檢驗(yàn)了本文的研究假設(shè)，進(jìn)一步考察了董事會(huì)監(jiān)管機(jī)制對(duì)高管變更發(fā)生時(shí)產(chǎn)生的盈余管理行為的影響，并根據(jù)研究結(jié)果提出對(duì)于規(guī)范我國(guó)盈余管理治理的對(duì)策和建議，主要包括加強(qiáng)盈余管理行為的事后監(jiān)督，完善董事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)，加強(qiáng)會(huì)計(jì)制度建設(shè)，為完善上市公司內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)提供補(bǔ)充性的理論依據(jù)。 實(shí)證結(jié)果表明：（1)高管變更與盈余管理行為呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，說(shuō)明公司高管人員發(fā)生變更的當(dāng)年有調(diào)減利潤(rùn)的行為；（2)董事會(huì)監(jiān)管制度的四個(gè)特征手段中，董事會(huì)規(guī)模小、獨(dú)立董事比例高以及董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理兩職分離時(shí)與盈余管理呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，證明這三者對(duì)高管變更發(fā)生所帶來(lái)的盈余管理行為起到抑制作用；（3)董事會(huì)會(huì)議越多、董事長(zhǎng)和總經(jīng)理兩職分離與公司高管變更正相關(guān)而董事會(huì)規(guī)模與高管變更呈負(fù)相關(guān)。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the increasing scale of China's securities market, a large number of changes in senior executives of listed companies in China have been paid more and more attention by creditors, shareholders and other stakeholders. The change of executives is the result of common governance inside and outside the company. The ability to identify and replace underperforming executives is seen as an important indicator of the effectiveness of corporate governance. As a part of company management, earnings management behavior is to a large extent a choice made by executives of listed companies after weighing the pros and cons. At the same time, after the promulgation of the new accounting standards, In addition, the board of directors, the core department of corporate governance, is the key factor of the change of executives and the supervision of earnings management behavior. However, the listed companies in our country generally have imperfect supervision mechanism of the board of directors, which leads to the outstanding problem of principal-agent and the problem of earnings management. Therefore, earnings management has become a hot issue at home and abroad. According to the information of executive change disclosed in Cathay Pacific database, this paper uses the 2008-2011 data of listed companies in China to test the earnings management behavior caused by the change of senior executives in different corporate governance structures. To explore the relationship among board supervision, executive change and earnings management of listed companies in China, and put forward relevant suggestions. Chapter 1 summarizes the existing literature on the relationship among earnings management, executive change and board supervision; Then the second chapter describes the theoretical basis of executive change, the theoretical basis of board of directors supervision and earnings management behavior, and introduces the four characteristic means of board of directors supervision, the mechanism of executive change and the definition of earnings management. Means and measurement methods, for the next chapter for mechanism analysis to make the groundwork; The third chapter uses normative analysis to study the impact of board supervision on executive change, the impact of executive change on earnings management, and the impact of executive change on earnings management behavior under board supervision. After introducing the data filtering in this article, With the help of Spss software, this paper tests the hypothesis of this paper through multiple regression analysis and binary Logistic regression analysis, and further investigates the influence of the board of directors' supervision mechanism on earnings management behavior when executives change. Based on the results of the study, the author puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions for regulating the governance of earnings management in China, including strengthening the supervision of earnings management, perfecting the structure of the board of directors, and strengthening the construction of accounting system. To improve the internal governance structure of listed companies to provide complementary theoretical basis. The empirical results show that: 1) there is a negative correlation between executive change and earnings management behavior, which indicates that the board of directors is small among the four characteristic means of the board of directors supervision system. The high proportion of independent directors and the negative correlation between the separation of chairman and general manager and earnings management prove that these three factors play a restraining role in earnings management behavior brought about by the change of executives. The separation of chairman and general manager is positively related to the change of executives, while the size of board of directors is negatively correlated with the change of executives.
【學(xué)位授予單位】：湖南大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類號(hào)】：F275;F832.51

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