本文關(guān)鍵詞： 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu) 公司價(jià)值 博弈論　出處：《南京大學(xué)》2013年碩士論文　論文類(lèi)型：學(xué)位論文

【摘要】：公司所有活動(dòng)以?xún)r(jià)值創(chuàng)造為核心,并以實(shí)現(xiàn)公司價(jià)值最大化為目的,而公司價(jià)值卻受多方面因素的影響。股東作為公司的締造者,對(duì)公司擁有不可辯駁的所有權(quán)和控制權(quán),股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)決定了股東內(nèi)部利益格局和股東整體對(duì)管理層的監(jiān)督和控制能力,進(jìn)而會(huì)對(duì)公司績(jī)效和公司價(jià)值產(chǎn)生影響�，F(xiàn)在公司制度下,公司所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)分離使得股東與管理層間的利益矛盾尖銳,大股東利用其控制權(quán)侵占小股東權(quán)益、損害公司價(jià)值的問(wèn)題也十分突出,所以股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)究竟如何影響公司價(jià)值一直備受學(xué)術(shù)界關(guān)注。 在股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)如何影響公司價(jià)值問(wèn)題上,由于研究方法和樣本選擇的差異性,國(guó)內(nèi)外學(xué)者在理論和實(shí)證研究上都尚未得出較為一致的結(jié)論。本文選取博弈論獨(dú)特視角,利用博弈模型在理論上依次對(duì)股東與管理層之間、大股東與小股東之間、相對(duì)控股股東之間的利益斗爭(zhēng)進(jìn)行闡述,并分析不同的博弈結(jié)果對(duì)公司價(jià)值產(chǎn)生何種影響。在實(shí)證方面,選擇滬深兩市上市公司為樣本,采取公司相對(duì)行業(yè)ROA和ROE兩大績(jī)效指標(biāo)來(lái)描述公司價(jià)值,兼顧第一大股東持股比例和股權(quán)性質(zhì)的同時(shí),利用統(tǒng)計(jì)回歸方法依次分析在絕對(duì)控股、相對(duì)控股、分散控股公司中股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)如何影響公司價(jià)值。 本文在理論分析和實(shí)證研究的基礎(chǔ)之上,得出以下三大結(jié)論：第一,在絕對(duì)控股和分散持股公司中,第一大股東持股比例增加有助于公司價(jià)值提升；第二,在絕對(duì)控股公司中,相較于國(guó)有股,一般境內(nèi)法人股對(duì)提升公司價(jià)值有積極作用；第三,在相對(duì)控股公司中,增強(qiáng)對(duì)第一大股東的股權(quán)制衡有利于提高公司價(jià)值。
[Abstract]:All activities of the company to create value as the core, and to achieve the maximization of corporate value for the purpose and value of the company is affected by many factors. The shareholders as the company's founder, the company has ownership and control irrefutable, ownership structure determines the pattern of interests of shareholders and the overall supervision and control of the the management ability, which will affect the performance of the company and the value of the company. Now the company system, the separation of ownership and control of the interest conflicts between shareholders and management of the sharp, big shareholders using their control rights and interests of small shareholders, damage the value of the company is also very prominent, so on how the ownership structure influences the value of the company has attracted academic attention.
In the ownership structure how to influence the value of the company, due to differences in research methods and sample selection of domestic and foreign scholars in the theoretical and empirical studies have not reached consistent conclusions. This paper selects the unique perspective of game theory, the game model in theory of shareholder and management, between large shareholders and small shareholders the struggle between the interests of shareholders, holding relatively elaborate and analyze the different game results affect the value of the company. In the empirical analysis, select the Shanghai and Shenzhen two listed companies as samples, take the company relative to industry ROA and ROE two performance indicators to describe the value of the company, taking into account the proportion of the first shareholder and equity nature at the same time using statistical regression method, followed by the analysis of the relative holding in absolute holding, holding company, dispersed ownership structure how to affect the value of the company.
In this paper, based on the theoretical analysis and empirical research, draw the following three conclusions: first, in absolute controlling and dispersion of the Holding Company, the proportion of the first largest shareholder increase will help enhance the value of the company; second, in absolute holding companies, compared with the state-owned shares, a domestic legal person shares has a positive effect on promoting the company third, in the relative value; holding company, to enhance the first major shareholders to improve corporate value.

【學(xué)位授予單位】：南京大學(xué)
【學(xué)位級(jí)別】：碩士
【學(xué)位授予年份】：2013
【分類(lèi)號(hào)】：F275;F224.32;F832.51

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