發(fā)布時間：2019-02-13 20:57

【摘要】：本文以中國A股上市公司2006—2015年數(shù)據(jù)為樣本,結(jié)合產(chǎn)品市場競爭實證研究公司管理層權(quán)力對現(xiàn)金持有競爭效應(yīng)的影響。研究發(fā)現(xiàn),管理層權(quán)力弱化了公司現(xiàn)金持有競爭效應(yīng),而產(chǎn)品市場競爭對管理層權(quán)力之于現(xiàn)金持有競爭效應(yīng)的負向作用有一定的抑制效果。進一步研究管理層權(quán)力弱化公司現(xiàn)金持有競爭效應(yīng)的渠道發(fā)現(xiàn),管理層權(quán)力在加劇公司高額持有現(xiàn)金導(dǎo)致發(fā)生在職消費和過度投資行為的同時,降低了研發(fā)投入,而產(chǎn)品市場競爭能夠抑制這種在職消費和過度投資行為。上述結(jié)論不僅補充和豐富了現(xiàn)金持有競爭效應(yīng)的相關(guān)研究,也為鼓勵市場競爭以監(jiān)督管理層行為和提高公司現(xiàn)金持有的戰(zhàn)略價值提供了參考。
[Abstract]:Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2015, this paper studies the effect of management power on cash holding competition in combination with product market competition. It is found that the power of management weakens the competitive effect of cash holding, while the competition of product market has a certain inhibitory effect on the negative effect of management power on the competition effect of cash holding. Further study on the channels through which management power weakens the competitive effect of corporate cash holding finds that management power not only increases the high level of cash holding in the company, but also reduces R & D investment while leading to on-the-job consumption and overinvestment. And product market competition can restrain this kind of on-the-job consumption and excessive investment behavior. This conclusion not only complements and enriches the research on the competitive effect of cash holding, but also provides a reference for encouraging market competition to supervise management behavior and improve the strategic value of cash holding.
【作者單位】： 石河子大學(xué)經(jīng)濟與管理學(xué)院;
【基金】：國家自然科學(xué)基金項目“制度背景、行業(yè)特征與公司現(xiàn)金持有競爭效應(yīng)”(71362004)
【分類號】：F272.91;F275;F832.51

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