【摘要】：高管薪酬作為公司治理的一項重要機制,一直備受學術界和政府部門的高度關注。自從2008年美國次貸危機爆發(fā)后,高管高額薪酬引起了廣泛關注,公司業(yè)績下降而高管薪酬不降反升的現(xiàn)象受到社會激烈的抨擊,直接導致各種版本的“限薪令”出臺。然而,政府薪酬管制能否有效地提高高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度?是應該由政府對國有企業(yè)高管進行薪酬管制還是讓市場決定薪酬?本文從市場化進程視角研究政府薪酬管制對國有企業(yè)高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度的影響,以期為改善國有企業(yè)高管薪酬的激勵效果和完善國有企業(yè)高管薪酬激勵制度提供理論參考和經(jīng)驗依據(jù)。本文采用理論分析與實證研究結合的方法,對薪酬管制背景下國有上市公司的高管薪酬與企業(yè)績效之間的關系進行研究。全文共分五個章節(jié)。第一章是緒論,首先闡述本文的研究背景與意義、研究內(nèi)容和研究方法,提出本文的創(chuàng)新點和研究框架。第二章主要對相關文獻進行回顧。第三章運用委托代理理論、最優(yōu)契約理論、管理層權力理論對高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度進行理論分析。通過理論分析提出研究假設,并根據(jù)假設設計研究模型。第四章主要是實證檢驗,首先對高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度和薪酬管制各個代理指標進行描述性統(tǒng)計分析,然后運用回歸方法對市場化進程和薪酬管制與高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度的關系進行實證檢驗。第五章總結本文主要結論,并根據(jù)實證研究結果提出對策建議以及闡述本文的不足與對未來研究展望。本文研究發(fā)現(xiàn):(1)薪酬管制會扭曲高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度;(2)市場化進程會改善薪酬管制對高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度的扭曲作用;(3)薪酬管制對中央企業(yè)高管薪酬業(yè)績敏感度的扭曲作用大于對地方國有企業(yè);(4)專業(yè)委員會的設立使公司治理機制日趨完善。依據(jù)研究結果,本文提出以下政策建議,以改善國企高管薪酬激勵制度:(1)繼續(xù)推進市場化改革,營造一個公平競爭的環(huán)境;(2)實行差異化的薪酬管制;(3)建立高管薪酬與公司業(yè)績相掛鉤的業(yè)績考核制度;(4)繼續(xù)推進專業(yè)委員會的建立以完善公司內(nèi)部控制體系。
[Abstract]:As an important mechanism of corporate governance, executive compensation has been highly concerned by academia and government departments. Since the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008, high executive pay has attracted widespread concern. The phenomenon of corporate performance decline and executive pay rise instead of falling has been severely criticized by the society, which directly led to the introduction of various versions of the "pay restraint order." However, can government pay control effectively improve the performance sensitivity of executive compensation? Should the government regulate the pay of executives in state-owned enterprises or let the market determine the pay? From the perspective of market-oriented process, this paper studies the influence of government compensation regulation on the performance sensitivity of senior executives in state-owned enterprises. In order to improve the incentive effect of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises and improve the incentive system of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, this paper provides a theoretical reference and empirical basis. In this paper, the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance of state-owned listed companies under the background of salary regulation is studied by combining theoretical analysis with empirical research. The full text is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. Firstly, the research background and significance, research content and research methods are described, and the innovation and research framework of this paper are put forward. The second chapter reviews the related literature. The third chapter uses principal-agent theory, optimal contract theory and management power theory to analyze the sensitivity of executive compensation performance. The research hypothesis is put forward through theoretical analysis, and the research model is designed according to the hypothesis. The fourth chapter is the empirical test, first of all, the executive pay performance sensitivity and compensation regulation of the various proxy indicators for descriptive statistical analysis. Then the regression method is used to test the relationship between the marketization process and compensation regulation and executive compensation performance sensitivity. The fifth chapter summarizes the main conclusions of this paper and puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions according to the empirical research results as well as the shortcomings of this paper and prospects for future research. This paper finds that: (1) compensation control will distort the sensitivity of executive pay performance, (2) the process of marketization will improve the distorting effect of compensation regulation on the sensitivity of executive pay performance; (3) the effect of compensation regulation on the sensitivity of executive compensation performance in central enterprises is more than that on local state-owned enterprises; (4) the establishment of professional committees makes the corporate governance mechanism perfect day by day. Based on the results of the study, this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations to improve the executive compensation incentive system of state-owned enterprises: (1) to continue to promote market-oriented reform, to create a fair competitive environment, (2) to implement differentiated compensation control; (3) establishing the performance appraisal system that the executive compensation is linked to the company's performance; (4) continuing to promote the establishment of the professional committee in order to perfect the internal control system of the company.
【學位授予單位】：江西師范大學
【學位級別】：碩士
【學位授予年份】：2016
【分類號】：F272.92;F276.1

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